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In recognition of the role of smallholder irrigation farming in ensuring better rural 
livelihoods, the South African government has made substantial public investment in 
irrigation infrastructure. The most important perceived problems of communally-managed 
irrigation schemes in South Africa are the provision of an assured water supply and 
institutional support relating to water and land allocation, appropriate management, managing 
local conflicts and farmer participation and collective action in managing water resources. 
However, if one is to consider international standards as a yardstick, most communally-
managed irrigation schemes in South Africa are undergoing Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT), where the responsibility of managing, operating and maintaining irrigation schemes 
becomes that of the farmers instead of the state.  
 
The most critical issue, given the history of poor performance of smallholder farmers in 
South Africa, is the extent of users‟ involvement in irrigation water management. While user 
participation in water resource management is a South African and international principle, the 
question is whether smallholder farmers appreciate the importance of and possible benefits to 
be accrued from the participation. The objectives of the study were: to assess water 
governance and institutional arrangements and their effects on irrigation management in the 
Mooi River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; to assess the 
implication of institutional and management systems on water-use security; to assess the level 
of farmer participation in collective agricultural water management and the factors affecting 
users‟ willingness to do so; and, lastly, to estimate and explain the variation in average 
irrigation water values  as a basis to understand the water management challenges at 
smallholder farm level. The study used a number of data collection and analytical techniques 
to achieve the specific objectives. Participatory rural appraisals, which included focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews, and three household surveys comprising of 60, 71 
and 307 respondents were conducted to answer the specific questions. 
 
Water governance and institutional arrangements are critical in shaping the long-term 
sustainability of smallholder irrigation schemes. The Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework and Ostrom‟s eight institutional design principles were applied for 
assessing the linkages and effectiveness of institutions governing the management and use of 
irrigation water resources in the Mooi River Irrigation Scheme. The study found that water 
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user participation was hindered by farmers‟ lack of understanding of water policies that are 
driving the formalisation of local water management systems, which include the registration 
of water user associations and the requirement for farmers to contribute towards the 
sustainability of such associations. The role and relevance of water-user associations as 
formal local water governing institutions and their linkages to informal management 
structures like local irrigation committees and traditional leadership are weak and require 
farmer training to enhance coherent institutional linkages at local level. Weak regulatory 
instruments characterised by poor rule enforcement mechanisms, lack of secured property 
rights (especially for land) and lack of water security impact irrigation water management 
among smallholder farmers negatively. 
 
Irrigators in community-managed schemes have varying levels of water access. However, the 
greatest challenge in these schemes is lack of understanding of the level of water-use security 
and the influence of local management systems. As such, the study assessed the implications 
of institutional arrangements on agricultural water-use security. The study recognised the 
multifaceted nature of agricultural water-use security and therefore applied the Lancaster-
Maler model in the conceptualisation of water use at farm level.  After applying Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) to construct water-use security indices based on the desired 
attributes of irrigation water, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression technique was 
applied to identify factors affecting water use at farm level. The results show that agricultural 
water-use security can be grouped into three main dimensions, namely: physical on-farm 
availability of irrigation water, existence of effective enforcement mechanisms pertaining to 
water appropriation, and effective involvement of water users in decision-making processes. 
The study points to the fact that water-use security at farm level is relative and therefore no 
absolute measures can be applied. Furthermore, the three dimensions of agricultural water-
use security are affected by, among other things, farmers‟ experience in irrigation, household 
income, effectiveness of irrigation committees to enforce appropriation rules, membership of 
an irrigation scheme, membership of a water user association, as well as resource and cost 
sharing. To ensure improvement in agricultural water-use security among small-scale 
irrigation farmers, institutional arrangements that promote the effective participation of 
farmers in decision-making and conflict management mechanisms are recommended. This 
can be augmented by creating mechanisms that ensure equitable sharing of resources and 
costs among common pool resource users. Improving the capacity of local institutions and 
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management structures to minimise unsanctioned access to common pool resources (CPRs) 
may also improve water-use security.   
 
In line with current focus by most developing countries, including South Africa, to transfer 
management of communal irrigation schemes from state to farmers, an understanding of the 
determinants of farmer participation in collective activities forms the basis for improving the 
management of previously government-funded schemes. Empirical results of Tobit and the 
Ordered Probit models, estimated using cross-sectional data from 307 randomly selected 
smallholder irrigators, suggest that collective activities are negatively affected by low farmer-
literacy levels. Furthermore, the number of consecutive days per week that farmers go 
without access to irrigation water was used as a proxy for water scarcity, and was a 
significant determinant of farmer participation. The existing incentives for water-users in the 
Mooi River Irrigation Scheme were weak and need to be improved to encourage farmer 
participation in collective water management. This calls for strengthening of local water 
management systems and institutional policies to ensure maximum benefits from 
participating in collective activities.  
 
In a bid to understand on-farm water utilisation and management processes, water valuation 
was performed using irrigation data collected from 60 farmers over a single production cycle 
spanning the time from planting to harvesting. Furthermore, the SAPWAT 3 model was used 
to generate secondary data on irrigation water requirements for selected crops predominantly 
grown by farmers in MRIS. The residual value method was applied to both primary and 
secondary data to estimate water values and understand the factors affecting the magnitude of 
the values across irrigation plots. 
 
The results indicated that most farmers in the Mooi River Irrigation Scheme applied less 
water (average of 61.4%) to their potato crop, ranging between 14% and 174%, when 
compared to the irrigation water requirements. Crops with relatively low gross margins like 





respectively, while tomatoes yielded ZAR11.78/m
3
. Based on primary data gathered over the 
entire production cycle, the average water value for potatoes was ZAR0.50/m
3





, which were lower than that imputed from 
secondary provincial budget estimates, i.e. ZAR2.10/m
3
. This suggests poor performance by 
farmers in the study area. The variability of water value was significantly influenced by the 
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location of the irrigated plot along the main canal, which accounted for 12.5% of the 
variation. The number of irrigation cycles and education level of the farmer explained 5.8% 
and 5.9%, respectively, of the variation in average water values. The study illustrates that 
where water is provided free of charge to a large group of users, unequal distribution, poor 
management and inefficient use are the challenges commonly encountered. Negative water 
values also revealed under-performance and the potential high level of indirect government 
subsidisation of smallholder farmers, mainly through provision of irrigation infrastructure.  
 
In sum, the study has shown the complexity of managing common pool resources at a 
localized level, and pointed to the need to further understand the institutional dynamics in 
which smallholder irrigation farmers operate. In view of the parallel arrangements between 
formal and informal water management structures in communally managed schemes, it is 
recommended that the traditional authorities be incorporated in the water-user associations as 
ex-officio members and be the custodians of rule enforcement at community level. This might 
improve compliance to appropriation rules, where the traditional courts can be used 
concurrently with water user associations to settle local water disputes at community level. 
Furthermore, communally-managed irrigation schemes still lack capacity for self-
management and the negative water values signify poor performance. It is therefore 
recommended that both human and financial resources as well as technical backup still need 
to be provided through government support programmes to avoid the widespread collapse of 
communally-managed irrigation schemes in South Africa. However, such support should 
mainly be through capacity building, training and provision of expertise in irrigation 
management to enable the users to manage the scheme on their own, while putting 
mechanisms in place to ensure that irrigators pay for the maintenance of the infrastructure 
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Increasing food production through efficient utilisation of productive resources like land and 
water is a global challenge. Low resource use efficiency in agriculture is particularly 
perturbing in Sub-Saharan African countries, whose climate exposes them to the vagaries of 
nature, such as droughts, high temperatures, limited rainfall and occasionally floods (FAO, 
2012; Rampa and van Wyk, 2014). South Africa, like many other Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries, faces challenges of food insecurity and increasing poverty levels in the lower 
income households (Vink and Van-Rooyen, 2009). This is compounded by water scarcity and 
low productivity levels in critical food security sectors like smallholder agriculture 
(Backeberg, 1997; Turton, 2009). In order to improve water access for consumption and 
production purposes, the South African (SA) government embarked on a process of 
reforming the water sector post-apartheid in 1994. Although the focus of the reform process 
was driven by the scarcity of the resource, Ashton et al. (2006) highlighted that it was also 
driven by the need to redress the inequalities of previous political dispensations and to ensure 
that sufficient water supplies were made available to meet the agricultural and domestic water 
demand in communities.  
 
Key to South Africa‟s water sector reforms is the white paper of 1997, which gave rise to the 
National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) (NWA). The NWA is founded on the principle that the 
South African government has the overall responsibility for and authority over water resource 
management, including equitable allocations and beneficial use of water for the public 
interest (RSA, 1998). A number of statutory instruments, therefore, were developed to 
improve water access, for example, the National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) (DWAF, 
2004a), Policy on Financial Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers (DWAF, 2004b) 
and Water Conservation and Demand Management Strategy for the Agricultural Sector 
(DWAF, 2004c). Furthermore, the main institutions that give execution to the NWA include 
the Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs), Water User Associations (WUAs) and the 
Water Tribunal (Backeberg, 2005). While the purpose of establishing CMAs is to delegate 
water resource management to regional levels, the WUAs operate at localized or community 
level. On the other hand, the Water Tribunal is meant to handle appeals and all aspects of 
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dispute-resolution among various water users, CMAs, WUAs and any other water 
management institution (Gillitt et al., 2005). Key to the formulation of these policies and 
organizations was the realization that water was becoming scarcer within the South African 
economy, yet, according to Backeberg (2005),  the economy was moving from an 
expansionary phase of development to a maturing phase of water allocation and management.  
 
The NWA, therefore, recognises the importance of water within the agricultural sector 
(Backeberg, 2005). As such, South Africa‟s water policy reforms were aligned with the 
agricultural policy through the irrigation policy (Backeberg, 2005), which sought to create 
opportunities for smallholders and resource-poor farmers. Furthermore, South Africa‟s 
irrigation policy dwells more on revitalisation of existing schemes, development of new 
schemes, establishment of effective management institutions and improvement of water 
resource use (Backeberg, 2005). This was in response to concerns by some researchers, e.g.,  
Backeberg (1997), Bembridge (2000) and  Perret (2002), that publicly-financed irrigation 
schemes in South Africa were not performing according to expectations. This was echoed by 
Yokwe (2009) and van-Averbeke et al. (2011), who noted that most smallholder irrigation 
schemes (SISs) in South Africa have been inactive for many years. Some of the challenges 
leading to the collapse of SISs include lack of infrastructure and inappropriate planning and 
design of the irrigation schemes (Yokwe, 2009). Poor management structures, lack of 
technical knowledge and inappropriate land tenure arrangements also negatively affect the 
performance of SIS (Bembridge, 2000).  
 
However, due to continued failure of engineering approaches to address the challenges 
bedevilling the smallholder irrigation sector, Backeberg (2005) suggested that management 
of irrigation schemes should emphasis the use of institutional and economic instruments of 
balancing water demand with water supply (Backeberg, 2005). This involves the coordination 
of institutions and individuals to govern water resources and ensure long-term sustainability 
of irrigation farming and availability of water resources. However, the level of governance at 
smallholder level is determined by factors like the existence of consensus, compliance, and 
the availability of management systems, which enable, within a sustainable framework, the 
implementation and follow-up of policies (Ostrom, 2009). On the other hand, water 
institutions should have the capacity to enforce exclusivity and accountability, and ensure 
compliance to water use regulations (Ostrom, 1994). All these aspects must be attained at 
3 
 
minimal costs to minimise free-riding, hence the need for collective participation in water 
management (Dietz et al., 2003).  
 
While stakeholder participation in irrigation  management is a strong South African and 
international principle, the question of who benefits from this participation is not always clear 
(Orne-Gliemann, 2009). Some believe that participatory approaches, like Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT), reduce government bureaucracy in irrigation management 
(Vermillion, 1997). Others view IMT as a way of improving management of scheme 
infrastructure by instilling accountability and eliminating government dependency syndrome 
by the irrigators (Denison and Manona, 2007). However, from a farmers‟ perspective, it has 
been viewed as a way of cutting public expenditure on irrigation at the expense of irrigators,  
by WUAs that could pay the full operating costs of the schemes (Van der Zaag and Rap, 
2012). Several studies, for example, Chandran and Chackacherry (2004),  Bandarogoda 
(2005), Ginster et al. (2010),  Jayne et al. (2010)  and Ghazouani et al. (2012),  suggest that 
institutions that can ensure effective water management might not be adequate for most SISs 
in developing countries.  This has led to poor performance of communally owned smallholder 
schemes in Africa (Svendsen et al. 2009), consequently leading to water insecurity, poor 
farmer participation and low water productivity levels (Speelman et al., 2011). As such, 
Cleaver and Franks (2005) recommended the continuous use of ad hoc rules and 
organizations, whereas Perret (2002) called for the establishment of multi-functional 
institutions to improve management of SISs in South Africa.  
 
Although smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa are governed by both formal and 
informal institutional arrangements (IA), Orne-Gliemann (2009) argues that formalised 
institutions are needed at scheme level for small-scale users and policy makers to interact 
with each other. This comes at a time when the management of natural resources in 
developing countries is shifting from the centralised and state-driven regimes of the colonial 
periods towards decentralised and mainly community-based management regimes (Dorward 
and Omamo, 2009). In irrigation farming, the shift is influenced by the IMT and Participatory 
Irrigation Management (PIM) approaches (Perret, 2002; Perret and Geyser, 2007; Gomo et 
al., 2014a), articulated in theories of collective action (Olson, 1965) and common property 
resource management (CPRM) (Ostrom, 1990), which focus  on getting the institutions right. 
On a similar note, Gakpo et al. (2001) highlighted that water allocation in South Africa is 
more supply-side dominated, hence the establishment of CMAs and WUAs to address the 
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institutional challenges. However, according to Gakpo et al. (2001), the decision support and 
management tools for the proper functioning of the CMAs and WUAs in South Africa may 
be inadequate. This is also evidenced by the response of the South African Directorate of 
Catchment Management under the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) in 
capacity building and education of water users to enable the water management institutions to 
function effectively (Backeberg, 2005; DWAF, 2006). Considerable time is, however, 
required before the WUAs can allocate water efficiently, considering that institutional 
arrangements governing use of community water take long to adapt to changes (Nemarundwe 
and Kozanayi, 2002; Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Backeberg, 2005). 
 
Since irrigated agriculture in most countries often use the bulk portion of the harvested fresh 
water resources (DWA, 2013), this study sought to understand the embedded governance 
systems and institutional arrangements which provide incentives to use water more 
effectively and aid in the successful uptake and implementation of best water management 
practices. It must also be acknowledged that the benefits of an irrigation system depend 
mainly on the rules that govern it and the nature of production undertaken by the irrigators in 
terms of crop types, intensity of production and resource use efficiency (Hussain et al., 2009). 
The accrual of benefits are constrained by a number of factors, summarised by Dietz et al. 
(2003) as increasing human population, growing consumption and the rapid deployment of 
advanced resource-using technologies when governance institutions are absent or 
maladapted. They further argued that the way governance institutions value water informs the 
way people manage the resource; the challenge for good management lies in the mechanisms 
to devise institutional arrangements that help to improve resource access and utilisation. 
Analysis of the implications of water governance systems on South Africa‟s smallholder 
irrigation sector might improve an understanding of the dynamics of water institutions over 
time. Furthermore, the role of informal institutions, such as traditional leadership, local 
irrigation committees and individual involvement in water governance, forms an integral part 
of the IAs governing water resources in South Africa also require further scrutiny. The study 
also sought to unpack the challenges around irrigation governance systems, participation of 
irrigators in irrigation management according to the IMT approach, variations in average 
water values and water-use security at farm level, which have all been contextualized in the 





1.2 Justification for studying the smallholder irrigation sector  
 
The selection of smallholder irrigation for this study stems from the importance of the sector 
in contributing towards household food security and reducing rural poverty in South Africa 
(Oni et al., 2011), particularly in regions associated with low and erratic rainfall and high 
evaporative demand, which limits dry land crop production (Hassan, 2011). Furthermore, 
more than 60% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) live in the rural areas and 
depend on smallholder agriculture (Panin, 2010). In South Africa, the importance of 
smallholder irrigation schemes arises primarily from their location in the former homelands, 
where more than 1.3 million poor households reside (Vink and Van-Rooyen, 2009). Irrigation 
farming is, therefore, viewed as one of the strategies that can potentially contribute 
significantly to food security and income of participating households (van-Averbeke et al., 
2011; Sinyolo et al., 2014a). Of concern is the fact that agriculture (irrigation in particular) is 
the sector that uses the majority of harvested fresh water, accounting for more than 60% of 
the total water use in South Africa, yet its contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
only 3% (DWA, 2013). Nonetheless, the forward and backward linkages are important since 
agriculture provides inputs for the manufacturing / processing sector and also creates a 
demand for agricultural inputs.  
 
However, despite the substantial government investments in the establishment and 
refurbishment of smallholder irrigation schemes, some schemes faced collapse soon after the 
withdrawal of state support (Cousins, 2013). This is despite the fact that many countries, 
including South Africa, embarked on a process to transfer the management of state-managed 
irrigation systems from government agencies to water-users through IMT and PIM  policies 
(Perret, 2002; Arun et al., 2012; Gomo et al., 2014a). The rationale for IMT is to relieve the 
government of the financial burden of funding recurrent expenditures for irrigation,  improve 
the maintenance of irrigation facilities, promote a culture of self-reliance among farmers in 
irrigation schemes and enhance the productivity of irrigated land and water (Vermillion, 
1997; Hassan, 2011). The implementation of IMT in most countries confronted numerous 
challenges. For  instance, Fujiie et al. (2005) noted that service of national irrigation systems 
deteriorated after the reduction in state agencies‟ operation and maintenance activities 
because irrigators in south and southeast Asia could not meet all the costs of operation and 
maintenance from their farming activities. Similarly, smallholder irrigation schemes in South 
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Africa were planned and established following a centralised state design system (Fanadzo et 
al., 2010). High levels of dependence on government support among smallholder irrigation 
farmers, accompanied by weak local institutions, lack of information regarding farmers‟ 
production strategies, low participation, poor maintenance of infrastructure and poor 
performance when farmers are left to manage previously government-funded schemes, are 
recurrent problems in South Africa (Perret, 2002; Mnkeni et al., 2010; Fanadzo, 2012; 
Reinders et al., 2013). The aforementioned challenges of managing SISs have given rise to 
the need to explore the governance systems, institutional arrangements, water-use security, 
the level of participation in collective activities, and variability in water-use values at scheme 
level, as a basis for ensuring effective smallholder irrigation management.  
  
1.3 Problem statement 
Communal irrigation systems are such that common pool resources like land, water and 
infrastructure are the focus of efforts to organize and coordinate their activities (Ostrom, 
2000). The challenge of joint management of canal water emanates from its multiple uses and 
the high cost of excluding landowners with commandable land.  The fact that consumption is 
subtractive in the sense that water applied to one farmer‟s land is not simultaneously 
available for other plot holders makes management of canal water complex (Lecler, 2004). 
When water is scarce, congestion is likely, manifesting itself in conflict, hoarding, and yield 
reductions (Wade, 1987). It is also important to note the possibility of overuse or destruction 
of a common-pool infrastructure if its use is unregulated. The governance of community 
irrigation water and its access to members differ depending on the type and the water source 
(Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Backeberg, 2005). Drawing from several cases that attempted to 
contextualise the challenges of SISs in South Africa (Perret, 2002; Denison and Manona, 
2007; Fanadzo et al., 2010), weak participation of irrigators in water management, inadequate 
institutional structures and inappropriate land tenure arrangements were identified. 
Furthermore, the  scheme revitalisation and rehabilitation programme that aims to upgrade 
the technical, managerial and institutional arrangements of the schemes to enhance resource 
utilisation and water delivery is yielding minimal benefits (Perret, 2002; Gomo et al., 2014a). 
The programme tends to be biased towards irrigation infrastructure and technology 
improvement through scheme rehabilitation and less focus is given on addressing human 
capacity and institutional development at local level (Denison and Manona, 2007; Maepa et 
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al., 2014). The approach fails to address institutional challenges at scheme level and 
contributes to repeated failure of state-funded interventions due to perverse behaviour by 
water users (van-Averbeke et al., 2011). While several studies have scrutinised the 
implications of national water policy reforms on agriculture in South Africa, for example 
Backeberg (2005), Gillitt et al., (2005) and Reinders et al. (2013), there still exist gaps with 
regard to understanding the impact of local governance systems and various institutional 
arrangements on irrigation scheme management, which this study seeks to explore.  
 
The other aspect affecting smallholder performance in South Africa is water-use security at 
farm level. Water-use security has important economic and social impacts at both national 
and household level and contributes towards sustainable economic development (FAO, 2012; 
GWP, 2012). Its context varies widely across sectors, e.g. manufacturing, processing, 
production and domestic (Cook and Bakker, 2012), and at national level it underpins 
securities for health (through water quality), energy (through hydropower and biofuels), 
environmental (through ecological services) and food (through crop and livestock farming). 
Despite the contested definitions of water security, one commonly adopted definition of 
water security is by Grey and Sadoff (2007), who broadly defined water security as the 
availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems 
and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, 
environments and economies. The operational definition of water security used in this study 
was confined to access and use of water for agricultural purposes. In this context, agricultural 
water-use security refers to an adequate and reliable supply of water at affordable prices and 
the availability of rules and water-use rights to ensure that agricultural water needs of farmers 
are met.  GWP (2012) added that water security, or the lack of it, is felt at the household 
level, among farmers and industries, in cities, in the natural environment of river basins, and 
in communities, hence analyses, on a case-by-case basis, at international, national and local 
levels are essential.  
 
Water security is closely associated with the rules, laws and organizations managing water 
resources (Shah, 2005). Within the irrigation water sector, the institutional environment (IE) 
focuses on law, policy and administration, while the IAs focus on the operational level of 
institutions that include rules in use and structures that humans impose on their dealings with 
each other (Shah, 2005). IAs are, therefore, critical in shaping water access and consequently 
water-use security at farm and household level. Despite the substantial recurrent public 
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expenditures on the development of irrigated agriculture (Perret, 2002), there is 
dissatisfaction with the performance of irrigation projects in South Africa (Perret and Geyser, 
2007; Speelman et al., 2008). Challenges for communal irrigation schemes in South Africa 
are either technical, such as infrastructure collapse and inadequate design, or institutional, 
which includes poor management systems, lack of property rights and poor regulatory 
mechanisms at scheme and field level (Perret, 2002). While the technical issues are relatively 
easy to address, the institutional problems are recurrent. Consequently, without adequate 
institutional mechanisms to improve performance, most irrigation schemes fail to meet the 
household food security targets for which they were designed.  
 
Water-use security goes beyond just water access (Turral et al., 2010), and is one of the 
several indicators of irrigation performance at farm level (Namara et al., 2010; Hall and 
Borgomeo, 2013). While a number of studies have focused on the assessment of the 
performance of irrigation management processes using financial and engineering indicators 
(e.g. Doppler et al. (2002); Arun et al. (2012); Reinders et al. (2013); Gomo et al. (2014b)), 
limited research has dealt with the linkages between IAs and water-use security at farm level. 
Paying attention to the influence of water management systems and IAs on water security at 
farm level provides better understanding of water access issues for smallholder irrigation 
schemes in South Africa. It also provides different irrigation stakeholders, such as 
government, water suppliers and farmers, with a better understanding of how particular 
irrigation systems operate as well as identifying ways of improving performance (Bacha et 
al., 2011).  This follows some criticisms of water-security policies in most developing 
economies, which  are viewed as weak due to narrow approaches that separate biophysical 
and social processes governing water resources (Zeitoun, 2011). In South Africa, 
considerable attention has focused on irrigation infrastructure development to improve 
access, storage, regulation, movement and conservation of water (Denison and Manona, 
2007). The challenge with this approach is that institutions dealing with water allocation, 
quality, rights, pricing, asset management and service delivery have often been poorly 
developed (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). Research has shown that poor institutional arrangements 
have often led to unequal distribution of common pool resources (CPRs) (Shah et al., 2004; 
Ostrom, 2007; Rampa and van Wyk, 2014), and in the case of irrigation water, it results in 
some users being water insecure. However, quantitative measurement of water-use security 
among irrigators is a relatively new approach and builds on the existing body of literature, 
which is mainly based on qualitative analysis. 
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The reasons attributed to water insecurity at a local level include: unreliable water supply, 
lower water availability in the irrigation scheme than estimated during the allocation process, 
unexpected water demands arising from sectors other than irrigation, inappropriate 
consideration of the capacity of the water distribution system, canal breakage and 
management capacity or capability of the farmers to manage the scheduled supply (Komnenic 
et al., 2009; Hall and Borgomeo, 2013). However, from an engineering design perspective, 
most irrigation infrastructures are commissioned by experts and therefore suffice their 
command areas, if managed properly (Gomo et al., 2014a). This leaves institutional 
arrangements as the major factors possibly hindering access and agricultural water-use 
security at farm level. 
 
Due to institutional failures and lack of compliance with rules governing schemes, some 
schemes degenerate into open access resources, a problem defined by Hardin (1968) in the 
„tragedy of the commons‟ model. Hardin‟s model assumes the inability of individuals to 
cooperate to achieve outcomes superior to those achieved by individual actors. However, 
Hardin‟s theory was strongly contested by Ostrom through her Common Pool Resource 
Management theory, which was founded on  the collective action theory by Olson (1965). 
The underlying assumption about collective participation is that those who participate have a 
stake in the final outcome (Ostrom, 2010). Therefore, it can be argued that collective rules 
and agreed norms in rural communities result in preservation of CPRs by local appropriators 
(Ostrom, 1991; Ito, 2012). Canal water has a potentially high transaction cost of excluding a 
landowner with commandable land. Management even becomes more complex where users 
do not pay for the resources, and government is involved in the provision of the public good, 
a situation prevailing in most government-funded irrigation schemes in South Africa.  
 
Since 1997, the South African Government has focused on IMT of smallholder schemes from 
itself to plot holders and the rehabilitation of infrastructure (Cousins, 2013). The emphasis on 
farmer participation in irrigation water management through WUAs came as a realisation that 
most irrigation agencies (e.g., government departments, NGOs) cannot manage schemes 
efficiently without farmer support (Bacha et al., 2011).  The Mooi River Irrigation Scheme 
(MRIS) in KwaZulu-Natal Province is one of several government SISs developed in former 
homeland areas of South Africa during the apartheid era, mostly for food supply purposes. As 
noted by Perret (2002), from the early 1990s most of such schemes in South Africa faced 
serious problems and an uncertain future, owing to low yields, deteriorating infrastructure, 
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limited access to services, weak and unclear institutions regarding water and land, and lack of 
support. The need for collective participation in canal water management in MRIS is 
increasingly visible and is mandatory, unlike in the marketing of produce where farmers have 
a choice of participating or not. The assessment of farmers‟ responses to the need for 
collective management of schemes is critical. However, participation is popularly measured 
as a binary outcome, especially in market participation studies, and applying the same 
approach in irrigation management participation poses a challenge due to the multiplicity of 
activities that include infrastructure maintenance, financial contributions, decision making, 
etc. An irrigator might participate in one activity and not in another, hence better approaches 
to measure the intensity of individual participation in the wide range of activities was 
explored. 
 
The challenge confronted by smallholder irrigators is low water productivity and unequal 
sharing of the resource. Hussain et al. (2009) noted that, although most uses of water yield 
high economic returns, the lowest valued uses of water are in the production of agricultural 
crops.  Although estimates of the average value of water use are critical indicators of the 
scarcity of the resource, such estimates are not easily available for smallholder irrigation 
farmers in South Africa and hence variability in water use among irrigators is often not 
explained. Besides some attempts being made to estimate the economic value of irrigation 
water, for example, Young (2005), Lange and Hassan (2006), Yokwe (2009) and Speelman et 
al. (2011), the valuation process at smallholder level is hampered by data deficiencies. Young 
(2005) and Lange and Hassan (2006) attributed this gap to a lack of markets for water in 
communally managed farming systems, poor record keeping and lack of water measurement 
devices in most schemes. Adoption of global values of water has also been a challenge at 
smallholder level because water values are highly site-specific due to large regional 
variations in water availability and opportunities for alternative uses of water (Lange and 
Hassan, 2006). As such, there is need to generate site-specific water values, which can 
contribute towards the national averages and inform water policies. The average water values 
can also explain the variation experienced in water use among irrigators sharing the same 
irrigation infrastructure.  Unlike in domestic and industrial water sectors, research on 
smallholder agricultural water values in developing countries is hampered by lack of reliable 
data on water consumption and pricing at farm level (Wang and Lall, 2006); hence the need 
for continued and improved research on water valuation that can inform irrigation water 




To summarise, the challenges faced by smallholder farmers in the MRIS include high 
institutional failures leading to poor access of irrigation water and poor collective 
management of the scheme. The recurrent challenges of accessing irrigation water at farm 
level has led to high water insecurity as evidenced by high crop failures and increasing 
underutilisation of irrigable land, thereby exposing farmers to food insecurity. Volumetric 
measurement of water is difficult due to inadequate infrastructure; hence, possible factors 
affecting variation in water-use values among irrigators had to be explored as a basis to 
explain the management challenges in smallholder irrigation schemes. Given the challenges 
of poor performance and low productivity associated with community irrigation schemes in 
most developing countries, findings of this research can inform irrigation and water 
management policies beyond South Africa. The general and specific objectives aimed at 
answering the above challenges are presented in the following section. 
 
1.4 Research objectives 
 
This study is part of a broader five-year project initiated and fully funded by the Water 
Research Commission (WRC) of South Africa through project number K5/1879//4, entitled 
“Analysis of food value chains in rain-fed and irrigated agriculture to include emerging 
farmers in the mainstream of the economy”. Though duplication has been kept to a minimum, 
some sections of the thesis could have contributed towards some reports compiled to meet 
specific objectives of the sponsor. However, this specific study, focused on the MRIS, seeks 
to contribute to knowledge on how smallholder irrigation farmers can effectively participate 
in the management of irrigation schemes as common pool resources. The research, therefore, 
anchors on four pillars, namely: water institutions and governance systems, water-use 
security, farmer participation in collective management of schemes, and the economic 
valuation of agricultural water. The main assumption of the study was that smallholder 
irrigators are rational and sought to maximise their returns from farming activities. However, 
a wide range of institutional arrangements affects water-use security, collective action as well 






This study relies on primary data collected from smallholder farmers in the MRIS to answer 
the following specific objectives: 
1. To assess water governance systems and their effect on irrigation water management; 
2. To assess the implications of institutional arrangements on water-use security; 
3. To assess the level of farmer participation in collective irrigation management and the 
determinants thereof; and  
4. To explain the factors affecting variability in average water values at farm level and 
implications for irrigation water management.  
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters, including the introductory and concluding chapters. 
The body of the thesis comprises of one literature review chapter and four empirical chapters. 
Two of the empirical chapters - Chapters 4 and 5 - share the same household survey data of 
307 respondents. The other two empirical chapters - Chapters 3 and 6 – are based on separate 
data sets and the collection methods are discussed in the respective chapters. The study was 
conducted at one study site (MRIS), hence the description and the map is presented in 
Chapter 3, to which all other chapters refer. 
 
In terms of outline and content, Chapter 2 presents a review of the existing literature on 
smallholder irrigation schemes in the context of irrigation water governance, institutional 
arrangements, collective action, water-use security and water values. The chapter also 
reviews some empirical methods often used to analyse each component of the water 
management systems. Chapter 3 focuses on the governance issues around irrigation water 
management. The “institutional analysis and development” framework together with 
Ostrom‟s eight institutional design principles were applied to assess the performance of local 
level water governance systems. This is followed by Chapter 4, which assesses the 
implications of institutional arrangements on agricultural water–use security. Chapter 5 
applies the collective action theory to understand the extent of farmer participation in water 
management.  The dimensions of participation were identified and the factors affecting 
participation intensity were estimated using an ordered Probit model.  This is followed by 
Chapter 6 that focuses on the economic valuation of irrigation water by applying the Residual 
Value Method (RVM). The conclusions, policy recommendations and direction for further 








The chapter presents an overview of the literature on smallholder irrigation farming, from a 
South African perspective. It starts discussing the importance of smallholder irrigation 
farming as a cornerstone of agro-based economies and then narrows down to the issues of 
governance in the sector, with a specific focus on irrigation water. The other four sections of 
the chapter review the concept of governance, collective action, water-use security and water 
valuation, with reference to smallholder irrigation farming.  
 
2.2 Overview of South Africa’s smallholder agriculture sector  
 
The importance of smallholder agriculture in most developing economies is substantial. 
However, the sector is often faced with challenges of inadequate resources, technology 
deficiencies, shortage of inputs, lack of infrastructure, and poor access to credit and markets 
(Nieuwoudt and Groenewald, 2003; Ortmann and Machethe, 2003; Ortmann and King, 
2007). In South Africa, the agricultural sector is dualistic in nature, made up of a highly 
advanced commercial sector and a poorly developed smallholder sector (Vink and Kirsten, 
2003; Aliber and Hart, 2009).  
 
The definition of smallholder farmers is a challenge due to multiple criterion adopted by 
various researchers, including land size, purpose of production (subsistence or commercial), 
and income levels (poor or rich) (Fanadzo et al., 2010). In South Africa, the definition goes 
further to include the historical context of whether someone was previously disadvantaged or 
not, hence the issue of race (that is black or white) comes into play (Fanadzo et al., 2010). As 
such, the most commonly used definition of smallholder farmers in the South African context 
refers to black farmers, most of whom reside in the former homelands (Vink and Van-
Rooyen, 2009; Fanadzo et al., 2010). Due to the heterogeneous nature of the production 
systems, multiple strata exist for defining this group of farmers and there is no clear 
distinction among them. For example, some authors refer to these farmers as smallholder, 
small-scale, subsistence, communal or emerging farmers (Crosby et al., 2000; van-Averbeke, 
2008; Vink and Van-Rooyen, 2009). Within these groups, two main categories exist, namely 
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those who practice rain-fed agriculture and those who practice irrigated agriculture. This 
study focuses on the latter group. According van-Averbeke (2008) and Fanadzo et al. (2010), 
there are numerous classes that further categorise smallholder irrigators, including farmers in 
irrigation schemes, independent/private irrigation farmers, community gardeners and home 
gardeners. This review and study are focused on smallholder farmers operating in irrigation 
schemes in former homeland regions of SA. 
 
Smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa were first established during the colonial era 
around the early 1900s (van Averbeke, 2008), after which further developments and 
improvements on the schemes continued. Between 1930 and 1960, the focus was mostly on 
development of canal irrigation schemes (van-Averbeke, 2008). As expansion of scheme 
development continued, a shift of focus towards different forms of overhead irrigation 
occurred between 1970 and 1990, and this drive continued until 1994 (van-Averbeke, 2008). 
However, the major challenge affecting smallholder irrigation was sustainability, hence post-
1994 provincial governments dismantled agricultural homeland parastatals that were 
inherited from the apartheid government (van-Averbeke et al., 1998). This affected the 
performance of most schemes, especially the large and complex schemes that had been 
centrally managed from inception (Laker, 2004; van-Averbeke, 2008). Some schemes 
collapsed and others faced management challenges following the end of support from the 
government (Bembridge, 2000; Laker, 2004). 
 
Central to poor scheme performance was poor management of infrastructure and water 
resources (Crosby et al., 2000). Low irrigation efficiencies due to poor irrigation scheduling 
techniques were identified in Zanyokwe Irrigation Scheme in Eastern Cape Province 
(Fanadzo, 2012). At Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme in KwaZulu-Natal Province, Monde et 
al. (2005) and Sinyolo et al. (2014a) reported high competition for water among farmers, 
such that farmers in some blocks could not receive water at certain times. Lack of certainty 
with regard to water availability and supply exposes smallholder irrigators to water-use 
insecurity and consequently affects their production and household food security status 
(Sinyolo et al., 2014b). Due to the challenges associated with irrigation water management, 
market access and other agronomic aspects of production, yields obtained were generally 
below optimum in most irrigation schemes. Crosby et al. (2000) cite low yields as the main 
reason for scheme failures, while Machethe et al. (2004) highlighted poor irrigation practices 
that led to low yields in under-performing schemes, whereas those that performed relatively 
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well were attributed to better irrigation management.  In this respect, Machethe et al. (2004) 
noted that smallholder farmers tended to apply the same amount of irrigation water regardless 
of plant growth stage, resulting in over-irrigation during early crop growth stages and under-
irrigation during advanced growth stages as irrigation water requirements increase.  
 
Drawing from case studies in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Northern Provinces, 
Bembridge (2000) reported that crop yields were poor and extremely variable, though smaller 
schemes performed better than larger schemes. Bembridge (2000) identified weed 
management, general lack of technical skills, poor extension support, poor irrigation 
management, as well as in-field water-use inefficiency as the main causes of uneconomic 
yields. Due to the above challenges affecting smallholder irrigation schemes, the South 
African government adopted strategies to improve performance of the sector. The most recent 
approach includes the Irrigation Management and Transfer (IMT), which seeks to transfer the 
responsibility of managing, operating and maintenance of schemes from the government to 
the farmers (van-Averbeke, 2008). This is also in line with the South Africa‟s NWA of 1998, 
which seeks to empower local water users to manage water. As such, the process of IMT 
includes formation of water user associations, development of local management institutions 
and transfer of scheme ownership from government to farmers (Perret, 2002).  
 
Within the IMT framework, the South African government also embarked on a scheme 
revitalisation process, that includes whole enterprise planning, human capital development, 
sustainable financial  development strategy for schemes alongside repair and re-design of 
existing infrastructure (Denison and Manona, 2007). Although the South African government 
has initiated IMT in SIS, most transfer operations are still unsure how to design and 
implement the process (Fanadzo, 2012). This is also worsened by poor participation of 
farmers in irrigation, which has led to continued failure of government initiatives towards 
IMT (Denison and Manona, 2007). Furthermore, the government programmes are biased 
towards scheme rehabilitation and irrigation technology improvements with minimum focus 
on human capacity and institutional development (Denison and Manona, 2007; van-Averbeke 
et al., 2011). There is a growing need to improve farmer participation in irrigation 
management in South Africa, and closer synergies have to exist between the irrigation 
policies and water policies (Backeberg, 2005). As such, the following sections review the 
governance issues around irrigation management, in which concepts of collective action, 
water use security and water-use values are revisited.  
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2.3 Irrigation water governance 
 
2.3.1 An economic perspective of the complexities of water management 
 
The generic economic problem of water management is the need to match demand with 
supply, and ensuring that there is water of a suitable quality at the right location and the right 
time, and at a cost that people can afford and are willing to pay (Hanemann, 2006). 
According to Hanemann (2006), the most prevailing problem of water is not one of physical 
shortage but institutional, which includes problems of governance. Governance has broadly 
been defined in the literature as the process whereby societies or organisations determine how 
power is exercised, whom they involve and how they render their activities (Graham et al., 
2003). Governance includes decision making processes and capacity of groups to implement 
their decisions, and is characterised by the level of transparency (openness), accountability 
and participation (North, 1990). Together with good institutions, good governance has been 
the foundation of successful cooperatives and agricultural projects (Ortmann and King, 2007; 
Chibanda et al., 2009).  
 
Good governance systems at times resolve economic problems associated with resource 
sharing. For instance, the presence of fixed costs in surface water supply creates an economic 
problem of cost allocation which has no satisfactory technical solution, other than improving 
the governance systems (Hanemann, 2006). According to Young (1986:2-29), the most 
common solutions to water management are rooted in bargaining theory that seek to allocate  
costs based on relative bargaining strength, which is more of a political than an economic 
approach. Furthermore, the predominance of economies of scale and the need to ensure 
equitable participation by all beneficiaries of a common pool resource create a need for 
collective action in the provision and financing of water supply. However, the challenge of 
collective management of water arises from the attributes of the resource that include rival-
ness /non-rival-ness in benefits combined with excludability/non-excludability in costs. 
Where costs of participation outweigh their benefits,  free-riding by members of the group 
who withhold their individual contribution and still expect to benefit from the results of their 
colleagues' efforts becomes a governance challenge (Olson, 1965). 
 
The nature of the institutional arrangements, which Ostrom (2007) defined as the set of rules 
for supplying and using irrigation water in a particular area, is a crucial water governance 
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tool. If the rules are simple, transparent and devised locally, then, monitoring and 
enforcement are relatively cheap, graduated sanction for non-compliance is clearly defined, 
low-cost and fair adjudication is available, then, ceteris paribus, successful governance and 
collective action is more likely (Shah et al., 2004). The effectiveness of the institutional 
arrangements is also dependent on a set of clearly defined policies and legislative frameworks 
that constitute the institutional environment (Shah et al., 2004). The extent to which these 
conditions are met depends on people's outlook and disposition (Hanemann, 2006), and on 
the performance of organisations that are meant to improve access to resources, reducing 
transaction costs and promoting efficient economic performance (Kirsten et al., 2009).  
Institutional performance in irrigation management is therefore measured by the capacity of 
water institutions to protect water resources, enforce exclusivity, accountability and ensure 
compliance to water use regulations (Hassan, 2011). On the other hand, inefficient 
institutions are characterised by weak enforcement mechanisms, unequal distribution of 
resources, lack of accountability, wide-spread free-riding, and tend to discourage user 
participation and investment in the management of common pool resources (Gadzikwa, 2008; 
Dorward and Omamo, 2009). 
 
2.3.2 Empirical approaches for assessing institutional performance  
 
Measurement of institutional effectiveness is complex and cannot be attributed to the 
existence of private or public institutions, neither to those of formal or informal institutional 
arrangements (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). The complexity stems from the fact that institutions 
function within a specific environment in which they are expected to lower transaction costs, 
hence their performance also depends on the behaviour of the environment (Saleth and Dinar, 
2004). As such, attempts to measure institutional performance quantitatively has been 
questioned since it involved quantification of the performance of rules, norms of behaviour 
and traditions (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). Furthermore, institutions can be evaluated indirectly 
by analysing their impact on the state of water management or on the well-being of the target 
groups (Bandarogoda, 2005; Madani and Dinar, 2013).The argument put forward is that it is 
not the institutions that perform, but their presence influences the performance and efficiency 
of natural resource management (Jain and Gandhi, 2012).  
 
Although most studies in institutional analysis are descriptive, analytical or theoretical in 
orientation,  few studies attempted a quantitative or numerical analysis of different 
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dimensions of the process of institution–performance interaction within the water sector 
(Saleth and Dinar, 2004). The general approach for most quantitative analysis is either on 
game theory (Saleth et al., 1991) or optimization-based simulation models (Sampath, 1990). 
Such studies focus on the evaluation of alternative rules in terms of their impact on the 
efficiency properties of the water market from a micro perspective. 
 
Sarker (2013) applied Ostrom‟s Social-Ecological System (SES) approach (Ostrom, 2007) to 
illustrate how user self-governance in the management of irrigation schemes in Japan occurs 
with strong state involvement. The SES relies on a qualitative approach (Poteete et al., 2010) 
to scrutinize four subsystems: a resources system (a designated area that covers the irrigation 
system), a resource unit (volume and flow of irrigation water), a governance system (state-
reinforced self-governance), and users (irrigators) (Sarker, 2013) The strength of the SES lies 
in its ability to link the effects of social, economic, political and related ecosystems on the 
entire pattern of interaction generated outcomes (Sarker, 2013). By applying the SES 
approach in Japan, Sarker (2013) concluded that the state and users resolve provision 
problems by investing in the resource system and by combining physical capital with social 
capital so that irrigation water is allocated fairly and efficiently by all registered irrigators. 
 
Quantitative assessments of governance performance have also been attempted. Chibanda et 
al. (2009) applied cluster analysis to identify institutional and governance factors influencing 
the performance of selected smallholder agricultural cooperatives in South Africa. The study 
concluded that institutional problems give rise to low levels of equity and debt capital, 
reliance on government funding, low levels of investment, and subsequent loss of members 
by most cooperatives. At the same time, governance problems were strongly linked to the 
absence of a secret ballot, low levels of education, lack of production and management skills 
training, weak marketing arrangements and consequent low returns to members as patrons or 
investors. These are important findings that can inform policy around smallholder irrigation 
management in South Africa, whose model of formation and operation conforms to the 
cooperative concept. However, the technique applies well where a large number of cases are 
being investigated to introduce heterogeneity in the governance systems, hence cannot be 
used in a case study type of research.  
 
Mbatha and Antrobus (2008) applied the physical externalities (PE) model to assess irrigation 
water allocation challenges among farmers along the Kat River Valley in South Africa. The 
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geographical location of farmers along a given watercourse, in which water is diverted by 
individuals, leads to structural inefficiencies that negatively affect the whole farming 
community, with more severe effects felt at downstream sites than upstream (Mbatha and 
Antrobus, 2008). Poor coordination and lack of compliance with institutional and regulatory 
instruments lead to such water allocation inefficiencies. 
 
Some empirical measures for assessing interaction between formal and non-formal 
institutions include estimating costs of creation and management (collecting information, 
monitoring and decision making) of a formal institution instead of naturally occurring 
informal institutions (Pagan, 2010). Impact of interactions on institutional performance in the 
context of water development can indirectly be assessed using the indicators of institutional 
performance, namely: improvements in water availability; scarcity; equity; environment; and 
financial viability (Kerr, 2007).  
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), continuous assessment of irrigation governance institutions is 
crucial given the shift from the state-driven management regimes towards community-based 
management regimes (Dorward and Omamo, 2009). In irrigation management, the paradigm 
shift is influenced by the IMT and PIM approaches within the water sector (Perret and 
Geyser, 2007; Gomo et al., 2014a). As such, several frameworks borrowed from ecological, 
sociological, political and economics schools have been applied to assess institutional 
performance. In some instances, frameworks have been merged to analyse complex 
governance systems. Due to complexity of institutions and the need to streamline the focus of 
the analysis to local water management issues, this study applied the Institutional 
Development Analysis (IDA) approach (Ostrom, 1990; Kirsten et al., 2009).  
 
2.4 Agricultural water-use security 
 
2.4.1 Conceptual issues around water-use security  
 
Based on the literature, it has been noted that the concept of water-use security is dynamic 
and its definition varies per sector, geographical location and time of assessment. 
Furthermore, some definitions describe it as a process and not an absolute measure. For 
example, Muller et al. (2009) consider water security as something that is achieved when 
social and productive potential/benefits of water have been harnessed adequately and its 
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destructive potential (e.g. floods, contamination) sufficiently contained.  In this context, 
Muller et al. (2009) argued that water insecurity is not primary the result of not having 
enough water, but the incapacity to fully realise the beneficial uses of water due to a set of 
constraints (e.g. individual attributes, environmental, physical, socio-economic, etc.). 
Similarly, Grey and Sadoff (2007) defined water security as the reliable availability of an 
acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods and production, coupled with 
an acceptable level of water-related risks. Again, this definition has attracted critics, e.g. 
Muller et al. (2009) because of its focus on national water security and neglecting the detailed 
organisational requirements at local government level to achieve household water-use 
security.  
 
The definition of water-use security may gain significant relevance when contextualised 
within a micro-economic set-up, such as an irrigation scheme, domestic use of water, 
processing, etc., because adopting the national level definitions makes local level analysis 
complex and yields general results. As such, this study sought to pursue an understanding of 
agricultural water-use security at a localised level, bearing in mind that a measure like, for 
example, clean water for agriculture, might not be clean enough for domestic or processing 
uses. Such differences in standards and contexts attract sector-specific analysis of water-use 
security. Besides the broader framing of the concept, the other challenge of defining water-
use security partly stems from the qualitative nature of the indicators; hence, Cook and 
Bakker (2012) recommended  narrowing the definition in order to operationalize the concept. 
As such, the study adopted a definition by Komnenic et al. (2009), who defined water 
security from an insecurity perspective, as the perceived difficulty farmers face in securing 
adequate and reliable access to water for agricultural production. A related definition of water 
security by Sinyolo et al. (2014b)  refers to reliable access by the irrigating households to 
sufficient and reliable water  to meet their agricultural needs and their ability to assert their 
water rights against other parties. The two definitions above have informed this study. The 
following section, therefore, discusses some measurement issues around water-use security.  
 
 2.4.2 Measurement and quantification of agricultural water-use security 
 
The complexity of water-use security measurement stems from the heterogeneity of water 
as a resource, the qualitative nature of the variables and the relativity of water-use security 
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contexts among users within the same sector. Several studies have described water security 
in qualitative terms; for example, Grey and Sadoff (2007), Muller et al. (2009) and Norman 
et al. (2010). Others have quantified water security by defining it synonymously with 
scarcity, and per capita measures were applied; for example Falkenmark (1986) and 
Chenoweth (2008). Per capita measures categorise the nation into a water scarce nation if it 
has less than 1000 cubic meters per capita and an absolutely water scarce nation if water 
resources are below 500 cubic metres per capita (Falkenmark, 1986). Muller et al. (2009) 
argued that this measure does not reflect the intensity with which water is used; for 
example, some nations have lower per capita levels of water resources, yet they have high 
productivity and that ensure high food security (e.g. Singapore, which has 139m
3
 per capita 
and a booming economy), and others have higher water levels of resources per capita, yet 
they face higher food insecurity due to factors like geography of the nation, condition of 
land resources, human capacity and institutional environment (e.g. Botswana, which has 
8820m
3
 per capita). Cullis and Van-Koppen (2007) used Gini coefficient to measure water 
security and its welfare impacts at national level, while Sinyolo et al. (2014b) computed an 
index of water security that was then used to measure its impact on household food 
security. 
   
The concept of measuring agricultural water-use security is informed by the thinking that 
water access alone is not a sufficient condition for security, but how the water is used and by 
whom, and how well the variability of the resource is managed. This study deviates from the 
traditional engineering approach, which focuses on water supply enhancement and addressing 
physical scarcity of water, by focusing on institutional arrangements and management 
processes that deal with distributive issues at farm level. Poor coordination of institutional 
processes often leads to power asymmetries, such that water-use security for some rests on 
the water insecurity of others (Zeitoun, 2011). This is a major challenge in community 
irrigation schemes in South Africa, where lack of volumetric measurement of irrigation water 
results in unequal distribution at farm level; hence, measurement of water-use security of 
irrigators at farm level based on engineering techniques may not yield consistent results. By 
applying Likert scales to capture the qualitative indicators of water-use security and 
computing indices, the study sought to measure the relative water-use security status of 





2.5 Farmer participation in collective irrigation management  
 
2.5.1 Collective action theory 
 
Farmer participation in collective irrigation management is critical for the long-term 
sustainability of community irrigation schemes. Participation is well defined using the 
concept of collective action, which has a strong theoretical grounding in New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). According to Scott and Marshall (2009), collective action refers to action 
taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organisation) in pursuit of 
members‟ perceived shared interests. The theory of collective action, first coined by Olson 
(1965), has widely been applied in the management of common pool resources like irrigation 
schemes, community forests and commodity marketing. The basis of collective action is to 
solve problems of sharing by a group of individuals, by encouraging cooperation among 
users. The underlying assumption about collective participation is that those who participate 
have a stake in the final outcome (Ostrom, 2010). The effectiveness of this approach and the 
theoretical assumption of cooperating members or users attracted critics. Hardin (1968), 
through the theory of „tragedy of the commons‟, contended that due to the inherent 
selfishness of humans, rational self-interest will always prevail over the interest of the 
common good. Hardin‟s model assumes the inability of individuals to cooperate and the 
problem of „free-riders‟ who cause collapse of the system (Hardin, 1968). However, in 
Ostrom‟s seminal work (1990) she refutes the position that common pool resources are 
problematic. Drawing on a large number of examples throughout the world, Ostrom identifies 
situations where local people have come together in agreement to restrain their consumption 
of a resource that is scarce. However, due to institutional failures and lack of compliance to 
rules governing schemes, some schemes degenerated into open access resources, a problem 
defined by Hardin (1968) in the tragedy of the commons model. Contrary to this view, 
Ostrom (1991) and Ito (2012) argued that customary rules and agreed norms in rural 
communities result in common property resources (CPRs) that are well preserved and utilized 
through the collective action of local appropriators.    
 
Although collective action is not a new concept among smallholder irrigation farmers in 
South Africa, application of the concept is complex in water management due to the 
attributes of the resource. According to Hanemann (2006), some attributes that complicate the 
collective management of irrigation water include:, the mobility of water, the variability in 
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supply, the cost of supplying water, the price of the water, and lastly the heterogeneity of the 
water in terms of quality, location and timing of supply and  its properties as a public good, 
especially where weak management systems fail to manage rivalness and excludability in 
consumption. According to Wade (1987), canal water has a potentially high transaction cost 
of excluding a landowner with commandable land, yet consumption is subtractive, i.e. water 
applied to one farmer‟s land is not simultaneously available to other farmers or users. 
 
2.5.2 Importance of social capital in collective irrigation management 
 
While water irrigation water has been called „the dividing line between poverty and 
prosperity‟ (Wenhold et al., 2007), in practice many irrigation schemes in South Africa are 
failing and do not provide the anticipated benefits (van Averbeke et al. 2011). It is recognized 
that a range of capital assets are required to improve smallholder irrigation performance 
(Namara et al., 2010). Access, control, and ownership of productive assets such as land, 
labour, finance, and social capital enable people to create stable and productive lives. 
However, social capital is necessary if other forms of capital are to have real benefits, 
especially in performing collective action activities, where a number of individuals must 
contribute to achieve the desired outcomes (Ostrom, 2004). Social capital, which is defined as 
either cognitive (for example norms, values and beliefs) or structural (for example roles, 
networks and relationships) (Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2011), considers the nature of the 
relationships that exist between members of the schemes as well as the relationships that exist 
between scheme members and the broader community. As such, effective collective 
management of irrigation schemes can be achieved if there is good relationship between 
scheme members and the hosting communities (Muchara et al., 2014).  
Namara et al. (2010) highlighted that despise high failure rate of community managed 
schemes, technical interventions such as rehabilitation of scheme infrastructure or 
introducing new crops need to be complemented by institutional interventions such as 
improving water management processes to ensure equity in water distribution along the 
scheme. It can be argued that the success of most institutional interventions depends on the 
social networks within the respective communities. Furthermore, the extent to which 
collective action facilitate access to inputs like water is partly influenced by the social 
network structures such as informal groups, kinship, trust and leadership. However, informal 
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groups are often common among farmers and lack of trust is generally the reason for 
individual farming and failure most collective activities, besides practical considerations such 
as the timing of activities not allowing for collective action (Muchara, et al. 2014). Social 
capital has therefore been explored in the upcoming sections from the angle of group 
formations and farmers‟ involvement in group activities, to better understand its role in 
collective irrigation management. 
 
2.5.3 Measurement of participation in collective activities 
 
 
Based on the NIE literature, success or failure of collective action is determined by the 
following: (i) characteristic of the collective action problem; (ii) attributes of the group 
(members and non-members); (iii) attributes of the institutional arrangements; and (iv) 
external factors (Sekher, 2001). As such, the differences in group members‟ understanding of 
collective action are influenced by their perceptions of the problem, and the individual 
perceptions towards solving the collective action problems (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000). 
Heltberg (2001) and Gadzikwa (2008) attribute such differences to structural differences like 
age, education, gender, occupation, values, beliefs, ideas, and economic status.  
 
Mills et al. (2011) applied the collective action concept to investigate the effect of co-
operative working on the farm and the impact on group members‟ lives. The study concluded 
that locally adaptable engagement strategies, working with group members previously known 
to each other, institutional arrangements that limited group size and which allowed groups to 
develop their own solutions and implementation rules, and external support offering the 
services of a local facilitator and funding for both planning and management stages were 
critical for the success of collective action.  
 
Another challenge of collective irrigation management pertains to the sharing of benefits and 
costs among participating members (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001). Olson (1965)  has shown 
that successful participation of members in group activities depends on the expected benefits 
and costs, hence rational individuals will free-ride whenever an opportunity arises so as to 
achieve personal benefits at the expense of the group. This phenomenon is more common in 
larger groups than smaller ones, which are easy to monitor individual activities (Agrawal, 
2001; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Furthermore, social networking promoted trust among 
25 
 
group members thereby enhancing the chances of success in carrying out collective activities 
(Mills et al., 2011; Mabuza et al., 2012) 
 
Econometric analysis of participation in irrigation management goes further than the binary 
approach commonly applied in market participation (e.g. Fujiie et al. (2005); Fischer and 
Qaim (2012)). The multiple activities involved in irrigation management, which include canal 
repairs, cleaning of canal, financial contributions, etc., require more robust approaches to 
measure participation. This was also necessitated by the current focus on the implementation 
of IMT policy in most countries. To date, the IMT has been faced with numerous challenges; 
for  instance, Fujiie et al. (2005) noted that service of national irrigation systems deteriorated 
after the reduction in state agencies‟ operation and maintenance activities because irrigators 
in South and Southeast Asia could not meet all the costs of operation and maintenance from 
their farming activities. Similarly, high level of dependence on government support among 
smallholder irrigation farmers, accompanied by weak local institutions, lack of information 
regarding farmers‟ production strategies, low participation as well as poor maintenance and 
performance when farmers are left to manage previously government-funded schemes, are 
recurrent problems in South Africa (Perret, 2002; Mnkeni et al., 2010; Fanadzo, 2012; 
Reinders et al., 2013). The aforementioned challenges of managing SISs have given rise to 
the need to explore the level of participation in collective activities at scheme level, as a basis 
for ensuring effective smallholder irrigation management. 
 
2.6 Economic valuation of water 
 
2.6.1 The concept of economic value of water  
 
The economic concept of water valuation varies depending on the sector and the use of the 
water. There is utilitarian approach, which is based on the assumption that humans have a 
quantitative utility scale against which they measure the relative degree of satisfaction 
(Hanemann, 2006). This satisfaction is derived from consumption of alternative goods or a 
combination. Based on the utilitarian approach, water attains an economic value when users 
are willing to pay for it rather than do without (Lange and Hassan, 2006). As such, the 
various economic concepts of value are those relating to total, marginal, and average water 
values (Ward and Michelsen, 2002), whose application depends on the objective of the 
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valuation process. Therefore, it is important to define the specific value being derived during 
any valuation exercise. 
 
The total economic value (TEV) of water is measured by the total willingness to pay for a 
given level of water used (Ward and Michelsen, 2002) and includes an  economic consumer 
surplus component in addition to the price paid or received (Lange and Hassan, 2006). As 
such, the TEV measures total utility from water consumption or total economic benefits 
derived from using water as a production factor (Lange and Hassan, 2006). This measure 
often overstates the value of water compared to other measures like marginal productivity 
values (Hanemann, 2006). 
 
The marginal value (MV) of water represents the contribution of an incremental unit of water 
used in the production process, which is measured by the slope of the demand curve (Lange 
and Hassan, 2006). The MV concept is embedded in the economic principal of diminishing 
marginal returns and is important for water allocation decisions. The marginal value of water 
provides important information for policy analysis of water development or allocation (Ward 
and Michelsen, 2002). Furthermore, the concept is based on neoclassical economics, whose 
thrust is on economic efficiency. Although data deficiency affect computation of MV at 
smallholder level, the values are more informative than other valuation estimates (Young, 
2005). Based on accurate marginal water value estimates, development practitioners‟ 
decisions on increased water supply may require that water infrastructure be expanded as 
long as the marginal value of the added capacity exceeds its marginal cost (Ward and 
Michelsen, 2002). As such, policies aimed at improving economic efficiency of reallocating 
water among users do so based on the marginal value of the water.  
 
The average economic value of water is defined as the total value of water divided by the 
quantity of water supplied (Ward and Michelsen, 2002). Although the measure gives higher 
estimates compared to marginal values, its conceptual simplicity and ease of calculation may 
engage the policy analyst into using it to approximate marginal value (Ward and Michelsen, 
2002). However, since average value is typically much larger than marginal value, use of 
estimated average value, when marginal value is the needed measure, usually leads to an 
over-investment in water supply capacity or over-use of water (Ward and Michelsen, 2002; 




Investment in agricultural water seeks to improve human well-being through increased 
agricultural productivity (Svendsen, 2009). Agricultural productivity is indicated by value of 
production over different types of agricultural activities from a given set of inputs including 
water (Turral et al., 2010). By examining individual factors of production over time, it is 
possible to measure their overall impact on agricultural output. Although numerous studies 
examine demand and value of water for domestic and industrial use, research on smallholder 
agricultural water value in developing countries is hampered by lack of reliable data on water 
consumption and pricing at farm level (Wang and Lall, 2006). From the above water value 
concepts, it is clear that assigning an accurate economic value to a unit of water requires 
informed choices of measurement techniques as the different estimated unit values of water 
can potentially affect allocations, equity and efficient utilisation of resources. 
 
2.6.2 Empirical approaches of valuing agricultural water 
 
Economists categorise the value of natural resources like forests and water into two main 
groups, i.e. use values and non-use values. According to Lange and Hassan (2006), use 
values refer to the use of the resources to support human life and economic activity, while 
non-use value refers to uses that aim to sustain the ecosystem and recreational purposes. In 
economic theory, the value of water as a productive input can be treated as an „economic 
rent‟, used as an input factor similar to land (Berbel et al., 2011). The complexity of water 
valuation emanates from lack of data, cost of data collection, relative absence of markets for 
water rights and the fact that water values are site specific (Lange and Hassan, 2006).  
 
Several water valuation techniques are available depending on the specific use of the water 
and the purpose for which the information is required. Al-Karablieh et al. (2012) noted three 
groups of water valuation methods, namely (1) methods that infer water value from 
information based on water-related markets and benefits where value is derived from rentals 
and sales of water rights; (2) methods that estimate water values from direct consumer 
demand; and (3) methods relying on the use of derived demand for water as an intermediate 
good, where water is assessed from the producers‟ point of view as in the case of agricultural 
and industrial use. 
 
Some of the methods that are widely applied in water valuation, where water markets are 
non-existent or dysfunctional, include the production function method, RVM, change in net 
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income approach (CNI), conjoint analysis, cost-based approaches, optimisation methods 
using mathematical programming, and the value-added method derived from computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) (Young, 2005).  
 
The economic valuation of water can also adopt environmental approaches like hedonic 
pricing and contingent valuation method (CVM). However, most of these techniques try to 
derive a financial value to a commodity whose market is not perfect. For instance, hedonic 
price analysis relates to property prices to water-related attributes in order to estimate a 
shadow price for those attributes. Hedonic methods for valuing irrigation water is rarely 
found in the agricultural economics literature; for example, Berbel et al. (2009) used quasi-
hedonic prices to estimate the value of irrigation water in Guadalquivir Basin in Spain. The 
technique often fails to adequately value community resources whose value goes beyond the 
financial price, but also encompasses non-financial or social values of the resources.  
 
Stated or revealed preferences have also been used to value water resources. The revealed 
preference methods are based on analysing user behaviour in surrogate markets. For example, 
willingness to pay for improving drinking water quality or irrigation water supply can be 
inferred by the money households spend on bottled water or household treatment to purify 
water (González-Gómez et al., 2012). On the other hand, stated preference methods estimate 
willingness to pay by asking the users of the water service directly, based on choice 
experiment methods or bidding game techniques of services associated with different prices 
so that survey respondents can chose the option they prefer. However, the most frequently 
used technique to analyse willingness to pay for water services is the Contingent Valuation 
Method (Young, 2005; González-Gómez et al., 2012). In this approach, the survey 
respondents state the maximum amount of money they would be willing to pay an irrigation 
water service on the basis of a hypothetical situation for decision making. It is important to 
note that each technique has its challenges. Besides, reliability of data for most contingent 
valuation techniques is questionable. Furthermore, the technique gives estimated financial 
values and may not reflect the variation in water distribution and utilisation by individual 
irrigators. 
 
Most experimental research in agriculture estimates water values from crop-water production 
functions, where demand functions are constructed using an output price with variations in 
the cost of water (Scheierling et al., 2004; Young, 2005). Similarly, mathematical and linear 
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programming (LP) approaches are widely applied to value irrigation water. These involve the 
use of demand functions for irrigation water and its price elasticity for valuation of irrigation 
water. A model of a representative farm usually is specified to maximize returns subject to 
constraints to some production resources (Berbel et al., 2011), and the results are often used 
to analyse the decisions made about irrigation problems. As mentioned above, LP has been 
frequently used for the valuation of water and, generally, mathematical models are based on 
the single criterion of „maximizing profits‟; but the quality of the model may be improved by 
maximizing a utility function representing the farmer‟s preferences. However, optimisation 
techniques have been criticised for over-estimating water values (Young, 2005; Al-Karablieh 
et al., 2012), while CGE specification requires aggregation which may not be sufficient for 
local conditions (Al-Karablieh et al., 2012).  
 
The Residual Value Method , also called the Residual Imputation Method, is a technique 
applied to value water used as an intermediate input in production (Hanemann, 2006). 
Valuation of water in production is based on the idea that a profit-maximizing firm will use 
water up to the point where the marginal revenue gained from one additional unit of water is 
just equal to the marginal cost of obtaining the water (Hanemann, 2006). However, recent 
studies that have employed the RVM are limited; for example, Bate and Dubourg (1997) and 
Moran and Dann (2008), whose studies estimated the residual value of water used for 
irrigation in East Anglia and Scotland, respectively. Where data about actual water use are 
unavailable, the residual value can be  calculated based on the amount of water needed to 
cultivate a hectare of a given crop (Lange and Hassan, 2006). As such, Lange and Hassan 
(2006) used this technique in the Orange River basin (Namibia), while Moran and Dann 
(2008) applied the residual technique on secondary data to derive economic values for water 
on a sector basis. Speelman et al. (2011) assessed irrigation water values at small-scale 
irrigation schemes in South Africa. 
  
Differences between the methods are wide as the production function allows obtaining the 
marginal value of water for individual crops, mathematical programming estimates the 
marginal value of a crop mix that maximized a farmer‟s objective, and RVM gives an 
average value of the water. The total value of output is allocated against each of the resources 
(inputs) used in the production process, including water as the „residual‟ input. In RVM the 
results are an estimation of average values, because the total value is divided by the quantity 
of water used. Due to lack of primary data for specific locations, all the studies that have been 
30 
 
reviewed, e.g., Hassan and Mungatana (2006), Berbel et al. (2009), Yokwe (2009), Speelman 
et al. (2011) and Berbel et al. (2011) used secondary data to estimate average water values. 
Since smallholder farmers in South Africa are not paying for irrigation water, concerns are 
more on distributional and equity challenges at scheme level, and not the price of water. As 
such, the RVM was adopted to estimate average water values and explaining the variation of 
water values among irrigation farmers. In this study, primary data were collected for an entire 





Failure of water management institutions are blamed for the poor performance of smallholder 
irrigation schemes in South Africa.  Institutions are defined as humanly devised constraints 
and rules that govern and limit human behaviour and interactions, which include rules, 
organisational forms, and norms of behaviour as well as enforcement mechanisms. The study 
of institutions is embedded in the neo-classical and New Institutional Economics theories. 
The literature has revealed that governance systems directly or indirectly impact on collective 
action, water-use security or the level of water distribution and utilisation. Collective action 
has been found to be difficult to organise where poor institutional arrangements exist, 
including lack of defined property rights, large differences in water supply between upstream 
and downstream farmers, and poorly coordinated formal and informal institutions. The water 
governance literature is also dominated by national level studies and less on site-specific 
information on the implications of various governance and institutional arrangements on 





















The objective of this chapter is to provide a broad understanding of the implications of the 
governance and institutional arrangements on irrigation water management systems at 
smallholder level. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and 
Ostrom's eight design principles were applied to characterise the governance systems, 
resource systems, resource users, resource unit and evaluate their implications on smallholder 
irrigation management systems. The chapter is organised as follows: Sections 3.2 presents the 
research methodology, where-in the conceptual and analytical frameworks are discussed. 
This is followed by the results and discussion in sections 3.3 to 3.7. A summary of the results 




3.2.1 Conceptual and analytical framework 
 
To enhance understanding of the governance systems in water management, the study applied 
the Institutional Analysis and Development approach. The IAD framework, developed by 
Ostrom (1990), has been widely applied, for example, by Kirsten et al. (2009) and 
Sserunkuuma et al. (2009) to analyse the management of Common Pool Resources (CPRs). 
The IAD framework presented in Figure 3.1 enables the organisation and analysis of 
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                                          Feedback and adaptive learning to the environment 
Figure 3.1. IAD framework showing institutional linkages in canal water management 
Source: Adapted from Ostrom (1990) and Sarker (2013)     
 
Ostrom (1990) argued that the environment, which includes the governance system, resource 
system, resource unit and the resource users, can only have positive impacts if sufficient 
conditions exist in the management of CPRs (Figure 3.1). As such, Ostrom (1990) developed 
eight design principles that create sufficient conditions for effective management of CPRs: 
(1) the existence of clearly-defined boundaries, (2) clarity on proportional sharing of costs 
and benefits, (3) mechanisms facilitating collective-choice autonomy to serve as necessary 
conditions to deal with appropriation and provision problems, (4) congruence between 
Resource Unit (RU)/ irrigation water 
RU.1. Spatial and temporal distribution 
of canal water 
ACTION DOMAIN 
1. Actors and attributes  
2. Activities and 
attributes 
3. Institutions and 
attributes, enforcement, 
coordination 
Resource system (RS) 
RS.1. Canal water 
RS.2. Scarcity relative to water demand 
RS.3. Infrastructure characteristics 
RS.4. Clarity of system boundaries 
 
Governance system (GS) 
GS.1. Water policy frameworks   
GS.2. Type of organisations 
(formal/informal) 
GS.3. Accountability 
GS.4. Property rights system 
GS.5. Operational rules (formal/informal)  
Users (U) / Irrigators 
U.1. Number of beneficiaries (824 
members and unknown number of 
irrigators who are not members of MRIS) 
U.2. Social capital 
U.3. Human capital 
U.4. Socio-economic attribute 
U5. Psychological capital 
OUTCOMES  
-Good/poor water access 
-Good/poor water security 
-Good/poor water sharing 
-Good/poor welfare 
-Good/poor food security 
  
Sufficient conditions 
1-8. Ostrom‟s eight 
design principles 
9. Psychological capital 
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resource appropriation and provision rules, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) establishment of 
dispute-resolution mechanisms, (7) recognition of user rights to self-organize, and (8) the 
need for appropriate coordination among relevant groups. The core design principles have a 
wider range of application and are relevant when people must cooperate to achieve shared 
goals (Wilson et al., 2013). In the case of canal irrigation management, absence of principles 
1, 2 and 3 lead to collapse of CPRs due to poor maintenance, while lack of sanctions and 
monitoring mechanisms may lead to free riding and unfair distribution of canal irrigation 
water. 
 
However, limitations of both the IAD framework and the design principles should be noted. 
For instance, Wilson et al. (2013) highlighted the lack of emphasis on social variables and its 
failure to incorporate the impact of global problems, such as climate change, water scarcity 
and food insecurity. The eight design principles are also criticised for not accounting for 
other conditions and constraints, like market integration, globalisation and rapid economic 
development (Wilson et al., 2013). Furthermore, both the IAD and the eight design principles 
do not recognise the importance of psychological capital, which was defined broadly by 
Luthans et al. (2007) as the motivation of individuals through self-efficacy, optimism, hope 
and resilience. Psychological capital is considered critical in influencing the outcomes of 
CPR management, including irrigation water. Rather than focusing on any one individual 
facet in particular, it is expected that the combined motivational effects are broader and more 
impactful than any one of the constructs individually (Luthans et al., 2007). It can, therefore, 
be argued that positive psychological capital greatly influences human behaviour of each user 
and their interactions in the management of CPRs, hence its inclusion as the ninth sufficient 
condition in the framework. 
 
3.2.2 Description of the study site 
 
The study was conducted in the MRIS located in the Msinga Local Municipality, which falls 
under the Umzinyathi District Municipality of KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa 




Figure 3.2. Location and sketch of study site in KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa   
Notes: A: South Africa‟s provinces; B: Umzinyathi District municipality in KwaZulu-Natal 
province; C: Sketch of Mooi River Irrigation Scheme 
Source: Adapted from  Environmental Planning and Development Consultants (2007). 
 
Msinga is a local municipality established in December 2000 (Msinga Municipality, 2009) as 
one of the four local municipalities constituting the Mzinyathi District Municipality in the 
northern part of the province of KwaZulu-Natal (Figure 3.2). According to the 2009/2010 
integrated development plan, Msinga municipality is largely rural, with 69% under 
Traditional Authority, where land is held in trust by the Ingonyama Trust while the remaining 
31% of land is commercial farm land, all of which is located to the north of Pomeroy (Msinga 





authority areas (Msinga Municipality, 2009). Small towns of Tugela Ferry, Keates Drift and 
Pomeroy are the main service centres in the area. The scheme is accessible via the R33 road, 
linking it with Dundee, Ladysmith, Pietermaritzburg, Kranskop and Weenen. The scheme is 
situated between Tugela Ferry and Greytown and approximately 124kms from 
Pietermaritzburg along the R33 road. The MRIS falls within a vegetation type known as 
Thukela Valley Bushveld (Letty, 2007). Rainfall varies throughout the district from more 
than 800 mm in Endumeni and Umvoti, to less than 400 mm in parts of Msinga and mean 




C), and vegetable production is only possible as 
a result of the availability of irrigation (Mkhabela, 2005; Letty, 2007; Msinga Municipality, 
2009).  
 
The MRIS was established by the South African government in the early 1900s and is 
communally owned. The main idea of establishing the scheme was to improve food security 
by ensuring that smallholders have the means to produce their own food in the relatively dry 
areas of KwaZulu-Natal (Msinga Municipality, 2009). It consists of fifteen blocks that run 
along the Mooi River. Across the Mooi River are larger commercial farms whose water 
source is the same river. A total of 824 farmers participate in the scheme, which has a total of 
601 hectares. Farmers at the MRIS produce a wide range of crops under furrow irrigation, 
with cabbages, potatoes, tomatoes, onions and maize being the main crops. Crop production 
as well as marketing of produce is done individually, with minimal collective action efforts in 
certain activities like weeding and harvesting. 
 
Infrastructural development was wholly funded by the South African government, through 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and thereafter the government also 
performed some maintenance work on the infrastructure. Irrigation water is diverted from the 
Mooi River along a concrete-lined canal to supply downstream crop fields through gravity. 
The canal either feeds directly into the fields or into overnight storage dams. Farmers access 
water via distribution canals on specific days agreed upon by the scheme participants and 
block committees. 
 
Water is diverted from a weir constructed across the Mooi River and flows by gravity along 
the main canal, which is about 20.8km in length. The concrete-lined canal has a top width of 





(Gomo et al., 2014b). The canal gradually reduces in size and capacity from the head section 
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(Block 1) to the tail-end section (Block 15). The main canal also feeds water into four 
overnight storage dams or directly to the field through infield canals. Once water is released 
from either the main canal or the dams, it is channelled along the smaller infield canals to the 
crops. Although some infield canals are concrete-lined, more than 90% are either earth built 
or need complete revamping due to extensive collapse and breakages.  
 
Water allocation within the scheme is done according to a weekly roster, which is controlled 
by the canal attendants commonly known as canal rangers or “phoyisa” for police in the local 
Zulu language. The block committee members also assist canal attendants to enforce the 
implementation of the roster. The canal attendants are government employees, under the 
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs (DAEA), and are 
responsible for opening and closing water from the main canal to the fields and storage dams. 
They are also responsible for monitoring unauthorised water abstractions by community and 
scheme members.  
 
Selection of MRIS as a study site was informed by the size of the scheme in terms of number 
of participants (824 irrigators) and the land size (601ha), which could provide sufficient 
heterogeneity from the respondents. Furthermore, the scheme was viewed a potential site that 
can give a reflection of governance systems in government supported schemes, having 
existed pre- and post-independence in 1994. The scheme also resembles multiple governance 
systems, characterised by both formal and informal management structures, which had to be 
explored and contribute towards the performance of the smallholder irrigation sector in South 
Africa. The study was part of broader Water Research Commission  project on smallholder 
values, hence the some selection criteria to meet the requirements of the sponsor was also 
considered, including: (1) existence of active farming in the area, (2) participation in value 
chains by the smallholder farmers, and (3) willingness of the farmers to voluntarily 
participate in research activities. 
 
3.2.3 Sampling, data collection and analysis 
 
In order to understand the water governance systems in the scheme, three focus group 
discussions were conducted across the scheme, comprising of 7, 8 and 11 irrigators, drawn 
from the head, middle and tail-end section of the scheme, respectively. Furthermore, a 
household questionnaire was administered to 71 individual farmers, randomly sampled from 
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the three strata of the scheme, bringing the total number of respondents to 97. The IAD 
framework and Ostrom‟s eight design principles were applied to assess the impact of various 
IAs on smallholder irrigation water management and access. The ninth principle on 
psychological capital was also assessed to establish its relevance in irrigation water 
management. The governance systems were grouped into themes based on the IAD 
framework. Qualitative synthesis and deductive evaluation of institutional performance was 
done to draw conclusions. Quantitative analysis of the data involved the use of descriptive 
statistics such as ranking, means and frequency counts to augment the qualitative analysis. 
  
3.2.4 Contextualising water access and management system in MRIS 
 
 
Smallholder farmers in MRIS face challenges of water shortage emanating from low rainfall 
and seasonal fluctuations of water levels in the Mooi River.  The Craigie-Burn Dam, which is 
located at the upper part of the Mooi River and controlled by the Mvoti Catchment 
Management Agency (CMA) to boost water supply to downstream users, could only be 
accessed by registered WUAs. The WUA in MRIS was at the inception phase and not yet 
recognised by water management authorities as an officially registered group.  
 
On the other hand, commercial farmers sharing the same weir with smallholder farmers were 
recognised as registered water-users based on their membership of the old water governing 
boards, currently being transformed into WUAs. As such, this group of users made official 
requests for the opening and closing of the feeder dam. Although smallholder farmers also 
benefited from the same water by virtue of sharing the same river with commercial farmers, 
challenges of enforcing exclusivity rights against non-registered water users complicated the 
approximation of quantity demanded. There have been disputes between commercial farmers 
and smallholders, with the former being accused by the latter of having an unfair advantage 
over the water resource. This was worsened by the fact that some commercial farmers use 
overhead irrigation systems and pump water directly from the main canal and river, upstream 
from the diversion point. As such, smallholders complain that commercial farmers pump too 






3.3 The results and discussion 
 
3.3.1 Application of the IAD framework to assess irrigation water management 
structures in MRIS 
 
The need for communities to organise water provision, i.e. involvement in the design, 
construction and maintenance of infrastructure, are crucial elements that positively contribute 
towards irrigation water management. The characterisation of the institutional arrangements 
(IAs) influencing water management in MRIS was done using the IAD framework (Figure 
3.1). The following sections, therefore, scrutinize the institutional arrangements by focusing 
on the influence of governance systems, resource systems, resource units and resource users 
on the water management outcomes (water access).  
 
3.3.1.1 Irrigation organisation and water governance systems in MRIS 
 
Water policy frameworks in South Africa (GS.1) 
 
An important issue is how the water legislative policy in South Africa is linked to the current 
governance systems in irrigation schemes and how the whole system impacts provision of 
water to smallholder irrigation farmers. Shah (2005) defined various government agencies, 
international agencies, government‟s water policy, and water-related laws that directly or 
indirectly deal with water as the institutional environment (IE). The IE, closely linked to IA, 
was defined by Shah (2005) as humanly devised rules that govern the behaviour of water-
users. Understanding the linkages between water policies and users is important because lack 
of user cooperation, especially due to a knowledge gap about statutory instruments between 
users and regulatory bodies, can hamper public allocation of resources.  
 
With respect to the case study, 16 years after the adoption of the NWA of 1998 not all water 
management structures are in place. This agrees with Backeberg (2005) who noted in his 
theoretical analysis of the South African NWA of 1998 that the reform process may take 10–
20 years for the design of appropriate institutions and implementation of the water policy. 
Due to non-compliance of the MRIS to the legal requirement to be registered as a water using 
entity with the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), the Minister of Water Affairs in South 
Africa, through the NWA of 1998, has the power to reallocate all or portion of the water at 
the Mooi River weir to other registered users, without consultation with the MRIS farmers, 
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consequently exerting pressure on production activities in the scheme. For instance, starting 
2012, water from the Mooi River weir was made available to supply domestic water to 
Gudwini community, about 30km from the scheme. Although domestic allocation takes 
precedence over all other water uses (RSA, 1998), recognition of the scheme as a water user 
could have influenced the quantity of water to be reallocated or even the point of abstraction 
could have been constructed after the weir to avoid interference with water supply for 
irrigation purposes.  Legal recognition of the scheme is, therefore, critical to improve water 
security and access at local levels.  
 
Types of organisations (GS.2) 
 
The MRIS scheme is governed by both formal and informal management systems, which are 
embedded within each other. However, the problems associated with irrigation water access 
in most government-funded schemes in South Africa, including MRIS, arise from poor 
management of infrastructure, inadequate enforcement of regulations and subsidised prices. 
These challenges result in poor irrigation performance (Perret and Geyser, 2007). 
Furthermore, lack of proper business plans as per legislative requirement during formation of 
WUAs, poorly articulated transfer of ownership, and poor capacity building for collective 
management of the schemes can all be attributed to the low success rate of MRIS. 
 
Although the informal arrangements that include the traditional norms and values, belief 
systems and kinship are important, they are not directly involved in securing water rights by 
the irrigators, especially where government agencies (Catchment Management Agencies 
(CMA), WUAs) and water policies are involved. The finding is critical for smallholders, 
including those at MRIS, where farmers misunderstand the SA water policy and perceive 
formation of formal structures like WUAs as a way by the government to introduce water 
levies on smallholder farmers, despite the anticipated benefits of securing water rights for the 
users. Change of mind-set and building on positive psychological capital through irrigation 
training and capacity building is therefore important among smallholder irrigation water 
users. 
 
The registration of MRIS farmers as members of the WUA comes with its own institutional 
and management challenges. Firstly, there were individual farmers of the scheme who were 
not prepared to be part of the association but still expected to have access to the same amount 
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of irrigation water as the members. In the case of MRIS, some farmers located at the upper 
section, who were perceived to be accessing more water than their counterparts located at the 
tail-end section, were less willing to be part of the WUA and were interested in preserving 
the status quo while the tail-end farmers, who were facing more water supply challenges, 
were willing to take part in the change process. The finding supported those by Bandarogoda 
(2005) and Madani and Dinar (2013) who concluded that head and tail-end farmers have 
opposing motivations when it comes to cooperating with regulatory authorities. The current 
design of MRIS infrastructure with no lockable off-take gates and the institutional set-up 
does not offer exclusive water rights to members of the WUA. As long as water is available 
in the canal, anyone can access the resource; hence members of the WUA do not receive any 
additional benefits over non-members.  
 
Furthermore, MRIS farmers do not pay for water and their inclusion as members of the WUA 
means they have equal access rights with commercial farmers in the area, who pay for 
irrigation water. Thirdly, the nature of irrigation infrastructure used by MRIS makes it 
difficult to measure actual volumes of water used by individual farmers unlike the sprinkler 
systems used by some commercial farmers in the same area. Whilst furrow irrigation is 
cheaper to maintain and much easier to operate (Crosby et al., 2000), water budgeting and 
equitable allocation remains a challenge due to lack of measuring devices (flow meters) and 
uncoordinated cropping patterns among  smallholder farmers in the scheme. This was 
worsened by non-adherence to the scheme irrigation roster and widespread unsanctioned 
diversions of water from the canal, which negatively affected consistency of supply and 
consequently crop production.  
 
Furthermore, anticipated benefit underlying IMT through formation of WUAs includes high 
pay-offs if successful (Shah, 2005). Success is measured in terms of revenue collection, cost 
recovery mechanisms, equity and improved coordination of water users, which were not 
being met due to a number of factors including non-cooperation among users and resource 
constraints. For instance, Shah (2005) noted that IMT tended to be smooth and relatively 
effortless where the irrigation system is high-performing and average farm size is large 
enough for command area farmers to operate as agri-businesses. The scheme under study 
resembles a complex system, where farmers in the command area have small land holdings 
(0.275ha) with less productivity, making it a challenge to bring them together to negotiate. 
Although smallholder farmers in MRIS qualify to access government financial assistance for 
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resource poor irrigation farmers through the WUA (DWAF, 2004b), this facility was not 
being utilised since the WUA was not fully operational. Furthermore, the long-term 
sustainability of the WUA might need to be considered, given the scepticism of smallholder 
farmers over the ability of the WUA, as a potential state organ, to collect irrigation 
maintenance fees and water levies from farmers.  
 
Accountability system (GS.3) 
 
Accountability systems (GS.2) are critical for effective collective management of irrigation 
schemes. The inclusion and subsequent participation of resource users in the monitoring and 
enforcement of operational rules through rotational management can be adopted as a possible 
strategy to improve scheme management. Through rotational management, irrigators can be 
subdivided into smaller groups to monitor behaviour of other users from a given canal section 
and reporting opportunistic user behaviour to the local irrigation management committee for 
sanctioning. By so doing, every member becomes accountable and irrigation water 
management might improve.  
 
The informal governance procedure in MRIS stipulated that irrigation committees should be 
elected every five years and the local government authorities are not allowed to interfere with 
the selection process. The rules were not written and enforcement was weak, hence some 
committee members served on the committees for more than ten years without being re-
elected. Some committee members felt that being members did not add any value to their 
daily irrigation activities and rather cost them time through attending committee meetings; 
hence there were no incentives to encourage them to participate. On the other hand, irrigators 
were often reluctant to remove a sitting member of the committee even if he/she was 
ineffective. Resignation or deaths have been the systems through which committee members 
leave office. These challenges reveal a weak governance system in the scheme, where the 
consequence of members overstaying in committees manifest in the form of complacency and 
negligence of duty. There are no incentives to join the committees, hence some potential 
committee members were not willing to take up responsibilities and therefore bad governance 






Property rights system (GS.4) 
 
Clearly defined property rights (GS.3) of water and land can improve ownership and 
accountability (GS.2) among users (Ostrom, 1990). The case study revealed that no entity had 
a complete bundle of rights over all or some of the components of the resource system (RS) 
and units (U). Irrigators in MRIS have rights to use land and water, but the access is not 
privately secured, hence land could be reallocated to other users by traditional authorities if it 
was deemed to be underutilised. Furthermore, water-use security was not guaranteed in 
MRIS, and the “use it or lose it” principle applies to all canal water users. Lack of clarity of 
the water access rights system (GS.3) negatively impacts water management due to 
unreliability of supply and lack of commitment by some users to invest in CPR infrastructure 
maintenance. Farmers were hesitant to commit financial resources to upgrade their water 
infrastructure due to non-exclusivity of the costs and benefits, with a potential impact of 
lowering resource productivity. This was consistent with Perret and Geyser (2007), who 
noted that smallholders in South Africa view irrigation schemes as government property, and 
as such maintenance and upgrading of the canal was assumed to be government‟s 
responsibility. This shows that positive psychological capital among irrigators was weak and 
its enhancement through capacity building workshops and training can improve farmers‟ 
attitude towards collective infrastructure maintenance.  
 
Operational rules (GS.5) 
 
Clarity of operational rules (GS.4) determines the success or failure of CPR management 
where large numbers of beneficiaries are involved (Agrawal, 2001). Although irrigation 
committees serve as recognised and accepted institutions to address problems of provision 
and sharing of irrigation water, a number of players were involved in the formulation and 
enforcement of water use rules in MRIS. However, some agencies operating in MRIS, like 
irrigation committees, traditional leadership, canal attendants and ordinary members, follow 
unwritten rules defined by the community together with irrigation water users. Therefore, the 
enforcement of the rules and the effectiveness of the agencies in managing local water-use 
were compromised. In order to understand the effectiveness of water management agencies 
operating in the scheme, farmers were asked to score the perceived effectiveness of seven 
water management institutions. The scoring was based on a five point Likert scale (1 = not 
effective to 5 = excellent) on the perceived ability of each water management institution to 
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enforce water abstraction and canal maintenance rules in the scheme. Table 3.1 reports the 
average scores of the ranking process.  
 
Table 3.1. Farmer evaluation of effectiveness of water management structures in Mooi 
River Irrigation Scheme, 2013 (n= 71) 
  Average 
Score 
Ranking 
Canal attendants/rangers 2.5 1 
Irrigation committees 2.5 1 
Department of Agriculture (Extension Officers) 2.4 3 
Ordinary scheme members/Irrigators 2.4 3 
Department of Water Affairs (Area representative) 2.1 5 
Traditional leadership 2.0 6 
Water User Association (WUA) 1.3 7 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
The results in Table 3.1 reflect the survey respondents‟ perceptions on the relative importance 
of canal attendants and irrigation committees in the management of irrigation water. The 
irrigators relied on canal attendants for daily allocation of water to the different blocks 
according to the roster, while irrigation committees were expected to enforce compliance to 
the roster. However, the results might also reflect a historical perspective, especially with 
regard to the responsibility of the canal attendants as rule enforcement agencies. There were 
only two out of five canal attendants operating in the scheme as the government did not 
replace them after retirement or death. However, their relevance in irrigation water 
management was perceived to be important, and the question was whether the government 
must completely let go of the canal attendants as part of the IMT approach or whether they 
should still be maintained. Farmers perceived the role of canal attendants in the management 
of water as more important than ordinary members as shown by higher scores; hence there 
might still be a need to maintain canal attendants as part of local water management 
structures. The fact that farmers rank the involvement of government departments and 
traditional leadership in water management lowly suggests a preference for a non-coercive 
approach in the management of canal water. The results indicate that there is room to 
strengthen irrigation water management by further empowering local structures and 
enhancing the role of WUAs and traditional authorities to manage water resources. Although, 
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the results reflect general perceptions of farmers on the role of various stakeholders in water 
management, it is quite possible that some respondents were generally unaware of the roles of 
some structures, and their perceptions may be biased according to the frequency with which 
employees of the various structures interact with members of the MRIS.  
 
3.3.1.2 Resource system and irrigation management in MRIS 
 
Canal water (RS.1) 
A resource system represents a stock of water and irrigable land that is available for 
everybody in the community (Sarker, 2013). Considering the case of canal water in MRIS, 
users indicated through focus group discussions that it was nearly impossible to exclude 
individuals from the resource system. This was mainly due to weak institutional by-laws 
regulating water access for non-participating members. The existing scenario was such that 
appropriators took advantage of any improvements on the system, even without making the 
required contributions. Furthermore, there was a strong linkage between land access and 
access to canal water in MRIS.  
 
Scarcity relative to water demand (RS.2) 
 
The users resolve provision problems by investing in the resource system and by combining 
physical capital with social capital so that irrigation water is allocated fairly and efficiently by 
all irrigators. However, evidence from MRIS revealed that the number of irrigation 
beneficiaries within and outside the scheme increased over the years. This is due to 
population increase in the area, which led to increase in demand for irrigation land. Irrigators 
indicated that the capacity of the canal has never been upgraded to cope with the increasing 
demand of irrigation water. Furthermore, irrigators perceive the Mooi River to be discharging 
less water than before (i.e. more than a decade ago). There are several explanations, including 
climate change, increasing uses of water upstream and siltation. There is, therefore, a 







Infrastructure characteristics (RS.3) 
 
MRIS has about 20.8 kilometres of the main irrigation canal, which feeds into four storage 
dams and numerous infield canals. The main canal is concrete lined, and maintenance is done 
by scheme members with some support from the provincial department of agriculture. The 
major challenge with the conveyance infrastructure is the state of collapse of the facility. 
Some off-takes have broken screw gates and others are rusty, making their operation a 
challenge. Where there are no metal screw gates, farmers use bags of sand to regulate or close 
water from the main conveyance. Sand bags were reported to be ineffective and result in 
water losses due to water leakages. Furthermore, the sand bags break and result in excessive 
silt deposits along the canal, which result in less volume of water flowing in the canal without 
spillage.  Beside the use of sand bags there are instances when some farmers use stones or 
wooden logs to channel water to their infield canals from the main conveyance canal. These 
were reportedly causing the canal to break, resulting in excessive loss of water from the 
canal.  
 
The challenge of water leakages was also common along infield canals, the bulk of which are 
either not lined or broken. Infield water leakages result in shortage of water to crops, but at 
the same time result in the development of water logged patches in areas where the leakages 
take place.  There is, therefore, a need to improve water management in the MRIS by 
maintaining and installing new lockable off-take gates along the main canal. Effective 
concrete lining of both main canal and the infield canal may reduce water losses, with a 
potential to increase water availability among farmers and reducing the chances of water 
logged conditions in the fields.   
 
Clarity of system boundaries (RS.4) 
 
Access to irrigation water was partly influenced by owning an irrigable piece of land within 
the canal‟s command area. However, there was no proper accountability and record keeping 
systems to account for actual size of land under irrigation in MRIS; hence the technical 
complexity of defining, with precision, the quantity of water available and demanded for crop 
production. This limited the capacity of local community and canal water users to manage 
water efficiently. The study also noted an increase in demand for irrigation land by 
community members, shown by pieces of irrigable land being developed outside the scheme. 
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The majority of the plots were allocated by traditional authorities, who did not have the 
technical expertise to take into account the water supply capacity of the canal. Land 
allocation for irrigation purposes was on a need basis, and the traditional authorities did not 
want to be found excluding some members of the community from accessing irrigation 
facilities. This comes at the back-drop of more than 30% of land lying fallow at any given 
time within the scheme, due to multiple factors, ranging from water constraint, inputs costs, 
old age of plot owners and lack of interest in farming. Although the traditional authorities had 
the power to reallocate idle irrigation land within the scheme to the landless community 
members, cases of reallocation are rare in MRIS due to close ties of families (kinship) and 
inheritance issues surrounding land ownership. Conflicting objectives of land access and 
utilisation exists between inheritance issues at household level meant to guarantee access to 
land by family members in the future and immediate productivity concerns. This was 
identified as a possible challenge impeding the productivity potential of smallholder schemes.  
 
3.3.1.3 Resource unit in MRIS 
 
The study considers irrigation water as the resource unit that requires community or user 
management. The challenge of managing irrigation water stems from its attributes, which 
include high mobility, highly subtractable and having an economic value born from the cost 
of infrastructure maintenance (Sarker, 2013). The MRIS draws water from the Mooi River at 
no direct cost, and it is diverted into a gravity fed canal that supplies the whole scheme. 
When the water enters the MRIS canal, it changes from a public good to a common pool 
resource (CPR). The case of MRIS is that due to high subtractability, when water is available 
in the canal, the motivation for users is to abstract it. Furthermore, water savings made by an 
individual and „left‟ (stored) in the storage reservoir or canal may at a later stage, be used by 
another operator deemed to have a higher priority of use at that time. Lecler (2004)  referred 
to this outcome as the „use it or lose it‟ mind-set. This phenomenon is inherent in the 
common property resource (CPR) and consequently diminishes the farmers‟ incentive to save 
water in MRIS. Apart from the potential for recurrent conflicts, the major problem affecting 
effective water conservation and demand management strategies on canal water, as in the 
MRIS, is lack of rule enforcement and compliance among water users. This might be because 




Focus group discussions (FGDs) with irrigation committee members developed an 
understanding of farmers‟ perceptions of reasons behind water management challenges in 
MRIS. Evaluation was based on what farmers perceived to be the major issues affecting the 
resource unit (U) in the scheme. Ranking of eight variables affecting water access and 
management in MRIS was done. The ranking allowed farmers to choose in order of priority 
and based on personal experiences the variables that greatly influenced water access and 
management in the scheme (score 1) and the variables with the least effect (scored 8) in 
chronological order. Results of the ranking process are presented in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2. Farmers’ perceptions of challenges associated with water management in 






(n =7 ) 
Block 6-10 
(Middle)  
(n = 8) 
Block11-15 
 (Tail-end) 
n = 11) 
Water supplied not adequate 4 5 3 
Conveyance structure leakages 1 1 5 
Unsanctioned water access by non-scheme 
members 
5 6 4 
Unsanctioned water access by scheme members 7 4 1 
Absence of regulatory policies 6 3 6 
Weak regulatory framework 8 2 2 
Increase in water users 2 8 7 
Increase in area under irrigation 3 6 8 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
Results in Table 3.2 indicate that head-end farmers perceived technical challenges, including 
leakages along conveyance structures, as greatly affecting availability of the resource unit in 
MRIS. Irrigators cited cracked canals and debris along the canal as the major causes of 
leakages. In contrast, tail-end farmers (Blocks 11-15 ) indicated that water being supplied 
along the canal was not enough to meet their irrigation requirements, although previous 
research indicated that the design capacity of the canal for MRIS was adequate to meet the 
water demand (Gomo et al., 2014b). The high ranking of unsanctioned water access by 
scheme and non-members points to poor water management systems resulting in unequal 
water distribution. The sentiments were also echoed by the farmers, who believe that the 
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existing irrigation programme was not adhered to and weak regulatory mechanisms 
negatively affect water supply in the tail-end blocks and water management in the scheme.  
 
With respect to temporal distribution of water, the procedures regarding water access in 
MRIS were organised by irrigation committees, with the help of government-paid canal 
attendants. As such, the study identified two different settings for the process of withdrawing 
water from the canal at any given time,  including:  
i. unlimited or uncontrolled withdrawal of water in situations where water supply was 
abundant in the whole canal system, and 
ii. if there was a water supply constraint, the order of withdrawal was unknown to the 
farmers. In addition, the amount of water for a single farmer was not restricted but 
was based on mutual understanding among farmers sharing the same distribution 
canal. 
The first scenario was usually applied in the rain season or after heavy rains and irrigation of 
crops was not considered critical. The second scenario was the one that occurred most often 
in MRIS, and there was a general agreement not to withdraw water outside the farmer‟s 
irrigation roster. Although the appropriation rules were attached to the provision rules and the 
local conditions, the study found that under either regime, all appropriators act according to 
their rational self-interest and attempt to maximise their own utility from the resource with no 
consideration for the impacts on other users and the community. When water level was low in 
both the Mooi River and the supply canal, demand for irrigation water in the scheme 
exceeded supply, posing a challenge on the sharing of the limited supplies of water. Rule 
violation among scheme members became dominant, especially as farmers access water 
outside their roster, with no appropriate sanctions enforced. This practice violated design 
principles 4 and 5. Irrigation management in MRIS was, therefore, found to be under-
performing due to poor enforcement of institutional design principles.  
 
3.3.1.4 Resource users and the decision making process in irrigation water management  
 
The effectiveness of water governance structures could be assessed on how diversity of 
interests is considered during the decision-making process. In this context, Wilson et al. 
(2013) emphasize two elements in the process of balancing interests: getting everybody truly 
represented in the decision-making process and facilitating the negotiation process by the 
timely distribution of credible, easy-to-access and understandable information, and by 
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ensuring that all stakeholders‟ problems and interests were catered for. It is important to note 
that user-based allocation of water is undertaken through collective management of water 
sources.  However, low level of cooperation hamper infrastructure maintenance in MRIS, 
resulting in poor allocation of water among users. Failure to identify and develop positive 
psychological capital among farmers was one of the factors leading to poor cooperation 
among farmers.  
 
The transaction cost of managing a large group size was the other institutional factor 
negatively affecting participation in collective activities at MRIS. Moreover, lack of clearly 
defined water distribution rules and mechanisms and non-compliance to appropriation rules 
by irrigators was resulting in low water allocation efficiency and poor performance of the 
irrigation scheme.  
 
3.4 Applying institutional design principles on irrigation management in MRIS  
 
According to Sarker (2013), design principles 1, 2, 3 and 7 (see section 3.2.1) serve to deal 
with appropriation and provision problems while principles 4, 5, 6, and 8 serve as sufficient 
conditions for fair allocation of the resource. As such, some principles are discussed together 
(for example, 3 and 7 for collective action arrangements and the need to self-organise, 
respectively, as well as principles 5 and 6 for graduated sanctions and the need to establish 
dispute-resolution mechanisms, respectively). In addition, positive psychological capital was 
also discussed as an additional sufficient condition for the management of CPRs. 
 
3.4.1 Clearly defined boundaries 
 
Boundaries of a CPR are defined with respect to users and the resource systems (Wilson et 
al., 2013). This means individuals or households with rights to withdraw resource units from 
the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. The 601 ha 
scheme at MRIS was being serviced by one main canal that supplied irrigation water to the 
scheme. Farmers owned multiple plots, depending on family size and leasing arrangements, 
and the farmland was fragmented into 0.1 ha plots to accommodate more beneficiaries in the 
scheme. Boundaries were, therefore, defined in terms of three aspects; that is, land ownership 
within the scheme, irrigation water access from the canal, and whether an individual qualifies 
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to use the canal water by virtue of being a community member or allocated a plot in the 
scheme (irrigators). 
 
Although the system had clearly defined boundaries in terms of space or area to be irrigated, 
enforcement and maintenance of the boundaries posed a serious threat to the management of 
water in the scheme. Irrigation land was continuously being accessed outside the scheme 
boundaries, through traditional and self-allocation by community members. This was done 
without due consideration of the capacity of the canal. Use of portable pumps that draw water 
directly from the canal or the extension of distributional canals was also being done by the 
irrigators to supply water to additional plots located outside the scheme boundaries. These 
activities compromised water access by other members, thereby negatively affecting their 
productivity. Weak enforcement of land boundaries in MRIS to counteract its negative 
impact on water resources management was a big challenge, which might turn the canal from 
being a CPR to an open access resource if not regulated. This could be averted by either 
excluding irrigators outside the scheme boundaries from accessing canal water or by 
upgrading the capacity of the canal to meet the increasing demand. In the immediate future, 
the focus has to be on enforcing resource withdrawal rules to ensure excludability at local 
level.  
 
Furthermore, there was no clear demarcation between authorised and un-authorised users of 
canal water in MRIS. As such, canal water was used for unintended uses like livestock 
watering and non-agricultural purposes like house construction and brick making by 
community members.  Despite the fact that canal water was exclusively meant for crop 
production purposes, no exclusivity rules exist to all other uses. This has a bearing on the 
day-to-day management of water resources, through potential non-cooperation by some user 
groups in violation of design principle 3. For instance, livestock farmers and brick makers 
utilising the canal water were not represented in the WUA that was formed, despite the 
impact they might have on irrigation water access. However, it can be highlighted that due to 
the diversified nature of rural livelihoods, some irrigators also owned livestock and also 
benefited from non-agricultural activities like brick making and laundry, thereby posing a 
challenge to enforce exclusive rights to canal water for irrigators. Recognising the multiple 
uses of canal water was paramount and further incorporating such users in the local water 
management structures might improve the management of canal water. Furthermore, if other 
users were to be accommodated, the canal capacity required a capacity upgrade or livestock 
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farmers and brick makers have to get access to other water sources. Such alternative 
arrangements have to be collectively negotiated so that efforts to enhance the wellbeing of 
irrigators do not happen at the expense of others.  
 
3.4.2 Clarity on proportional sharing of benefits and costs 
 
Proportional sharing of benefits and costs form a major pillar for an effective incentive 
system in CPR management. The challenge in MRIS was the large number of beneficiaries, 
and where rule enforcement mechanisms are weak and fairness or equity are not guaranteed, 
the incentive was for users to free-ride. Quantity of water allocated to either paying or non-
paying members was not guaranteed at MRIS. The same applies to the contribution of 
members towards infrastructure maintenance, i.e. labour contribution, financial contribution, 
decision making and policing roles. As such, improving the clarity of benefits and costs as 
well as realigning the IAs was necessary to improve resource sharing.  
 
3.4.3 Collective arrangements, monitoring and self-organisation (principles 3 and 7).  
 
The case of canal water access in MRIS was such that entry was easy and exclusion was 
difficult or not attempted due to kinship and lack of clarity of appropriation rules. Principle 1 
and 6 were essential to ensure effective application of principle 3 in MRIS. Maintenance of 
irrigation infrastructure also requires full implementation of design principle 3 for facilitating 
collective choice actions among canal water users. However, farmers expressed their 
concerns pertaining to the scale and multiple users of the canal water, whose numbers were 
too large to be effectively managed by the elected committee members. Previously, there 
were many canal attendants to ensure effective monitoring of the canal. However, these were 
no longer being employed or replaced after retirement or death as the government slowly 
implement IMT policies. The farmers argued that this stance was causing water sharing 
problems in the scheme, and their assertion was supported by the collective action theory, 
which indicates that smaller CPR groups were easier to manage than larger groups (Agrawal, 
2001; Gadzikwa, 2008). Learning from other experiences in Africa, the disappearance of 
canal guards and replacement by water user associations in the Gezira scheme in Sudan led to 
a chaotic situation in water distribution after transfer (Van der Zaag and Rap, 2012). This 
study, therefore, identified the need for great caution in fully transferring smallholder 




MRIS has a large number of participants, and the case exposes a situation where a common-
pool resource is highly subtractable and unequal allocation of water led to shortages due to 
management problems. In contrast, Ostrom (1991) noted that if irrigators or CPR users are 
strongly involved in the decisions and the establishment of rules, they must have the capacity 
to modify operational rules to suit the group size at minimal cost. In MRIS, farmers compete 
for water and by so doing compromise the potential benefits of collective sharing of the 
resource. The right of appropriators to devise their own institutions (design principle 7) was 
therefore lacking.  In MRIS there were no governmental rules governing the irrigation 
process, except with respect to access of support services like extension services and tractors. 
The irrigators were completely responsible for the collective management of the system. 
However, rule violation negatively impacted the management process, with little 
consequence to the perpetrators. 
 
3.4.4 Congruence between resource appropriation and provision rules 
 
According to design principle 8, appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities around irrigation water in MRIS were organised in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises (that encompass individuals as well as organisations) at 
local, regional and national level. At the local level there were the irrigators and the irrigation 
committees, with the CMA operating at a regional level. The national level was another layer, 
but with little importance because decisions made at this level were not directly impacting the 
direct day-to-day running of irrigation activities. Only the local and regional layers respond 
through compliance and enforcement of the policies.  
 
Although the appropriation rules were attached to the provision rules and the local conditions, 
the study found that under either regime all appropriators act according to their rational self-
interest and attempt to maximise their own utility from the resource with no consideration for 
the impacts on other users and the community. Low water levels in the Mooi River or the 
MRIS canal constrained the supply; hence demand for irrigation water in the scheme 
increased. This posed a challenge on the sharing of the limited supplies of water. The 
violation of water sharing rules among scheme members became dominant, characterised by 
farmers accessing water outside their roster, with no appropriate sanctions enforced. The 
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failure to enforce sanctions on those that do not follow water sharing rules and violated 
design principles 4 and 5, could be an indicator of under-performance among committee 
members and weak institutional structures in the MRIS.  
 
3.4.5 Graduated sanctions and establishment of conflict-resolution mechanisms  
 
Appropriators of canal water in MRIS had access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts 
among themselves. These include irrigation committees and the traditional leadership 
structures that preside over the village courts. However, despite access to these arbitration 
mechanisms, rule breaking was common and it was causing irrigation management 
challenges in MRIS, where offenders were not even recorded. A penalty of R200 is payable 
to the village headman if a water user flouts water access rules including irrigating outside 
the roster (stealing water), wasting water and not participating in canal maintenance 
activities. The fine was not payable to the irrigation committees, hence the money was put to 
personal use and not used to upgrade or repair irrigation infrastructure. In some instances, 
committee members were charged the same fee if irrigators in their respective areas flouted 
irrigation rules. While the rationale was to instil commitment to monitor water-use among 
committee members, one chairperson of the committee who paid the fine to the headman 
indicated dissatisfaction with the penalty system. The offense was committed by one of the 
irrigators in her area when she was away, but she was still made to pay the fine.  
 
In exploring the penalty issue to enforce compliance in an irrigation context, Wilson et al. 
(2013) assert that when irrigators lose the ability to feel morally committed to value and 
respect the rules, the power of the regulatory authority over the regulated agents diminishes, 
thereby increasing chances of non-compliance by the latter. Specific roles of traditional 
leaders in irrigation water management in MRIS are not clearly defined, but their role in 
conflict resolution among community members gave them the right to implement the same 
even in irrigation matters. Proper incorporation of the traditional leaders into the water 
management structures like WUA and CMA might need to be considered, with the hope of 
improving collective management of resources at local levels. This strategy might be 
effective in MRIS where the culture, norms and belief systems of surrounding communities 




The case of MRIS revealed a reliance on informal rules and governance systems supported by 
formal governance structures, which were weak and failed to clearly define the property 
rights and water security systems at scheme level. The importance of recognising the 
polycentric nature of governance mechanisms and the need to relate to each institution for 
effective irrigation water management was noted. In summary, the IAs for water management 
in MRIS needs to be redesigned. 
 
3.4.6 Importance of positive psychological capital in CPR management 
 
According to Luthans et al. (2007), the major components of psychological capital allow 
resource users to have confidence (self-efficacy), make positive contributions (optimism), 
persevere toward goals (hope) and build a sustaining effort, allowing them to bounce back to 
attain success when faced with obstacles and adversity (resilience). The element of positive 
psychological capital was missing among farmers in MRIS. The notion that smallholders in 
most communally-managed schemes that were/are still being funded by the government 
regard the infrastructure as belonging to government (Perret, 2002), can be changed through a 
mind-set shift, defined in the context of psychological capital. Self-efficacy, hope and 
resilience were missing among farmers in MRIS, evidenced by farmers quitting farming and 
infrastructure deterioration as farmers fail to participate in collective activities like irrigation 
maintenance.   
 
Other indicators of low positive psychological capital among MRIS farmers include: the slow 
pace at which irrigators were willing to join and participate in the local WUA for fear of 
being charged water fees, poor chances of farmers volunteering to serve as committee 
members leading to the prolonged stay of existing members, prevalence of free-riding and 
rule violation at the expense of other irrigators, and the prevalence of fallow plots across the 
scheme. Abandonment of plots by farmers citing water distribution challenges was viewed as 
a lack of resilience and hope. Farmers might tap into positive psychological capital to address 
water challenges instead of quitting or underutilising land. As such, the positive thinking 
processes brought along with psychological capital ensure effectiveness and success in the 
collective management of CPRs. A broader focus and adoption of strategies to enhance 
psychological capital among irrigators might improve irrigation performance. It can be 
argued that technical skills training and the redesigning of irrigation policies without 
supporting the psychological component might yield minimum results in the long-run. 
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3.5 Alternative water governance mechanisms in MRIS 
 
There was a polycentric water governance system of canal water in MRIS, made up of local 
irrigation committees, traditional leaders, and officials from the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fisheries (DAFF), CMA, WUA and crop production cooperatives. The multiple 
organisations present a complex set of both formal and informal governance structures. 
However, clarity of organisational roles and relevance in water management was critical. 
Through focus group discussions, water users ranked the preferred management structures to 
avert the water management challenges in the scheme. Although focus could have been put 
on improvement of operational rules, these may fail to yield positive results if the 
enforcement agencies are weak and not supported by the users. Farmers ranked the preferred 
institutional arrangements on a five-point Likert scale, and average scores were allocated for 
each arrangement. The scores ranged from the least preferred (score 1) to the most preferred 
(score 5) and the results are presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3. Farmers’ perceptions of various strategies to improve water management in 
the Mooi River Irrigation Scheme, 2013 (n=71) 
 Intervention strategy Average 
Score 
Ranking 
Training farmers on water management  3.2 1 
Empowering local irrigation/block committees 3.2 1 
More involvement of Department of Agriculture extension officials 3.1 3 
More involvement of Department of Water Affairs  representatives 3.1 3 
WUA membership of all irrigators 2.9 5 
Involvement of traditional leadership 2.7 6 
Involvement of political leadership (councilors)  2.5 7 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
Irrigation water users ranked the need for training of farmers and empowerment of irrigation 
committees top as possible intervention strategies towards improving water management. 
This comes on the back-drop of minimal farmer training on irrigation management, including 
scheduling and drainage by water users in MRIS. Furthermore, this has to be complemented 
by effective irrigation committees that can enforce operational rules for the benefit of the 
entire scheme. The effectiveness of irrigation committees can improve if the majority of users 
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have the know-how of the best practices in irrigation management, which can be acquired 
through training. A combination of irrigator training and effective irrigation committees can 
ensure effective cooperation in water management and collective action activities, as 
stipulated in Ostrom‟s third institutional design principle. The study, however, found that 
irrigators were willing to improve irrigation management. As such, involvement of 
government authorities was ranked slightly lower than training of irrigators and committee 
involvement (Table 3.3). This showed that irrigators were keen to cooperate among each 
other rather than having government authorities involved in the crafting and enforcement of 
local water management rules. Similarly, irrigators have shown their dissatisfaction with the 
involvement of political leadership in the management of irrigation water.  
3.6 Summary 
The study sought to understand the governance and institutional arrangements around 
smallholder water management at MRIS. Given the qualitative and investigative nature of the 
research design, there was no test to identify which arrangement was superior to achieve 
good irrigation management. The chapter concluded that rule-violations were common, yet 
sanctioning was rare among smallholder irrigators. The study, therefore, asserts that CPR 
users relied more on deep rooted social capital of kinship and trust to monitor each other‟s 
actions, providing room for rule violation. Under such circumstances, associated with non-
cohesive rule enforcement, Olson (1965) indicated that rational group members always free-
ride to maximise their utility against the wishes of other group members. Traditional 
leadership was also found to have strong linkages with the socio-cultural aspects of rural 
irrigators, whose role in resolving internal problems around water sharing, sharing of benefits 
and costs as well as compliance with operational rules was critical. Furthermore, institutional 
mechanisms and incentives to ensure that additional benefits accrue to those who cooperate 
and comply with membership rules of user associations were missing and need to be 
developed at scheme level. Institutional by-laws clarifying ownership and access rights for 
water users need to be strengthened. Rotational management of canal water by all irrigators 






While technical interventions like provision of lockable water supply infrastructure to ensure 
easy control of unsanctioned withdrawal of water, upgrading of supply capacity and water 
measurement devices can be pursued at scheme level, focus on improving the institutional 
arrangements, management capacity and the governance systems can achieve better water 
allocation and minimize supply uncertainties. Without investing in building effective local 
institutions, promoting user cooperation and building positive psychological capital among 
users, engineering interventions for CPR management are often subject to vandalism and 






































4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines farmers‟ perceived water-use security at farm level. The study applied 
principal component analysis (PCA) to group the major determinants of water-use security 
among smallholder irrigators in MRIS. The PCA was applied taking into account the broad 
definition of water-use security. As such, the multiple components defining water-use 
security, that include physical availability of the resource, quality, pricing and distribution 
issues, were scored by irrigators and indices were generated to measure water-use security in 
relative terms. Socio-economic and institutional factors affecting water use security were 
regressed against the water-use security indices. The proceeding sections include the research 
methodology, wherein the conceptual framework and the empirical models are explained, 
followed by the results and discussion sections and, lastly, by the summary of the chapter.   
 
4.2 Research methodology 
 
4.2.1 Sampling and data collection 
 
Multistage sampling was used to draw a sample of 307 respondents from 824 scheme 
members. The sampled comprised of 246 scheme members, i.e., 29.7% of the total number of 
irrigators in the scheme, plus 61 respondents of an indeterminate population of non-members 
who irrigate from the MRIS. Pre-survey discussions with community leaders indicated that 
farmers were allocated plots in blocks closer to their homesteads, except in situations where 
plots were not easily available, thus forcing the farmers to take up plots in more distant 
blocks. Therefore, to ensure that a representative sample is drawn, the scheme was stratified 
into three segments (upper, middle, and tail-end) based on positions of individual farmers‟ 
irrigation plots along the main conveyance canal. The upper segment of the MRIS comprises 
of members farming in blocks 1 to 5, the middle segment comprises of members farming in 
                                                 
2
 This chapter gave rise to the following manuscript: Muchara B, Ortmann GF, Mudhara M 
and Wale E. Implications of institutional arrangements on agricultural water-use security: 
evidence from Mooi River Irrigation Scheme in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. (Under 
review: Water SA) 
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blocks 6 to 11, and the tail-end segment constitutes blocks 12 to 15.  Respondents were 
proportionally selected from each of the three sections based on the number of farmers in 
each segment of the scheme. A household questionnaire was used to extract data from the 
sampled farmers. Interviewees were contacted at farmers‟ homesteads to ensure easy tracing 
of the farmers by using homestead numbers and mobile telephone numbers.  
 
4.2.2 Conceptual framework  
 
Measurement and conceptualisation of irrigation water-use security is complex because water 
is not homogenous, and has many dimensions besides just quantity, which include: (a) 
location; (b) timing; (c) quality; and (d) variability/uncertainty (Hanemann, 2006). To a user, 
one litre of water is not necessarily the same as another litre of water if it is available at a 
different location, at a different point in time, with a different quality, or with a different 
probability of occurrence (Young, 1986:2-29). The water-use security concept refers to the 
satisfactory provision of all the above attributes of water to meet the demand of the 
consumer/irrigator. As such Hanemann (2006) proposed two ways to incorporate the multi-
faceted nature of water in a formal economic analysis. The first approach defines different 
types of water as different commodities. For example, the consumption of water in January is 
represented by Xl, that in February is represented by X2, that in March by X3, etc. The 
consumer is then assumed to have a utility function defined over monthly consumption 
throughout the year and also over other commodities whose consumption is denoted by z, 
leading to the formulation: 
 
U = U(X1, X2,..., X12, z)         [4.1] 
 
Therefore, each month would have separate demand function, indicating the water-use 
security of an irrigator vary over time (Hanemann, 2006). Economically, this means the 
demand for water in the i
th
 month will be a function of the price of water in that month, the 
prices of water in the other months (which may or may not be different), and the price of z, as 
well as the consumer's income,   
Xi = h
i
 (Pl, P2 ,..., PN ,Pz, Y). The differences between one month's demand function and that 
of another will reflect the different ways in which the two monthly consumptions enter the 
underlying utility function (4.1) (Hanemann, 2006). While this approach can easily be 
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applied to drinking water or where water markets exist, it poses a challenge in smallholder 
irrigation set-up, where water is neither measured nor priced. 
  
The second alternative framework for analysing differentiated commodities, known as the 
characteristics approach to consumer demand was provided by Lancaster (1966) and Maler 
(1971). The Lancaster-Maler model extends the utility model (4.1) by offering an explicit 
account X's, based on their specific characteristics (Maler, 1971). Suppose there are K 
relevant characteristics (attributes), and qik denote the amount or level of the kth characteristic 
associated with one unit of consumption of commodity i. The characteristics of each 
commodity are taken as given by the consumer who is free to vary only the quantity of the 
commodity, Xi. Thus, if the consumer wishes for more of the kth characteristic, he/she 
accomplishes this by consuming more quantity of the commodity, because the desired 
characteristic cannot be detached or provided separately from the product; quality variation is 
accomplished through quantity variation (Hanemann, 2006). This dilemma that affect 
common pool irrigation water, is that quality of water supplied, reliability of supply without 
and quantity of water available for irrigation is inseparable, and therefore need to be assessed 
concurrently.  
 
If these attributes could be separated, then water could be regarded as N separate 
differentiated commodities together with undifferentiated consumption, z. The utility 
function therefore takes the form: 
 
U = U(X1, X2, , XN, q1, q2, , qN, z)        [4.2] 
 
where qi = (qi1, ..., qik). 
  
Since irrigation water-use security is multi-faceted with respect to consumer choice, the 
second approach provides a better framework for analysing the demand for attributes and can 
be give a better approximation of water-use security. In addition to providing a framework 
for conceptualizing the demand for certain attributes of irrigation water, the Lancaster-Maler 
model also provides a framework for the economic valuation of the attributes (Maler, 1971), 
hence can also be used to measure water users' willingness to pay (WTP) for better 
availability of water, more reliable water supply, or more generally water of one type versus 
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another (groundwater versus surface water), or availability of water at one location versus 
another (Hanemann, 2006). 
 
The attributes that describe irrigation water is not limited to the type of physical 
characteristics such as location, timing, quality, and reliability, but also include other aspects, 
such as how the water is provided, and the users‟ preferences, fairness in allocation or 
payment (Lancaster, 1966). The Lancaster-Maler formulation also permits one to incorporate 
psychological or sociological attitudes within an economic model of the demand for water, so 
that one can analyse how these attitudes might generate a different water-use security status 
obtained from a particular source (Maler, 1971). 
 
Based on the definition of water-use security (Komnenic et al., 2009), the various attributes 
of water-use security such as reliability of water supply, adequacy of water supply, price of 
water, quality of water, compliance to regulatory frameworks, conflict resolution 
mechanisms; have been measured and used as indicators of water-use security. At farm level, 
irrigation water-use security can be measured in relative and not in absolute terms; hence the 
need to encompass as many dimensions of water-use security as possible. Positive feedback 
from the respective attributes might be an indicator of good or satisfactory access/security, 
while negative responses reveal poor performance with respect to water use security. 
Improved water access in terms of volumes and the regulatory environment is expected to 
increase water use security, and consequently agricultural productivity (yields, incomes).   
 
4.2.3 Empirical models  
 
The study adopted two statistical tools to understand the relationship between institutional 
arrangements in irrigation management and water-use security at farm level. As noted before, 
the definition of water use security poses a measurement challenge, hence the need for more 
robust methods to analyse water-use security at farm level. First, PCA was used to generate 
the water-use security indices and group them into three main dimensions. Secondly, the PCs 
were regressed against a number of institutional variables to determine their effect on water-
use security. Detailed description of the analytical techniques used is presented in the 





Principal Component Analysis 
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a multivariate data analysis technique, to reduce the 
dimensionality of a large number of interrelated variables, while retaining as much as 
possible of the variation present in the data set (Jolliffe, 2002:1-9). According to Jolliffe 
(2002:1-9), the  reduction is achieved by transforming to a new set of variables, the principal 
components, which are uncorrelated, and which are ordered so that the first few retained 
components explain the variation present in all of the original variables. This can be 
expressed in mathematical terms following Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006:459-468);  
 
PC1 =  a11X1 + a12X2 +………………+ a1nXn      [4.3]  
 
PCm =  am1X1 + am2X2 +………………+ amnXn     [4.4] 
 
Where amn represents the weight for the m
th
 principal component and the nth variable. 
 
Application of the PCA is wide including the construction of poverty index, food-security 
index, household asset index and wealth index (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001), social capital 
index (Mabuza et al., 2012) and recently has also been applied to calculate water security 
index (Sinyolo et al., 2014b). Similarly the study applied the PCA to reduce a large number 
of dependent variables that could be used as proxies for agricultural water-use security. A 
total of nine variables relating to agricultural water-use security were ranked by respondents 
based on their personal experiences to determine individual water-use security status. 
Respondents ranked on a 5 point Likert scale, the level of water use security by indicating 
whether they strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree or strongly agree to the hypothesised 
water related scenarios. The values increased from 1 if the respondent strongly disagrees to 5 
if he/she strongly agrees with the statement. For instance, water users ranked their situation as 
to whether water supply is adequate in terms of volume supplied, whether the user has the 
capacity to pay for water infrastructure maintenance, whether the user regularly participate in 
decision making processes regarding water allocation; and the variables are presented in 
Table 4.1. Some statements were asked to proxy for certain water security indicators defined 
by (Komnenic et al., 2009) and Hanemann (2006). For instance, farmers in the study area are 
currently not paying for water but are paying for infrastructure maintenance. Therefore, the 
ability to pay for infrastructure maintenance was used as a proxy for farmers‟ ability to pay 
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for water. Some variables like quality of water were deliberately left due to lack of 
heterogeneity emanating from a single source of water. Key informants and focus discussions 
in the same area also indicated satisfaction with the quality of water for irrigation purposes.   
 
Table 4.1. Description of variables used to identify water use security in Mooi River 
Irrigation Scheme, 2013 (n=307) 
Variable label Scale 
Water sharing at farm level is fair W_DISTR 1-5 
Water is supplied in adequate quantities W_ADEQ 1-5 
Water supply to my plot is reliable RELWAT 1-5 
Conflict resolution mechanisms are effective INV_CONF 1-5 
The penalty system is effective EF_PENLT 1-5 
I have the capacity to pay for infrastructure 
maintenance 
CAPAY 1-5 
I often participate in infrastructure maintenance  M_PARTIC 1-5 
Reliability of communication networks for 
water issues 
RELCOM 1-5 
I participate fully in decision making relating to 
water allocation in the scheme 
WAT-CONS 1-5 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
Note: Strongly disagree=1, disagree=2, neutral=3, agree=4, strongly agree=5 
 
The dimensions of water use security were extracted from the variables in Table 4.1. The 
coefficients are computed such that the first principal component (PC1) to the last principal 
component, explain the largest to the smallest variation of the original variables, respectively 
(Jolliffe, 2002:1-9). By applying the Kaiser criterion, three PCs with eigenvalues greater than 
1 were retained, and were used as dependant variables in an Ordinary Least Squares 








Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model 
 
Water use security is a relative term, and the use of a single index to define water use security 
might not offer sufficient dimensions especially among heterogeneous groups.  As such, three 
regression models were estimated, whose dependent variables were derived from the PCA 
and represent the dimensions of water use security among respondents. According to Cook 
and Bakker (2012), a water user is considered to have better water use security if water 
supply is guaranteed, has capacity to pay for the water, enforcement mechanisms are 
satisfactory and farmer actively participate in decision making processes concerning 
irrigation water in the scheme.   Following Gujarati (2004), the OLS regression model is 
specified as:   
Yi = β0 + βiXi + µi         [4.5] 
Where Yi is the agricultural water use security index (PC1, PC2 and PC3) for farmer i; Xi is a 
vector of socio-economic and institutional factors affecting water use security; β0 is the 
intercept; βi are the coefficients to be estimated and µi is the error term.  
 
4.2.4 Dependent and independent variables 
 
4.2.4.1 Dependent variables:  
 
PCs that identified the different dimensions of water security were used as dependent 
variables in the OLS regression model. Similar studies in food security and other wealth 
indicators have often placed the PCA derived indices into two or more categories (Filmer and 
Pritchett, 2001; Sinyolo et al., 2014b), defined as severe, fair or good. The cut-off points and 
the methods of categorisation are critiqued for relying on arbitrary and subjective 
percentages, with minimum scientific backing (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006:459-468).  
For instance, Filmer and Pritchett (2001) used cut-off points to group households into broad 
socio-economic categories based on an asset index, with the lowest  40%  representing the 
poor while the upper 20% represented the rich. The assumption there was that the socio-
economic status is uniformly distributed, which might not be substantiated and therefore was 
not adopted in this study. Gwatkin et al. (2000) also assumed uniformity of the socio-
economic index and used quintiles to group households into distinct socio-economic groups. 
In this study, applying arbitrary cut-off points, such as the 40–40–20 split as in Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001), was not feasible and  would have disaggregated the distribution, but it would 
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not reflect the exact nature of the underlying data, hence the use of continuous measures of 
water-use security. Besides, agricultural water-use security among users is always measured 
in relative and not in absolute terms; hence, this would not justify the placing of irrigators 
into distinct groups based on the computed index. 
 




The literature on agricultural water-use security at farm level is limited and does not clearly 
depict its relationship with household socio-economic attributes. However, Sinyolo et al. 
(2014b) argued that demographic attributes that include age, gender and farm experience are 
critical determinants of water-use security. Furthermore, a number of studies, e.g. Van der 
Zaag and Rap (2012) and  FAO (2012), identified significant relationships between water 
access and access to credit, gender, education level and age. With reference to gender issues 
around water access, Van der Zaag and Rap (2012)  and FAO (2012) indicated that 
masculinity played a major role in the performance of water sharing schemes. It can, 
therefore, be argued that demographic attributes are critical in determining water-use security 
at farm level, where the elderly and women are postulated to be associated with agricultural 
water insecurity, while an increase in farming experience might improve water-use security 
among irrigators. Based on the assumption that capacity to pay for infrastructure maintenance 
is influenced by the household‟s income levels, it was hypothesised that the level of income 
from irrigation activities is an incentive for households to participate in irrigation farming, 
hence has a positive effect on water-use security.  
 
Institutional variables 
Shah et al. (2004) postulated that the IAs governing irrigation schemes influence the 
performance of the latter and consequently water-use security. Since there are sequential 
linkages and synergies among institutional components, performance of communal irrigation 
schemes are likely to be better with well-defined IAs than without (Shah et al., 2004),  
 
In an environment like the smallholder agricultural sector in South Africa, where water 
markets are non-existent and informal IAs dominate, an analysis of the influence of 
arrangements that are necessary to support water-access is critical. As such, formal and 
66 
 
informal IAs that are hypothesized to directly or indirectly impact on irrigation water access 
and consequently water-use security status include membership in specific groups such as 
WUAs, cooperatives or an irrigation scheme. In South Africa, the informal IAs include 
village committees, water committees and social ties among users, which are reinforced by 
formal and legal requirements for farmers to form WUAs as enshrined in the 1998 National 
Water Act (RSA, 1998).  
 
The study also assessed variations in the perception-based information of water users on 
institutions governing water resources, including irrigation committees, application of water 
governing rules, resource sharing, and cost sharing in the scheme. Although perception-based 
information may be subjective due to factors such as bias and expectations, it offers an 
overall indication of how water users perceive the local institutions and governance systems, 
and thus their willingness or otherwise to cooperate with the system. Variations in 
perceptions can be interpreted as an indicator of uncertainty about the features of water 
institutions and their performance impacts (McKay and Keremane, 2006). At a local level, 
individual perceptions about irrigation management can also be considered as a measure of 
institutional effectiveness, hence their inclusion in the analysis. Since the main function of 
institutions is to reduce uncertainty and make human behaviour predictable, the extent of 
uncertainty or ambiguity evaluated in specific cases can also provide comparative insights 
into the relative efficacy and performance of water institutions in different contexts (Shah, 
2005). 
 
4.3 The results and discussions 
 
4.3.1 Descriptive analysis of socio-economic and institutional variables  
 
Based on a sample size of 307 respondents, the characteristics of the respondents are 
presented on Table 4.2 and 4.3. The average age of the respondents was 56.9 years, ranging 
between 20 and 93 years. Generally, the farmers are relatively old, with an average farming 
experience of 21.9 years, ranging between 1 and 60 years. The high number of years of 
farming experience might signify that there were few entrants into farming, especially the 
youth. On average, the farmers‟ homesteads are located 1.34km from their irrigation plots, 
with the furthest located 4km away. Distance is not a major threat to water access, given that 
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the literature has presented farmers who walk much longer distances to access irrigation 
services. 
 
Table 4.2. Descriptive analysis of continuous variables for sample farmers, Mooi River 
Irrigation Scheme, 2013 (n=307) 
Description Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Age of household in years AGE 56.99 13.18 20 93 
Farming experience in years F_EXPER 21.94 13.95 1 60 
Income from irrigation farming 
(Rands per annum) 
IRGINCO  3807.00 
(R13843.63/ha) 
5672.27 0 33500 
Average annual contribution by 
a water user towards irrigation 
maintenance (Rands) 
AV_CONT 100.35 109.12 0 600 
Average distance of homestead 
from the canal (km) 
HMSDIST 1.34 1.22 0 4 
Irrigated area per farmer (ha) IRRSCH_HA 0.275 0.013 0.1 1.5 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
The returns from irrigation farming are fairly low, with an average of R3807 per annum. 
Average irrigated land per household was 0.275ha, and therefore, returns from irrigation was 
approximately R13 843/ha per household per annum. This figure is less but close to the 
R15000/ha per annum reported by Sinyolo et al., (2014a) as the revenue from irrigation 
farming per household in the Msinga area of KwaZulu-Natal Province. However, most 
farmers in MRIS did not plant in winter (May-August) due to low irrigation water supply. 
This reduced farm incomes for the farmers in MRIS. However, although returns are low and 
expansion of land under irrigation does not seem feasible, there is room to improve returns 
through intensification of the production systems. Improved water provision in winter, 
fencing of fields, institutional support to promote collective maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure may all be explored to improve yields in MRIS.  
 
A summary of the categorical variables are presented in Table 4.3. It is important to note the 
high number of female headed households (72.6%) in the area, who also happen to be the 
most active in irrigation farming. The less number of males taking part in irrigation 
agriculture might also be due to culture. Irrigation farming is considered to be a female 
activity in the area, while male concentrate on cattle rearing (Sinyolo et al., 2014b). While 
canal water is meant for irrigation, lack of clarity on who the beneficiaries should be is 
68 
 
indicated by the factor that about 20% of the respondents are actually irrigating plots located 
outside the scheme boundaries.   
 
Table 4.3 shows that a small percentage of respondents (8.5%) are actually members of the 
WUA in the area, and only 36% have received some form of training in irrigation. This 
shows a gap in terms of institutional support, especially with regard to government 
departments. Extension services need to be improved to ensure more access to irrigation 
training. Furthermore, more capacity building workshops are required to ensure that farmers 
comply with the National Water Act of 1998, by registering as water users.  
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive analysis of categorical variables of sample farmers, Mooi River 
Irrigation Scheme, 2013 (n=307) 
Description Variable Units  Freq.  Percent (%) 
Gender of household head  GENDER 1=Male  84 27.4 
0=Female 223 72.6 
Membership to the irrigation 
scheme 
SCH_MEB 0= No  61 19.9 
1= Yes 246 80.1 
Training in irrigation water 
management  
TRAWAT 1=Yes 111 36.2 
0=No 196 63.8 
Whether an individual irrigator 
is a  member of a Water User 
Association  
WUA_MEB 1=Yes 26 8.5 
0=No 281 91.5 
Whether a water user is a 
member of any group that is 
involved in water use. 
GRP_WAT 1=Yes 75 24.4 
0=No 232 75.6 
Position of farmer‟s plot  along 





Upper (dummy) 62 20.2 
Middle(dummy) 112 36.5 
Tail-end (dummy) 133 43.3 
Perceived effectiveness of the 
committee members  
COMIT_EF 1=Effective 188 61.2 
0=Not effective 153 49.8 
Perceived condition of 
irrigation infrastructure  
INFRASCO 0= Bad  259 84.4 
1= Good 48 15.6 
Whether appropriation rules 
are clearly defined and known 
to all water users  
APRULS 0 = Bad 243 79.2 
1= Good 64 20.8 
Whether there is equitable 
sharing of water resources  
RESHAR 0 = Bad 202 65.8 
1 = Good 105 34.2 
Whether there is equitable 
sharing of maintenance 
COSTSHAR 0 = Bad 194 63.2 
1 = Good 113 36.8 




Statistics reveal that infrastructure condition, resource sharing and compliance to 
appropriation rules are all poor, indicating institutional failure. In view of the challenges 
highlighted, the dimensions of water use security among irrigators were assessed.  
 
4.3.2 Proxies of agricultural water-use security  
 
The societal challenge of achieving and sustaining agricultural water-use security is 
determined by many factors. Grey and Sadoff (2007) identified three main determinants of 
water security at national and global level, namely (1) the hydrologic environment, (2) the 
socio-economic environment, and (3) changes in the future environment.  The hydrologic 
environment refers to the absolute level of water resource availability and its spatial 
distribution, while the socio-economic environment refers to the structure of the economy 
and the behaviour of its actors. The future environment refers to the influence of climate 
change on the water situations. Furthermore, there is considerable and growing evidence that 
climate change also plays a major part in determining water security at a global scale. These 
factors play important roles in determining the institutions and the types and scales of 
infrastructure needed to achieve water security. 
 
Agricultural water-use security at a smallholder level is influenced by a range of local 
conditions. As such, the PCA was applied using a correlation matrix to group dominant 
determinants of water-use security in MRIS. The PCA can perform a compression function of 
the available information only if the null hypothesis is rejected. The Bartlett‟s sphericity test 
was applied to check if the observed correlation matrix diverges significantly from the 
identity matrix (theoretical matrix under H0: the variables are orthogonal). For this study, the 
Bartlett‟s test was significant (P < 0.001) and therefore rejects the null hypothesis that 
variables are not inter-correlated, hence a PCA can be performed efficiently on the dataset. 
However, Dunteman (1989) cautioned on the drawback of the Bartlett‟s test that tends to be 
statistically significant when the sample (n) increases. Therefore, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was also applied and a value 0.67, which is greater 
than 0.5, indicates that the PCA could be applied to the dataset. Table 4.4 presents the PCs of 
the major determinants of water-use security among smallholder farmers and appendix 4 





Table 4.4. Principal component analysis of the determinants of agricultural water 
security in Mooi River Irrigation Scheme, 2013 (n=307) 
Variable Principal Components 







W_DISTR 0.4511 0.3322 -0.3158 
W_ADEQ 0.4967 -0.0197 -0.0970 
RELWAT 0.5403 0.1301 -0.2053 
EF_PENLT -0.0443 0.6414 0.1043 
INV_CONF -0.1109 0.5468 0.4430 
RELCOM 0.2316 -0.2427 0.5397 
WAT-CONS 0.1828 -0.0278 0.4537 
CAPAY 0.3286 -0.2828 0.2686 
M_PARTIC -0.2202 -0.1494 -0.2687 
eigenvalue 2.48 1.34 1.11 
Variance explained 28% 15% 12% 
Cumulative % of variance explained 28% 43% 55% 
Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
Measure of sampling adequacy 
0.675 
Bartlett test of sphericity Chi-square  = 447.48 
Degrees of freedom  = 36 
p = 0.001 
Notes: Component loadings greater than |0.40| are highlighted in bold print 
Source: Survey data (2013). 
 
Applying the Kaiser criterion that PCs with eigenvalues greater that one may be retained, 
three PCs were therefore considered. The three PCs were named based on the dominant 
variables and explained 55% of the total variation in the data. The first component (PCWS1) 
explained 28% of the variation and was found to be closely related to the level of physical 
availability of water among irrigators. The dominant indicators of water access are reliability 
and consistency of supply (RELWAT), infield water sharing or distribution among farmers 




The second component (PCWS2) explained 15% of the variation and represented rule 
enforcement mechanisms around irrigation water management among users. The canal in 
MRIS is a CPR and as such is governed by both informal and formal rules that are known to 
the users. However, rule enforcement is always viewed as the major challenge leading to the 
collapse of infrastructure and inequitable sharing of CPRs (Ostrom, 2007). Rule enforcement 
was, therefore, measured in the context of conflict resolution mechanisms (INV_CONF) and 
effectiveness of the penalty systems (EF_PENLT) that are used to minimise rule breaking by 
CPR users. The indicators of rule enforcement show that CPR users can effectively monitor 
usage of water if strong conflict resolution mechanisms and penalty systems are enforceable, 
which are also positively associated with equitable sharing of water among irrigators.  
 
Irrigator involvement in the decision making process around water management is reflected 
in the third component (PCWS3). The indicators suggest that adequate consultation of water 
users (WAT-CONS) by management authorities is positively associated with reliability of 
communication networks for water related issues (RELCOM) and effectiveness of conflict 
resolution mechanisms (INV_CONF) around water access. These indicators are, therefore, 
positively associated with water-use security among small-scale irrigators.  
  
4.3.3 Factors affecting smallholder farmers’ water-use security 
 
The results of the PCA shows that water use security can be defined with respect to three 
dominant pillars; that is, water availability, rule enforcement mechanisms and the 
involvement of users in decision making process concerning irrigation water. The 
eigenvalues (variance) for each principal component indicates the percentage of variation in 
the total data explained. Following Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006:459-468), the percentage 
variations for individual PCs are not high, and this could reflect the number of variables 
included in the analysis or the complexity of correlations between variables, hence each 
included variable may have its own determinants (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006:459-468). 
As such, in order to capture the various factors affecting the water use security at farm level, 
OLS regression model was estimated using the three PCs as dependent variables, being 
explained by a range of socio-economic and institutional factors (Table 4.4). Adopting one 
index of water-use security would mean losing valuable information explained by the second 
and third PCs.  
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Model diagnostics tests were performed to test the fitness of the OLS model to the data. First, 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) were estimated to test for multicollinearity among 
variables. The VIFs were less than the critical value of 10 (Greene, 2003), indicating that 
multicollinearity was not a serious problem in the data set. Furthermore, heteroscedasticity 
was accounted for by estimating robust standard errors. Results of the OLS regression model 
are presented in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5. Regression results of factors affecting dimensions of water use security in 






















GENDER -0.0344 0.1315 0.0859 0.1554 -0.0037 0.1310 1.14 
F_XPER 0.0036 0.0046 -0.0092* 0.0047 -0.0145*** 0.0047 1.46 
IRGINCOM 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 1.36 
AV_CONT -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0018*** 0.0008 0.0014*** 0.0005 1.35 
HMSDIST -0.1006** 0.0451 0.0414 0.0608 -0.0698 0.0473 1.17 
Institutional variables 
SCH_MEB -1.6830*** 0.1849 -0.4733** 0.2311 0.2839** 0.1463 1.21 
WUA_MEB -0.1904 0.1892 0.0271 0.1660 0.2953 0.2045 1.09 
TRAWAT 0.1084** 0.0480 -0.0214 0.0559 -0.0537 0.0460 1.45 
COMIT_EF 0.1532*** 0.0523 -0.0537 0.0674 0.0239 0.0503 1.21 
GRP_WAT -0.1350 0.1233 0.1600 0.1228 0.3440** 0.1367 1.24 
APRULS 0.3313* 0.1996 0.1174 0.1921 0.3303* 0.1755 1.65 
INFRASCO 0.1191 0.1454 -0.2915* 0.1557 -0.4056*** 0.1431 1.5 
COSTSHAR -0.0078 0.0778 -0.0226 0.0818 -0.2088*** 0.0755 1.13 
BPOSITN1 0.8598*** 0.1699 0.3022* 0.1728 0.2887** 0.1207 1.88 
BPOSITN3 -1.8255*** 0.1613 -0.1296 0.1882 -0.6171*** 0.1366 2.09 





P = 0.001 
F-Stat =3.17 
R-square =0.102 
P = 0.001 
F-Stat =7.52 
R-square =0.229 
P = 0.001 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * mean significance at the 1%, 5 %, and 10% levels of probability, 
respectively 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
The regression results indicate a relationship between the perceived water-use security and a 
number of explanatory variables. The results have been discussed according to the different 
dimensions of water use security, namely physical on-farm availability of water, rule 
enforcement, and farmer involvement in decision making processes.   
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Physical on-farm availability of water in MRIS 
 
The results in Table 4.5 indicate that water availability is influenced by socio-economic and 
institutional arrangements related to water access. Irrigation income (IRGINCOM) is 
perceived to be positively related to water availability. Higher returns from irrigation 
activities, in terms of income, ensure that farmers have the capacity to pay for irrigation 
maintenance activities. Similarly, farmers with greater perceived water availability are more 
likely to invest in irrigation agriculture; hence they will tend to earn more from irrigation 
agriculture, ceteris paribus. This is a critical finding in the light of the current focus on IMT 
that seeks to transfer ownership of community irrigation schemes from government to local 
communities. By improving availability of irrigation water, farmers become relatively water 
secure and are, therefore, expected to improve their productivity. The challenge is that 
farmers are failing to internalise their expenditure in irrigation management; hence irrigation 
maintenance benefits all MRIS members/water users and the marginal benefit that accrues to 
a funder (paying farmer) of irrigation maintenance is probably small. This might be the cause 
of the perceived prevalence of free-riding in MRIS. 
 
The results also indicate that water users that belong to groups (formal and informal) are 
perceived to be more water insecure, especially regarding physical access. This was 
highlighted by the negative coefficient for members of the scheme (SCH_MEB), members of 
the water user association (WUA_MEB) and members of cooperatives (GRP_WAT). The 
groups or associations were meant to improve irrigation water access. It was, however, noted 
that non-group members flouted water appropriation rules at the expense of group members. 
For instance, non-scheme members had the opportunity to choose sites outside the scheme 
boundaries and strategically establish their plots in areas on the upper sections of the canal 
where there was better access to water compared to scheme members. This was identified as 
a major challenge affecting water-use security among farmers in the scheme. 
 
The WUA comprised mainly of members of the scheme, and the members perceived water 
availability to be inadequate. The water allocation system in the area did not give special 
treatment for water access to scheme members or members of the WUAs, because it was 
based on a “use-it or lose-it principle”, thereby putting non-compliant irrigators at an 
advantage. In South Africa, water access by members of WUAs is well defined and secured 
in the water policies and the regulatory framework of the National Water Act (NWA) of 
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1998. However, MRIS illustrates the informal nature of the water sector at smallholder level, 
which was characterised by weak implementation of statutes, thereby delaying the 
formalisation of the collective management of irrigation water. This might also have 
undesirable effect on the water management transfer to use groups in South Africa. Ensuring 
that incentives are put in place and water-use rights and exclusivity rights are protected for 
formal groups can improve the formalisation of collective water management, with the hope 
of also improving water-use security at scheme level. 
 
Institutional arrangements governing appropriation were weak and had no capacity to protect 
users; hence location of plots at the tail-end (BPOSITN3) of the supply infrastructure was 
negatively associated with water availability among farmers, while belonging to the head 
section (BPOSITN1) was positively associated with water availability. The results were 
consistent with Gomo et al. (2014a) and Sinyolo et al. (2014a), where tail-end water users 
were identified as more vulnerable to water insecurity. This was also a major challenge 
among farmers sharing the Kat River in Eastern Cape Province of South Africa (Mbatha and 
Antrobus, 2008).  
 
Perceptions were also sought on the effectiveness of irrigation committees (COMIT_EF), and 
their capacity to ensure water-use security at farm level. Respondents who perceive the 
committee to be effective also tend to perceive that they have greater water availability. 
Furthermore, the causality is more likely to reflect that respondents who perceive to have 
have greater water availability are more likely to be satisfied with the performance of the 
irrigation committees and will tend to perceive them to be efficient. Weak committees signify 
inefficient institutions, often lacking the will and capacity to enforce appropriation rules that 
ensure equal sharing of water resources and costs (Niasse, 2011). 
 
The estimated coefficients for the clarity of appropriation rules (APRULS) and access to 
irrigation training (TRAWAT) were statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level, 
respectively. The signs of the coefficients are both positive and conform to a priori 
information that the variables have a positive influence on perceived water availability at 
farm level. Access to irrigation training by farmers is perceived to improve efficient water 
utilisation at farm level, while well-defined appropriation rules is perceived to minimise free-
riding, hence improvement in water-use security among users.  However, distance from the 
canal (HHSDST) is perceived to negatively affect water access by farmers. Farmers staying 
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closer to the canal can monitor the flow and respond by channelling the water to their  fields 
unlike those whose homestead are far away from the conveyance structures.   
 
Rule enforcement among water users in MRIS 
 
It is noted that rule enforcement is measured as the respondents‟ perception that rules are 
being enforced, and not the actual level of enforcement of the rules (Table 4.5). The negative 
relationship between SCH_MEB and rule enforcement may be explained by the negative 
relationship between SCH_MEB and water access. The irrigators who are members of the 
group prove not to have reliable access to water; hence they may have the perception that the 
rules are not enforced.  
 
However, rule enforcement was perceived to be associated with farming experience 
(F_EXPER), average financial contributions towards scheme maintenance (AV_CONT), the 
condition of irrigation infrastructure (INFRASCO) and block position along the main 
conveyance canal (BPOSITN1). The condition of infrastructure in MRIS is poor and cause 
water leakages. Respondents who perceive that the condition of infrastructure is bad also 
perceive that rule enforcement is the main challenge. The condition of lockable gates is bad 
and in most cases not functional, hence monitoring and allocation of water to individual plots 
is perceived to be a challenge. Sharing of water is at two stages; first at scheme level among 
the head and the tail-end farmers, and secondly at plot level among farmers sharing the same 
distribution canal. However, farmers in the head section of the scheme (BPOSITN1) perceive 
that rules are being enforced. This might be due to the perceived reliability of water access by 
farmers located in the dead section compared to tail-end farmers. Down-stream farmers were 
perceived to be water constrained due to limited availability of the resource and enforcement 
of rules might be one way to improve water-use security among them. 
 
Farmer involvement in decision making process in MRIS 
 
The management of small-scale irrigation schemes in South Africa is being transferred from 
state control to the users, in line with PIM and IMT. The inclusion of farmers in decision 
making processes is important to improve water access and hence water-use security. In line 
with expectations, farming experience (F_EXPER) and average contribution towards 
irrigation activities (AVE_CONT) were perceived to influence farmers‟ involvement in 
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decision making processes. The positive relationship between average contributions and 
decision making could mean that farmers who contribute money towards irrigation activities 
may want accountability for the use of resources (Table 4.5). Furthermore, members of the 
scheme (SCH_MEB) and members of informal groups (GRP_WAT) were perceived to be 
more likely to participate in decision making processes around water use. This finding was in 
line with a priori expectation that group members were more likely to participate in decision 
making than non-members. However, membership of a WUA (WUA_MEB) was statistically 
insignificant, contrary to expectations. This might be because the WUA in the area was still 
in its inception phase and most decisions regarding water use in the scheme were still being 
controlled by the irrigation committees and canal attendants and not by the WUA. While the 
irrigation literature on IMT emphasizes the importance of farmer participation in the 
promotion of successful WUAs (Huang et al., 2010), in MRIS, there was little participation 
by farmers in the WUA. Rigorous persuasions by the officials from the Department of Water 
Affairs (DWA) and the local Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs (DAEA) 
led to few members joining the WUA. However, attendance of WUA meetings was poor, 
feedbacks from meeting outcomes were poor and farmers seem not to know how to 
participate in aspects of water management through the WUA.  
 
The results also indicate that irrigators were less likely to participate in decision making when 
they perceive that appropriation rules were not clear (APRULS) and that the condition of the 
irrigation infrastructure (INFRASCO) is bad. This was an indication of a reactive nature of 
the governance system in the scheme, where irrigators were called to attend meetings to 
address specific challenges like canal breakages and non-compliance to the roster. However, 
farmers who perceive distribution of irrigation maintenance costs (COSTSHAR) as unfair 
were less likely to be involved in decision making processes at scheme level.  
 
There was positive relationship between involvement in decision making and location of the 
farmers‟ plots at the head section of the scheme (BPOSITN1) and a negative relationship 
with location at the tail-end section (BPOSITN3). The results reveal that farmers at the tail-
end section of the scheme (Bpost3) were less likely cooperate in decision making because 
they perceive that their water access is more constrained than their counterparts in the dead 
section. In MRIS, farmers in the tail-end were always in short supply of water and often 
frustrated with the water allocation system. There might be need to improve their water 
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By applying PCA and an OLS regression model, the study managed to identify the major 
dimensions of water-use security among smallholder irrigation farmers, as well as examining 
the factors affecting agricultural water use security at among common pool irrigation users. 
The dimensions of agricultural water-use security at farm level include physical access to 
water, rule enforcement mechanisms at farm level, and involvement of water users in 
decision making processes pertaining to water access. Consequently, a combination of socio-
economic factors, institutional arrangements and governance systems affect the relative 
water-use security status of irrigators. The findings reveal that formal associations including 
WUAs, scheme membership and membership of cooperatives are currently not offering 
adequate incentives to water users at a local level. The perceived violations of rules by some 
water users was more likely depriving members of groups  of the anticipated improvement in 
water access at local level. Regarding enforcement mechanisms, conflict management and 
decision making, the existing structures were perceived to be too weak to ensure reasonable 
compliance to both formal and informal rules, manifesting in unequal sharing of common 
pool resources and costs among water users. The study concludes that water-use security 
among communal irrigators is multidimensional. Both technical and institutional support that 
ensure improved availability of water, promote the participation of farmers in decision 
making and effective conflict management mechanisms might ensure improvement in water-




















The chapter seeks to understand the various ways in which respondents participate in 
collective management of irrigation water. This is further expanded by identifying the 
determinants of farmer participation in the collective activities as a basis to inform 
smallholder irrigation management policy. This chapter draws its data from the survey 
instruments described in chapter 4 and this detail is, therefore, not repeated here. The 
following section presents the methodological framework, followed by the empirical results 
and discussions in section 5.3. The last section presents the summary of the results. 
 
5.2 Research methodology 
 
5.2.1 Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
The importance of collective action in the management of common pool resources like 
irrigation schemes is vital and cannot be overemphasised. Weirich (2008) argued that failure 
to monitor group or organizational activities involving several people may lead to the group 
degenerating into chaos and anarchy. The assumption underlying this view is that individuals 
involved in group activities invariably make decisions based on self-interest rather than the 
common good if their actions are not monitored and action taken if individual decisions result 
in collective loss or tragedy. This assumption finds justification in rational choice theory, 
which predicts that individuals will act in ways that maximize their personal utility without 
any regard of the common good. Although MRIS is a common pool resource (CPR), lack of 
rule enforcement and institutional failures to exclude non-irrigators, such as livestock owners 
and brick makers, from accessing canal water, led to the resource being open access. Hardin 
(1968) explained this scenario in the “Tragedy of the Commons”, wherein individuals with 
access to a common resource over-exploit it in their pursuit of personal gain, and thus end up 
                                                 
3
 This chapter gave rise to the following publication: Muchara B, Ortmann GF, Wale, E and 
Mudhara M (2014). Collective action and participation in irrigation water management: a 
case study of Mooi River Irrigation Scheme in KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa. Water 
SA 40(4): 699-708. 
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depleting the resource completely, resulting in a tragedy common to all. In the current study, 
the tragedy can manifest itself in the form of infrastructure decay, water shortages and poor 
yields. On the other hand, Ostrom (2007) argued that given the right conditions, individuals 
and groups behave rationally and can work towards the common good even if it means 
foregoing personal gains. However, individual utility maximisation is regarded as a necessary 
condition of rationality, subject to constraints on the goals (Weirich, 2008). Figure 5.1 
illustrates the postulated relationship among factors influencing individual behaviour towards 
collective activities, the various ways through which individuals contribute, and the possible 























Figure 5.1. Framework for analysing collective irrigation water management  
Source: Adapted from Ostrom (1994) and Sabatier (2007)  
Individual rational behaviour 
Factors influencing behaviour in collective water management 
 User attributes (e.g. demographic, socio-economic, financial) 
 Physical (e.g. resource attributes, land size, water scarcity) 
 Institutional (e.g. rules-in-use, conflict resolution) 














Possible outcomes of 
collective action: 




3. Food security 
4. Poverty reduction 
5. Increased productivity 
 
1. Labour contribution: e.g. canal repairs & 
maintenance 
 




2. Decision making: e.g. water use allocation 
4. Information dissemination: e.g. sharing the 
outcomes of meetings 
5. Regulation and control: e.g. infrastructure 
theft control, unlawful water diversion 
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The collective action theory finds relevance in the present era of IMT, where a group of 
farmers sharing water resources are supposed to cooperate in order to maximise benefits from 
the resource. Based on Ostrom (2010), the three underlying assumptions of collective action 
are that: participants have common knowledge about the structure of payoffs to be received 
by all individuals under the combination of collective actions; decisions are made 
independently and simultaneously; and no external actor or central authority is present to 
enforce agreements among participants. 
 
The nature and intensity of individual participation in collective activities is influenced by 
personal attributes, resource attributes, institutional setting and the incentive systems (Fischer 
and Qaim, 2014), and these have been summarised in Figure 5.1. Members participate in 
collective activities through contributing labour, finance, decision making, information 
dissemination as well as regulation and control (Van der Zaag and Rap, 2012). However, the 
levels of contribution vary across members of the group depending on individual decisions 
and resource constraints. This gave rise to the need to measure individual intensity of 
participation in irrigation scheme management. The analytical framework considers the 
outcomes as important measures of collective action. The outcomes, that include reliability in 
water supply, infrastructure condition, food security, poverty reduction and incomes, may 
impact directly or indirectly on the way members perform collective activities. Undesirable 
outcomes hinder collective action activities, while positive outcomes can potentially motivate 
member participation in collective activities. 
 
5.2.2 Empirical methods of data analysis 
 
Reference is made to sampling design and data collection methods presented in the previous 
chapter. The study employed three main data analysis techniques: Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) specified in equations 4.3 and 4.4, was used for dimension reduction. The 
Tobit regression was applied to assess the determinants of participation, and lastly the 
ordered Probit regression was used to measure individual intensity of participation in 
irrigation water management. 
 
Other studies mostly in collective marketing (Fischer and Qaim, 2012) have considered 
participation as a choice and step-wise decision, where respondents either participate or not. 
Under such circumstances, binary choice models are applied to analyse the determinants. 
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This study could not consider the binary option due to the multidimensional nature of 
activities involved in water management. A respondent might be participating in one activity 
and not in others, as such it is logical to generate a composite index that captures the most 
possible collective activities that farmers are expected to engage in. Participation in water 
management activities within the MRIS is mandatory for all members, although compliance 
and cooperation seems to be a challenge. More so, participation in canal water management 
in the MRIS is multi-dimensional; hence, PCA was used to generate a composite index of 
participation. The variables representing the various forms of farmers‟ participation in 
collective action are not orthogonal, hence PCA reduce dimensionality of variables 
(Manyong et al., 2006) and decompose variations in the variables included in the analysis 
into orthogonal components, each having a characteristic unique from the others (Dunteman, 
1989; Fujiie et al., 2005). 
 
Respondents ranked their participation level in a wide range of irrigation management 
activities. A total of 15 activities were identified, which were grouped into five main themes 
(Figure 5.1), namely (1) labour-based participation: canal cleaning, canal repairs and pump 
repairs; (2) financial-based participation: contributing finance towards infrastructure repairs 
and towards the running of the WUA; (3) participation in decision making: attending 
meetings, lobbying, and contributing ideas in water related issues; (4) information 
dissemination activities: distributing water related information in the area: and (5) 
participation in regulation and control: reporting unlawful diversion of water, reporting theft 
of irrigation infrastructure, and reporting damages and water leakages along the major 
irrigation infrastructure. Participation in activities was ranked using a five-point Likert scale 
from zero (0) if a farmer is not involved in a given activity, to four (4) if he/she is highly 
involved. The rankings were then used to compute the participation index (PI) using PCA for 
individual farmers in water-related activities.  
 
Explicitly, the forms of participation in collective activities by farmers are assumed to have 
equal weights. This may be queried where smallholder farmers value the forms of 
contribution differently; for example, one farmer might value labour contribution more than 
financial contribution or attending meetings. Differences in value allocation might be 
emanating from different socio-economic status of respondents or the characteristics of the 
resource. The complexity of allocating specific values to the various forms of participation 
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resulted in the current implicit assumption about equal weights. The PI was therefore used as 
a proxy to measure farmers‟ involvement in collective action. 
 
The PCA was also used to generate an incentive index based on benefits accrued from 
participating in collective water management activities. Water users ranked a total of seven 
perceived benefits of participating in water management on a five-point Likert scale from 0 
(poor) to 4 (excellent). Some of the perceived benefits include reliability of water supply for 
agricultural needs, improvement in government support, improved capacity to lobby by water 
users, increased feeling of responsibility, reliability of water supply for non-agricultural 
activities, and improved access to canal water. The incentive index was then used as an 
independent variable to explain farmers‟ participation in collective action. The study 
hypothesised that incentives have a positive influence on the intensity of participation in 
collective action. 
 
Following previous studies,  e.g., Manyong et al. (2006)  and   Wang et al. (1997), a censored 
Tobit regression model was applied to estimate the factors influencing behaviour in collective 
water management (Z) i.e. user attributes, physical or resource attributes, institutional 
attributes and incentives on the forms and level of participation (participation index) (Figure 
5.1). The PCA derived composite index of participation (σ) is the dependent variable.  Given 
the right- and left-censoring at minimum (σmin) and maximum (σmax) score, respectively, the 
two-limit Tobit model (Maddala, 1983:261); Wang et al., 1997) is specified as follows:  
iii Z   )('
*
         [5.1] 
Where 
*
i  is an unobservable latent response variable, Zi is an observable vector of 
explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and εi is a vector of 
independently and normally distributed residuals with a common variance θ. Then the actual 
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With this specification, parameters of participation  variables,  the model can be estimated by 
















































where Φ and Ø are the standard normal density and distribution functions, respectively.  
 
Ordered Probit regression was then applied to assess the determinants of participation 
intensity in common pool water resource management by smallholder farmers. Based on 
individual rationality, which is influenced by resource, socio-economic, incentives and 
institutional attributes (Figure 5.1), respondents indicated that they either participate or not 
participate in collective activities. For those that participate, their level of participation varies. 
Respondents‟ observed preference to take collective responsibilities was regarded as a key 
measure of participation intensity. As such, the intensity of participation in irrigation water 
management is an ordered dependent variable and categorically measured as:  
 
Category 0 = User not participating at all (none) 
Category 1 = Willing to participate but not participating (poor) 
Category 2 = Participating as an ordinary member (good); 
Category 3 = Participating as a committee management member (very good) 
Category 4 = Participating as a chairperson (Excellent) 
 
Due to a limited number of respondents, categories 3 and 4 were merged to improve the 
estimation of the model. According to Greene and Hensher (2008:6-7), the ordered Probit 
model (OPM) takes into account the order value of the dependent variable, hence its adoption 
in this study. Intensity of participation in irrigation water management depends on certain 
measurable factors (Xi) and certain unobservable factors (εi). The ordered Probit model was 
therefore estimated for the polychotomous dependent variable with four categories.  
 
Following Wooldridge (2002:540-5), the ordered Probit model for Y (conditional on 
explanatory variables Xi) can be derived from a latent variable model as follows: 
Yi* = β′Xi + εi, where i = 1,..., N, and       [5.4] 
 Y* is unobserved, but what are observed are threshold values of Y (Wooldridge, 2002:540-
5), which in the present case would be: 
Y = 0   if Y* ≤ 0 
Y = 1   if 0 < Y* ≤ 1 
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Y = 2   if 1 < Y* ≤ 2         
Y = 3   if Y* ≥ 3        [5.5] 
The vector of independent parameter estimates are embedded in the coefficient vector β 
(Wooldridge, 2002:540-5), consisting of demographic, institutional and socio-economic 
factors (Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). The model adjusts better to a probability curve by using a 
normal distribution function to estimate the probability of a certain ranking (Greene and 
Hensher, 2008). 
 
5.3 The results and discussions 
 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the models 
 
An understanding of the household characteristics (Table 5.1) is important to contextualize 
farmers‟ behaviour in irrigation management. The average number of household members 
who are economically active and have indicated that they actually participate in agricultural 
activities is two people per household. Farming households utilize both family labour and 
hired labour to carry out their agricultural activities.  
 













Average age of household head in years (AGE) 56.99 56.50 58.80 
Average number of household members who do 
agricultural work (FARMLAB) 
2.29 2.30 2.25 
Average number of years in formal education 
(YRSEDUC) 
2.52 2.30 3.38 
Average annual income from irrigation agriculture in 
Rands. (IRGINCOM) (April 2012 –April 2013) 
5694 5878.00 3807.00 
Average irrigation area (ha) per household (IRIG_HA) 0.275 0.306 0.148 
Average area per household (ha) (irrigated plus dry 
land) (TOT_HA) 
0.405 0.424 0.347 
Average amount farmers are willing and able to 
contribute for irrigation maintenance per year in Rands 
(AVE_AMT) (April 2012-April 2013) 
100.35 112.55 51.14 
Average household‟s  non-farm income in Rands 
(NON_FARM) 
17425.18 16956.54 19315.08 
Number of days without consistent supply of water  
per week (NOWAT) 
3.11 3.11 3.13 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
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The average size of irrigation land accessed per household is 0.275ha. This area increases to 
0.405ha per household after adding both irrigated and dry land fields that a household has use 
rights outside the scheme. With regards to willingness to contribute finances towards canal 
maintenance, those who irrigate within the scheme (scheme-members) have a higher 
willingness to pay (R112.55/farmer/year) than those who irrigate plots located outside the 
scheme boundaries (non-scheme members) (R51.14). The difference between the two groups 
lies in the fact that the land being irrigated by the latter group was not part of the original 
infrastructure design of the irrigation scheme; this poses a possible water constraint to the 
land originally meant to be irrigated from the canal. However, irrigation of plots outside the 
scheme is necessitated by shortage of irrigation land within the scheme. Although, 
agricultural income levels are higher for scheme members (R5878.00 per/year) than non-
scheme members (R3807 per year), like other schemes, they are generally lower than 
expected (Cousins, 2013; Sinyolo et al., 2014a). However, the income differences between 
the groups cannot entirely be attributed to water access alone because some sources of 
variation like farmer training, access to land and institutional aspects could not be controlled. 
A detailed summary of the categorical variables is presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 for the 
response and explanatory variables respectively.  
Table 5.2. Description of categorical variables, Mooi River Irrigation Scheme, 2013 
(n=307) 
Response variable (Ordered categorical)  Total 
 
Percentage (%) 
Farmers‟ intensity of 
participation in common 
water management 
(LPARTIC) 
0= not participating at 
all (none) 
54 17.6 
1= not participating 
fully (poor); 
145 47.2 




3= participating as a 
committee management 
member (very good) 
16 5.2 
Source:  Survey data, 2013 
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Table 5.3. Description of categorical variables, Mooi River Irrigation Scheme, 2013 
(n=307) 
Explanatory Variables Units  Total 
sample  
Percentage (%) 
Gender of household head 
(GENDER) 
1=Male 84 27.4 
0=Female 223 72.6 
Training in irrigation water 
management (TRAWAT) 
1=Yes 111 36.2 
0=No 196 63.8 
Membership of individual 
irrigators to a Water User 
Association (WUA_MEB) 
1=Yes 26 8.5 
0=No 281 91.5 
Member has been involved in 
water-related conflict in the past 
year (CONFLC) 
1=Involved 210 68.4 
0 =Not 97 31.6 
Membership to a 
group/cooperative  that uses 
water (GRP_MEB) 
1=Yes 75 24.4 
0=No 232 75.6 
Mode of water supply 
(IRRTYP) 
1=Gravity 228 74.3 
0=(Pump) 79 25.7 
Position of block along the main 
canal (BPOSITN) dummies 
 
BPOSITN1(Upper) 62 20.2 
BPOSITN2 (Middle) 112 36.5 
BPOSITN3(Tail-end) 133 43.3 
Whether user often draws water 
directly from the Mooi River 
(DIR_RIV) 
1=Yes 129 42.0 
0=No 178 58.0 
Whether there is need for water 
measurement devices in the area 
(WAT_MST) 
1=Yes 136 44.3 
0=No 171 55.7 
Perception of irrigation water 
adequacy 
( ADEQCY) 
1=Adequate 64 20.8 
0= Inadequate 243 79.2 
Perceived effectiveness of the 
committee members 
(COMIT_EF) 
1=Effective 188 61.2 
0=Not effective 153 49.8 
Frequency of attending water 
related meetings (FREQM). 
1= Regular attendance 198 64.5 
0= less regular or not 
at all 
109 35.5 
Whether the respondent is a full-
time farmer or not (OCCUP) 
1=Full-time farmer 174 56.7 
0=Part-time/has other 
full time income 
generating occupation 
133 43.3 
Perception of infield water 
distribution (WAT_PERC) 
1=fair 105 34.2 
0=Unfair 202 65.8 




The majority of the respondents were women (72.6%), indicating active involvement of 
women in smallholder irrigation crop farming and 56.7% of the respondents were full-time 
farmers. The general perception among farmers was that irrigation water supply was 
inadequate and unfairly distributed as reported by 79.2% and 65.8% of the irrigators 
respectively. Furthermore, a significant number of respondents (68.4%) have also been 
involved in water-related conflicts in the area. The identified challenges might have a 
negative effect on farmer participation in collective management of irrigation. Both the 
continuous and the categorical variables in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 have been used as 
explanatory variables to estimate the Tobit and the ordered Probit regression models. The 
descriptive statistics of the variables used to construct the indices are presented in appendix 5.  
 
5.3.2 Measures of participation in collective activities 
 
Seven principal components were extracted using Pearson correlations. By applying the 
Kaiser criterion, three components that had Eigen values greater than one were retained.  
Table 5.4 presents the PCA results. The first principal component (PCCP1) has a higher 
explanatory power and explains 58.67% of the variation in farmer participation in collective 
activities, with PCCP2 and PCCP3 explaining 21.56% and 18.05%, respectively. The three PCs 
explained 98.28% of the variation in the data. The PC vector of the first component is 
economically meaningful because, unlike the other components‟ vectors, none of its 
coefficients is negative. Since each of the variables represents participation in each different 
activity of scheme management, the positive weights for all the variables in the first 
component vector can be taken as evidence that PCCP1 represents the aggregate variations due 
to the differing degrees of participation; hence PCCP1 was retained and then used to generate 
the participation index. The first retained component accounts for such a large percentage of 
the variance in the variables that it can be used alone without much loss in information 










Table 5.4. Collective participation index generation using PCA, Mooi River Irrigation 
Scheme, 2013 (n=307) 
 Principal Component (PC) 
 PCCP1 PCCP2 PCCP3 
Eigenvalues 4.55 1.67 1.40 
% of variance explained 58.67 21.56 18.05 
Cumulative % of variance explained 58.67 80.23 98.28 
Variables Factor loadings 
Providing labour for main canal cleaning (CANCLEN) 0.5095 -0.4289 0.2288 
Canal repairs (RPCANAL) 0.7016 0.2364 0.0517 
Repair of infield distribution canals (INFILDCA) 0.5924 -0.3814 0.3153 
Pump repairs (REP_PUMP) 0.1285 0.4917 0.5918 
Contribute funds for pump repairs ( FUNDPUM) 0.1149 0.3301 0.6908 
Contribute towards Water User Association (FUNDWUA) 0.4579 0.3540 0.1204 
Attend water-related meetings (ATTMEET) 0.5720 -0.4129 0.1925 
Attend irrigation training (ATRAING) 0.5834 0.2172 -0.0578 
Participating in meetings (IDEAS_IN) 0.6791 -0.0745 -0.0039 
Engage water authorities (ENGAGE) 0.6004 0.1742 -0.2319 
Disseminate water-related information (INFODISTR) 0.5202 -0.4912 0.0811 
Informally train others on water management 
(TRAINWAT) 
0.6233 0.2104 0.0130 
Report unlawful use of water (RPT_UNLAW) 0.5983 0.2815 -0.3415 
Report equipment theft (RPT_EQUP) 0.6005 0.3289 -0.4057 
Report damages and leakages (RPT_LKGS) 0.5860 -0.2913 -0.1487 
Notes: Five-point Likert scale values are: 0 = never been involved; 1 = low involvement;  
2 = Average; 3 = High; 4 = Very high 
Source: Survey data (2013) 
 
This first component (Table 5.4) is dominated by farmers‟ involvement in canal repairs as 
well as participation in decision making activities. This indicates that the farmers who 
participate in water management are more involved in labour-based activities like canal 
repairs and maintenance. Such farmers are also involved in complementary activities like 
decision making through participating in meetings, reporting infrastructure theft as well as 
engaging authorities to resolve water-related challenges in the scheme. Since most of the 
activities in management of communal irrigation schemes are complementary in nature 
(Fujiie et al., 2005), they should therefore be viewed wholly, and water users must be 
encouraged to participate equally in all activities because failure or success of a particular 
activity affect the performance of the others. This can be an effective approach to ensure 




It is also important to note the high factor loading of irrigation training as a complementary 
activity in scheme management. Most of the training is informal and mainly “farmer to 
farmer” through irrigation information sharing. Informal training is very critical at 
smallholder level where access to extension services is at times a constraint (Cousins, 2013). 
Possible strategies to improve informal learning include short courses in crop production, 
irrigation management and farmers‟ days that can also facilitate information diffusion among 
irrigators at scheme level.  
 
5.3.3 Determinants of collective participation in irrigation water management 
 
Following Manyong et al., (2006) a PCA generated index was used as a dependent variable to 
estimate a two-limit Tobit regression. The index of farmer participation (PCCP1) in collective 
water management activities was the dependent variable in the Tobit regression model. To 
ensure that the Tobit regression is correctly specified, post-estimation tests were conducted. 
The test for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables was assessed using Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF), which were all below 10, with an average of 1.41. The robust 
standard errors were also estimated to correct for heteroskedasticity. The importance of 
testing that the disturbance term is normally distributed comes from the fact that the standard 
tobit estimator is not consistent if the disturbance term is not normally distributed. Violation 
of the normality assumption results in biased and inconsistent estimates. The Jarque-Bera test 
for normality of the residuals was therefore performed. The results of the Tobit model are 
presented in Table 5.5.  
 
Combinations of socio-economic, institutional and resource related variables influence farmer 
participation in collective activities. The results indicate that location of plot (BPOSITN), 
income contribution  towards infrastructure maintenance (AVE_AMT), income from 
irrigation farming (IRGINCOM), total household land ownership (TOT_HA), frequency of 
attending irrigation management meetings (FREQM), training in irrigation management 
(TRAWAT), whether farmer has been involved in water related conflicts with the farming 
2012/13 season (CONFLC), farmer perception on the adequacy of irrigation water 
(ADEQCY), perception of committee effectiveness (COMIT_EF), amount of labour per 
household (FARMLAB)  and years of formal education  (YRSEDUC ) significantly affect 




Table 5.5. Determinants of collective participation (Tobit results), Mooi River Irrigation 
Scheme, 2013 (n=307) 
 Tobit regression  
Variables Coef. Rob Std. Err VIF 
AGE -0.0032 0.0044 1.35 
SCH_MEM 0.2355* 0.1251 1.19 
IRRTYP -0.1318 0.1393 1.89 
BPOSITN1 -0.0269 0.1185 1.56 
BPOSITN3 0.2721* 0.1586 2.73 
AVE_CONT 0.0014*** 0.0005 1.29 
IRGINCOM 0.0001*** 0.0001 1.29 
TOT_HA 0.2739*** 0.0847 1.09 
WUA_MEB 0.2066 0.1795 1.06 
TRAWAT 0.3832*** 0.0957 1.23 
NOWAT 0.0521 0.0637 1.63 
INCE~X 0.0397 0.0827 2.32 
CONFLC 0.1175*** 0.0455 1.12 
ADEQCY 0.0706 0.0546 2.10 
COMIT_EF 0.1565*** 0.0423 1.22 
NON_FARM 0.0001 0.0001 1.24 
GENDER 0.1650* 0.0975 1.10 
YRSEDUC -0.0436*** 0.0143 1.33 
_cons -0.9590 0.3716  
sigma 0.7712 0.0297  
F(18,288)                                     10.55 
Prob>F                                         0.000*** 
Pseudo R
2 
                                    0.1657 
Uncensored observations              299 
Left censored observations           6 (Minimum ≤ -2.38) 
Right censored observations         1 (Maximum ≥2 .03) 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Source: Survey data (2013). 
 
The results indicate that participation in collective activities more likely influenced by 
farmers‟ plot location within the scheme. Irrigators located at the tail-end (BPOSITN3) are 
more likely to participate in collective activities than their counterparts in the head section. 
This can be due to unequal distribution of water among head and tail-end farmers, with the 
latter experiencing more water stress and hence lower incentive to participate than their head 
counterpart. This is consistent with the finding by Mbatha and Antrobus (2008),  whose study 
noted that physical location of farmers along a watercourse, where water resources are 
diverted individually, contributes to economic inefficiencies due to resource misallocations, 
ceteris paribus. This suggest the need to focus on localised institutional arrangements to 
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address distribution of water among head and tail-end farmers, which might improve 
participation in collective activities. This must also be accompanied by improving the amount 
of irrigation water available to the farmers.   
 
The coefficients for the income a farmer receives from irrigation farming and the amount an 
individual farmer contributes annually towards water management activities are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This makes economic sense that farmers who receive more 
income from irrigation farming are more willing to participate in collective activities than 
those that receive less. Income generated in irrigation farming can be an indicator of the 
incentives available for farmers to participate in irrigation activities. Furthermore, irrigation 
training (TRAWAT) has an influence on farmer participation. Farmers with some form of 
training in water/irrigation scheme management participate more in scheme management 
activities. This highlights the importance of farmer training as being key to improving 
collective water/ irrigation scheme management. 
 
The total household irrigation land (TOT_HA) is more likely to affect farmers‟ participation 
in water management activities.  As the size of irrigation land increases, demand for reliable 
water supply increases, and hence more effort is required by the farmer to achieve this. In the 
MRIS, irrigation water is not allocated according to land size per farmer or type of crops 
planted, but is based on a roster that allocates specific number of irrigation days per block. 
Once the water gets to the block, it is then accessed on a “first-come first-take” basis, with a 
possibility of depriving water to irrigators who start irrigating late or are at the tail-end of the 
fields or canal. This is a possible indicator of both technical and institutional failure in the 
scheme. The system should have been designed with proper water measurement devices to 
regulate flow allocation per farmer, enforceable at field level. Water meant for late irrigators 
or those not available to irrigate should rather be stored in the balancing dams /reservoirs for 
future use, instead of being used by a few farmers. 
 
The conditions for successful collective action suggest that the establishment of the right 
institutions can create incentives that would make cooperation the rational choice. It has 
however been observed that, while these conditions are common to many successful 
collective action efforts (Agrawal, 2001), there may be other factors that influence the 
behaviour of people. As such, some of the institutional determinants of participation in 
collective activities include membership to the scheme, perceived effectiveness of the scheme 
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and block committees and the perceived occurrence of water related conflicts in the scheme. 
Water users who are members of the scheme (SCH_MEM) and those who perceive the 
existing scheme committee to be effective in managing irrigation water resources are more 
likely to participate in collective activities. Rule enforcement is important to minimise water 
related conflicts, as such farmers who perceive water related conflicts to be less, also 
participate more in collective activities. Furthermore, farmers with lower levels of education 
are less likely to participate in collective activities than those with better formal education. 
Since early 2012, the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) has been offering capacity-
building workshops to WUA committee members in the MRIS, in which some aspects of 
collective management of water are covered. Through attending water management meetings, 
non-members of the WUA can benefit from those that are currently attending the capacity 
building workshops. The need for functional support institutions at local level is therefore 
noted, the absence of which might result in lack of cooperation by members. Intensity of 
participation of individual respondents in collective water activities was analysed, and the 
findings are presented in the following section.  
 
5.3.4 Participation intensity in irrigation water management    
 
The study expanded on the commonly used concept of participation, mostly measured as a 
binary choice variable, which is often critiqued for losing valuable information about 
intermediate-level collective action. The level of participation was based on the individual 
participation status as observed during the time of data collection. Respondents indicated 
their level of involvement in water management at local level and were grouped into four 
groups, as presented in Table 5.2. Participation intensity increases from not participating at 
all to high levels of participation as committee members. An ordered Probit model was used 
to identify the determinants of participation intensity by the respondents, and results are 








Table 5.6. The determinants of participation intensity in managing small-scale 






Marginal effects (dy/dx) when LPARTIC 
equals 
0 1 2 3 
AGE 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
SCH_MEB 0.2021 -0.0454 -0.0264 0.0637 0.0081 
IRRTYP -0.2544 0.0535 0.0395 -0.0815 -0.0115 
BPOSITN1 -0.0381 0.0081 0.0058 -0.0122 -0.0017 
BPOSITN3 -0.1882 0.0401 0.0283 -0.0600 -0.0084 
AVE_CONT 0.0031*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** 0.0010*** 0.0001*** 
IRIGINCOM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TOT_HA 0.2750** -0.0578** -0.0427** 0.0881** 0.0125* 
WUA_MEB 1.8426*** -0.1622*** -0.4526 0.2825*** 0.3322*** 
TRAWAT -0.0394 0.0083 0.0060 -0.0126 -0.0018 
NOWAT 0.2051** -0.0431** -0.0319** 0.0657** 0.0093* 
INCE~X 0.1003 -0.0211 -0.0156 0.0321 0.0045 
ADEQCY -0.2393 0.0543 0.0303 -0.0752 -0.0094 
COMIT_EF -0.1166 0.0249 0.0175 -0.0372 -0.0051 
NON_FARM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
GENDER 0.1806 -0.0362 -0.0308 0.0581 0.0089 
YRSEDUC 0.0495** -0.0104** -0.0077** 0.0159** 0.0022* 
/cut1 -0.5040     
/cut2 1.0459     
/cut3 2.7138     
Number of observations          =      306    
Wald Chi-square (17)             =      93.71             
Prob > Chi-square                   =      0.000              
Pseudo R2                               =      0.1455                 
Log pseudo likelihood            =     -307.22 
Brant test for parallel line assumption  
Chi-square           =  24.12 
D.F                       = 38  
P >Chi-square      = 0.867 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
Before interpreting the results of the full model, tests for model fitness were done. The 
ordered Probit model has a good fit to the data, as shown by a strong probability of the Chi-
square (p=0.000). The parallel line assumption of proportional odds was also tested using the 
Brant test. The results fail to reject the null hypothesis that the model without predictors is as 
good as the model with the predictors.  Since the model did not violate the parallel line 
assumption, its use in this study was justified.  
 
The results of the ordered Probit model indicated that  irrigation type (IRRTYP), average 
contributions towards water management (AVE_AMT), total irrigation area (TOT_HA), 
membership to a water user association (WUA_MEB), frequency of days without consistent 
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supply of water (NOWAT) per week and years of education (YRSEDUC) have a statistically 
significant influence on participation intensity. As such, those respondents whose water 
supply is wholly supported by gravity are likely to participate more in water/irrigation 
scheme management than those with an additional system (pump system). During discussions 
with users, farmers highlighted that managing a pump is more complex, especially when 
mobilising participants to contribute money towards purchasing fuel. Water users would 
rather participate more as committee members in a gravity-only system that they perceive to 
be less challenging than the pump system. This finding point to the fact that furrow irrigation 
systems, relying on gravity, are easy to manage compared to sprinkler and furrow systems 
powered by diesel pumps. This is consistent with findings by Crosby et al. (2000)  that 
smallholder gravity-fed short furrow irrigation systems are better managed and more efficient 
for smallholder farmers in South Africa. Turral et al. (2010) also noted that irrigation 
technology must be appropriate to meet the agricultural, managerial, financial and economic 
needs and capacity of system operators and farmers. This  is an important decision making 
tool that can be of use in the current IMT and rehabilitation of smallholder irrigation schemes 
(RESIS) in South Africa. A focus on revitalising gravity fed furrow irrigation systems, which 
farmers are willing and able to manage might be a better policy option for smallholders in 
South Africa. 
 
Farmers who contribute finances are likely to participate at higher levels including being 
committee members than non-contributors. The marginal effects indicate a negative influence 
of financial contributions to participation at lower level categories as ordinary members 
(category 0 and 1) and a positive influence of participation at higher levels as committee 
members (categories 2 and 3). This can be attributed to financial accountability. Irrigators 
who contribute finances want to ensure that their finances are used appropriately; hence such 
farmers participate more, even in irrigation scheme meetings, either as ordinary or committee 
members. 
 
Total irrigation area (TOT_HA) and membership of a WUA (WUA_MEB) are significant 
predictors of participation intensity. During the time of conducting the study, there seemed to 
be a very low understanding of how formal institutions like WUA operate, with some 
respondents not even knowing what it is. Water users who are current members of the WUA 
participate more in water management activities than non-members. There is a 31.3% and 
35.2% chance of WUA members to participate regularly in collective activities as ordinary 
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members (category 2) and as committee members (category 3). Some WUA members in the 
MRIS have attended capacity building workshops (“cum-training”) offered by the 
Department of Water Affairs (DWA) on the importance of being active participants in water 
management through the local WUA. This could be the reason for a statistically significant 
influence of WUA membership on intensity of participation in water management. However, 
the detailed discourse of water institutions and their effect on water management and access 
at farm level are beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Theory predicts that users‟ demand for and dependence on a resource influences their 
participation in the collective management of that resource (Sserunkuuma et al., 2009). The 
increase in demand for water, represented by number of days per week without irrigation 
water (NOWAT) may result in irrigators putting more effort in order to access the resource. 
However, this might be true among the persistent irrigators who anticipate higher returns 
from irrigation farming, but at the same time, severe water scarcity might result in some 
irrigators to quit farming. This suggests that farmers recognise the role of participation in 
water management activities to improve their level of water supply. However, it was 
anticipated that a negative coefficient would have meant that a high frequency of days 
without water discourages participation, and eventually users would cease irrigation farming 
in the long-run.  The fact that it has a positive influence might represent a short-run effect of 
water scarcity on farmer participation. In the long-run, if the problem of water persists, 
farmers might quit farming as revealed by negative marginal effects for lower level 
participants.  
 
Intensity of participation is also influenced by the education level of the farmer. An increase 
in formal education increases intensity of participation in water/scheme management. 
Education level is a very critical aspect in making objective judgements on the importance of 
participation in group activities. However, farmers in the MRIS have low levels of formal 
education (2.5 years); hence there is a need to focus on literacy level development and 
irrigation training among irrigation water users as a strategy for improving collective 









Understanding the factors affecting farmer participation in irrigation water management is 
crucial for formulating sustainable smallholder irrigation policies. This is relevant given the 
high rate of failure of smallholder schemes following withdrawal of government funding and 
the step-by-step transfer of management and ownership to the users. A range of socio-
economic, institutional and resource-based attributes greatly influence farmer participation in 
collective management of schemes. The fact that irrigators who joined the local Water User 
Association revealed higher participation intensity compared to non-members suggests a need 
to increase farmer participation in formalised institutions that also expose them to water 
management training, through capacity building programmes presented by the government 
and other initiatives. 
 
Technical interventions in the management of communal schemes, such as infrastructure 
refurbishments and upgrading of scheme capacity, need to be complemented by institutional 
interventions. This can be a positive step towards deepening the irrigation management 
transfer process, and building the capacity of water users through targeted training. 
Institutional arrangements in irrigation scheme management must also be tailor-made to take 













EXPLAINING VARIATION IN SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION WATER VALUES: 






The chapter aims to estimate irrigation water values using the residual value method as a 
basis to explain variation in irrigation water-use at smallholder level. Factors influencing 
variation were identified. The chapter is presented as follows: the next section presents the 
methodology. The results and discussion are presented in section 6.3, followed by the 




6.2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
Valuation of irrigation water can be explained from the neoclassical theory of the firm. 
Although the behaviour of the firm may be characterised in a number of ways, focus of this 
study shall be on profit maximisation. A profit-maximising firm, operating in a competitive 
environment, uses an input to the point where marginal revenue gained from an additional 
unit of a specific input equals the marginal cost of obtaining the input (Gardner and Young, 
1983; Young, 2005). By adapting the product exhaustion theorem for residual valuation, 
economic value of a single un-priced good such as water entails isolating that portion 
contributed by water to the total value of the product from the contribution of all other inputs 
that go into the production process (Young, 2005). The theorem postulates that under 
competitive equilibrium, the total value of the product can be divided into shares, so that each 
resource is paid according to its value of marginal product and the total value of the product 
will be exactly exhausted by the distributive shares (Scheierling et al., 2004). In the case of 
smallholder farmers in South Africa, some markets are either absent or dysfunctional, while 
others operate at expected levels. The study, therefore, applies the residual valuation method 
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to impute returns left to water, in an environment where no market for water exists. In this 
case, the residual value method assumes that if all markets are competitive, except for water, 
the total value of production equals the opportunity costs of all inputs (Scheierling et al., 
2004). Thus, in using the residual method, after attributing the values of all the resources 
except water to the respective inputs, the rest can be attributed to water. 
 
Reliable estimates of water values can be an important decision making instrument in the 
water sector.  According to Hussain et al. (2007), water values can help in: investment 
decisions in water resources rehabilitation and for cost-benefit analysis of water-based 
projects, policy decisions on water allocations and re-allocations among users, assessing the 
socio-economic impacts of water management decisions, designing water pricing policies, 
and comparing performance of irrigation schemes. 
 
6.2.2 Study area, sampling design and data collection 
 
This was a follow-up study, which came after the realisation that data collected during the 
initial survey of 307 farmers could not accurately quantify individual input usage and yields 
due to reliance on recall information.  A sample of 60 smallholders was, therefore, drawn 
from the initial survey of 307 farmers that had been interviewed during the first survey. To 
ensure that a representative sample was drawn, the scheme was stratified into three segments 
(upper, middle, and tail-end) based on positions of individual farmer‟s irrigation plots along 
the 20.8km main conveyance canal. The stratification was also consistent with the scheme‟s 
weekly water allocation roster, where farmers in the upper, middle or tail-end sections access 
water on specific days of the week. Proportional sampling across the scheme also ensured 
variability and reasonable inference of the data at scheme level. Selection of the farmers was 
also based on: (1) willingness to participate in the data collection process for the entire crop 
cycle, (2) whether the farmer was full-time and actively involved in irrigation farming in the 
scheme, and (3) whether the farmer was targeting to maximise returns from the farming 
activities to meet marketing and home consumption needs. A data collection form (Appendix 
3) was used to extract data from the sampled farmers. The form contained all possible 
farming activities that farmers engaged in, including land preparation, planting, weeding, 
fertiliser application, irrigation, and marketing activities like grading and packaging. 
Interviews were conducted at farmers‟ fields on a weekly basis to ensure easy tracing of 
activities by reducing the recall period. In cases where some farmers were not in the fields on 
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the scheduled day of interview, follow-up interviews were done at homesteads or through 
phone calls to document the activities of the week.  
 
The input-output data requirements for application of the RVM led to the adoption of a more 
intensive weekly data collection procedure from land preparation to harvesting of the crop. 
The labour demand and complexity of monitoring and collecting weekly data from farmers 
also influenced the size of the sample. The sampling and the data collection procedure aimed 
to reduce the shortcoming of the RVM in underestimating or overestimating water values 
depending on the accuracy of the data used during the analysis (Young, 2005); hence the 
initial once-off survey data could not be used in the water valuation model (i.e.,RVM).  
 
6.2.3 Valuation of smallholder irrigation water 
 
Several water valuation techniques are available depending on the specific use of the water 
and the purpose for which the information is required. Al-Karablieh et al. (2012) noted three 
groups of water valuation methods, namely (1) methods that infer water value from 
information based on water-related markets and benefits where value is derived from rentals 
and sales of water rights; (2) methods relying on the use of derived demand for water as an 
intermediate good, where water is assessed from the producers‟ point of view; and (3) 
methods that estimate water values from direct consumer demand as in the case of 
agricultural and industrial use. 
 
Some of the methods that are widely applied in water valuation where water markets are non-
existent or dysfunctional include the production function method, RVM, change in net 
income approach (CNI), conjoint analysis, cost-based approaches, optimisation methods 
using mathematical programming, and the value-added method derived from computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) (Young, 2005). The economic valuation of water can also adopt 
environmental approaches like hedonic pricing and contingent valuation method (CVM). 
Each technique has its challenges, with optimisation techniques being criticised for over-
estimating water values (Young, 2005; Al-Karablieh et al., 2012), while CGE specification 
requires aggregation which may not be sufficient for local conditions (Al-Karablieh et al., 




The major challenge in deriving economic values of agricultural water in the absence of 
markets is separating the returns of water from those that should be allocated to other inputs 
like labour, agrochemicals and land (Hussain et al., 2009). Although the most scientifically 
accepted methods of water valuation are those based on market behaviour (Hussain et al., 
2007; Speelman et al., 2008; Speelman et al., 2011), these are not well suited to smallholder 
farmers in the study area because of non-existence of water markets, which is provided free 
by the government. 
  
By assuming competitive markets for  all production inputs except for water,  the total value 
of production equals the opportunity cost of all the inputs (Young, 2005; Lange and Hassan, 
2006; Berbel et al., 2011). This view suggests that the residual value of water can be 
estimated even if water is a scarce resource and crops are irrigated with deficit or 
supplementary irrigation because a water value is assigned once the remaining inputs get 
allocated their market costs (Berbel et al., 2011).  
 
The mathematical expression of output (Y) with respect to a vector of inputs (X) is shown in 
equation [6.1]. 
  Y = ƒ (Xm, Xh, Xf, Xl, Xw, Xe Xld )      [6.1] 
Where Y = Output (Yield/ha) 
Xm = Machinery/ha 
  Xh,  = All agrochemicals except fertilisers (herbicides, pesticides etc.) /ha 
 Xf = Fertilisers/ha 
Xl,  = labour/ha 
Xw, = Water/ha 
Xe =Transport/ha  
Xld =Land (ha) 
 
Expressing the function in terms of total value of production, equation [6.1] is written as: 
(Y*Py) = [(VMPmc*Xm ) + (VMPhc*Xh ) + (VMPfc*Xf) + (VMPl*Xl ) + (VMPw+Xw) + (VMPe* 
Xe)+ (VMPld*Xld)]           [6.2] 
VMP is the value of marginal product of each input (Xi). In order to operationalize equation 
[6.2], Young (2005) posited three assumptions, namely: the value of the product be assigned 
to each input according to the marginal productivity except the input under investigation 
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(water); the opportunity cost of non-water inputs are given by their market prices; and that 
profit maximising behaviour occurs at farm level. 
(Y*Py) = [(Pm*Xm ) +  (Ph*Xh )+(Pf*Xf)+(Pl*Xl) +(Pw+Xw)+ (Pe*Xe) )+ (Pld*Xld)]  [6.3] 
Where (Y*Py) represents the value of product (Y) computed for a unit surface (hectare) 
equated to the total cost of all inputs. The residual value of water (RVw) is calculated as the 
difference between the total value of output(Y*Py) and the costs of all non-water inputs. 
RVw = (Y*Py)- [(Pm*Xm  ) + (Ph*Xh )+(Pf*Xf)+(Pl*Xl) +(Pw+Xw)+(Pe* Xe)+ 
(Pld*Xld)]/ Xw)         [6.4] 
Hence; 





       [6.5] 
       
Although the RVM can derive meaningful results, Scheierling et al. (2004) and Young (2005) 
highlighted the possibility of over- or under-estimation of the value of water. Over-estimation 
occurs when returns that should be allocated to other inputs are allocated to water (Young, 
2005). This could also happen when any input (variable or fixed) is left out due to data 
constraints. Similarly, misallocations of returns from water to non-water inputs result in 
under-estimation of the value of water (Haab and McConnell, 2002; Lange and Hassan, 
2006). The RVM is sensitive to variable omissions and use of inaccurate prices (Speelman et 
al., 2008; Al-Karablieh et al., 2012). The other challenges of RVM can emanate from the 
specification of the production function, assigning prices to inputs and outputs, measuring 
and pricing inputs and output and the case of measuring labour and human effort (Hussain et 
al., 2009). In order to improve data precision and reduce the estimation errors, the present 
study used data collected on a weekly basis by field assistants from selected farmers and plots 
over a full cropping season. However, the inputs captured were not exhaustive, hence a 
possibility of over-estimation. For instance, farm management could not be captured due to 
the non-separability of family labour and operational cost of management at smallholder 
level.  
 
The study also aimed to analyse how different factors (age as a proxy for farming experience, 
area planted, location of the farmers‟ plot within the scheme, frequency of irrigation and 
number of crops grown) influence variability of water values at smallholder level. It is argued 
here that the possible over-estimation of water mentioned above does not affect the 
distribution of the response variable (water values) as the variable left is for all sampled plots. 
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Analysis of variance using the General Linear Model (GLM) procedure in IBM SPSS 
statistics 21 was used to identify factors that influence variation in water values. The 
magnitude of the effects was determined by computing Partial Eta squares. The value of the 
measure of association (partial eta squared) is  interpreted as the proportion of variance in the 
dependent variable that is attributable to each effect (Pierce et al., 2004).  The use of Type III 
sums of squares option tests the unique contribution of each independent variable by 
removing effects of all other independent variables (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989; Pierce et 
al., 2004). Furthermore, Type III sums of squares of the GLM ensures that both continuous 
and categorical variables from either balanced or unbalanced samples are not problematic 
(Green and Wind, 1973), hence its adoption in this analysis. The process of quantifying 
factors influencing variation enhances an understanding of the challenges of water allocation 
at a local level and influences water management decision making processes at a local and 
national level (Hussain et al., 2007; Speelman et al., 2011). 
 
6.2.4 Description of variables  
 
Production and marketing data were collected between June and December 2013, which 
according to scheme participants was the peak irrigation period, with minimum rainfall. 
Weekly record sheets were compiled for irrigation potato farmers, and used to quantify and 
value costs used in production and marketing of potatoes as specified in equation 1. Some of 
the costs include; land preparation, agrochemicals, labour, harvesting and marketing. Based 
on the 2013 observed prices, farmers in the study area faced land preparation costs of ZAR1 
495/ha. Farmers relied on hired-in tractors from government bodies, either the local office of 
the Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs or the local municipality. 
Conventional chemical fertilizers were used by most farmers, both as basal dressing and as a 
top dressing at an average market price of ZAR350/50kg bag. There was limited use of 
conventional crop protection chemicals among potato farmers in the area. A large number of 
farmers in the MRIS started potato production in 2011, and by 2013 there were still few or no 
severe cases of potato pest and disease outbreaks in the scheme. This has greatly influenced 
the low use of conventional pesticides, fungicides and insecticides by farmers in the scheme.  
 
A combination of family and hired labour is commonly used by farmers in MRIS. Payment 
for hired labour was in cash. Where labour is hired in to assist harvesting by farmers, the 
same labour performs packaging and grading to prepare the produce for the market. As such, 
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there was no additional labour hired for marketing of produce. The price of farm labour in 
South Africa is regulated by the government. The minister of labour has the power to review 
and increase minimum wages annually and is often linked to the consumer price index (CPI) 
(RSA, 2013). However, this only applies to minimum wages and not actual wages. Parties are 
still at liberty to negotiate for better increases, using the minimum as a floor. As at December 
2013, the minimum farm wage was ZAR105/day (RSA, 2013).  Lange and Hassan (2006) 
noted that the minimum wages in developing economies may be substantially higher than the 
marginal value of unskilled and semi-skilled labour especially at smallholder level. This 
poses a challenge for valuing labour in the MRIS. Following Lange and Hassan (2006), 
labour cost was therefore adjusted by using the observed wages being paid to hired labour in 
the scheme, which was ZAR30/day as at December 2013. While farmers in the MRIS tend to 
hire labour for some operations, irrigation was mainly done using family labour. This is due 
to uncertainties in water supply to the plots. More often, some farmers in the middle and tail-
end section of the scheme resort to night irrigation to improve irrigation water access, making 
it difficult to rely on hired labour for irrigation purposes. Additional costs include packaging 
material, which was valued at ZAR1,74/10kg pocket and market research cost valued at 
ZAR60,00 per farmer per crop cycle. The average producer price of potatoes in the study area 
was ZAR35,02/10kg bag. Crop revenue was therefore calculated by multiplying quantity 
harvested by the average farm-gate price. 
 
In addition to water, land is one of the main production inputs without a market value within 
the study area and its monetary value could not be attached. This is because land is 
communally owned and allocated to community members by traditional leaders without 
financial payment for the resource. Some members also inherit land from their elders, posing 
a potential challenge to attach a market value to land as a production input. Furthermore, 
another challenge emanates from the fact that value of land is also based on water access 
rights; hence, the value must incorporate value of water, whose financial value could not be 
ascertained due to absence of water markets in the area.  
 
There are no water measurement devices in the scheme under study; hence, more intensive 
methods to estimate quantity of water were applied. Firstly, SAPWAT 3, which is a computer 
based programme, was used to estimate seasonal irrigation water requirements. The 
estimation is based on statistical methods and biophysical models that govern water uptake 
and use, with the advantage of producing accurate estimates once it has been calibrated for a 
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specific area (Heerden et al., 2009). Secondly, field research assistants were hired to measure 
quantity of water applied to the crop using a Global Water Flow Probe. The Global Water 
Flow Probe relies on the velocity-area method, which involves measuring mean velocity of 
water at various cross-sections along a channel (Gomo et al., 2014b). Velocity-area method is 
recommended for temporary flow measurements such as research studies and in the absence 
of hydraulic structures (Yoder, 1999; Martin, 2009; Gomo et al., 2014b). Selection of the 
velocity area method was based on availability of the required instruments to the researchers 
and the ease of computing the outputs. The approach was also regarded as less costly because 
no new installations or construction are required along the canal, yet it still manages to give 
good estimates of water flow (Yoder, 1999; Forero and Fulton, 2013). 
 
The main focus of the study was infield water application; hence, measurement was done 
along infield canals that feed directly to individual crops. The discharge (Q) of a canal is the 
product of its cross-sectional area and the mean velocity of the water passing a given section 
(Forero and Fulton, 2013), which is  determined by the following equation:  
 
Q = V x A           [6.6]  
          




], V = average velocity [m.s
-1
], and A = flow area [m
2
]. 
The Global Water Flow Probe directly gives velocity readings (m/s
-1
). The canals in the 
MRIS are parabolic in shape and hence flow area was calculated as follows, following 
(Gomo, 2012): 
 
A = 2/3 (TY)          [6.7] 
 
where A is the area (m
2
), T is the top width of flow, and  Y is flow depth; all measured in 
metres. 
 
The quantity of water applied was estimated by multiplying discharge (Q) by the duration of 
the cycle (hours) and the number of cycles from planting to harvesting of the crop. Average 
quantity of water applied by a farmer per cycle was used, acknowledging the challenges of 
keeping track of recording multiple fluctuations in flow per each time period (0.5hr or 
hourly) during the irrigation process. Such precision could not be attained during the study 
due to time constraints and the cost associated with the data collection procedures required to 
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monitor such fluctuations as recommended by Forero and Fulton (2013). However, following 
the study by  Schuster (1970) which noted that in many irrigation systems, water 
measurements are made only once a day, or only when some mechanical change in supply or 
delivery has been made. Although it was beyond the scope of this study, the use of automated 
permanently fixed water measuring devices along the canal instead of the potable Global 
Water Flow Probe could have enabled monitoring the fluctuations of the flow more precisely. 
 
6.3 The results and discussion 
 
6.3.1 Descriptive analysis of production and marketing activities in MRIS 
 
The average size of land under potatoes was 0.2ha per farmer, with a minimum of 0.1ha and a 
maximum of 0.4ha. All the 60 sampled farmers planted the Mondial potato variety. Labour 
and input utilisation for potato production in the MRIS varies across the sampled farmers 
with averages presented in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1. Labour use and tradable inputs in irrigated potatoes, Mooi River Irrigation 
Scheme, 2013 (n = 60) 




Irrigation labour 775 
Chemicals/Crop protection* 284 
Harvesting 938 
Total labour costs    3644 
Tradable inputs: 
 Land preparation/Tractor hire 1495 
Seed cost 6655 
Irrigation cost (contributions to buy repair material) 524 
Fertiliser cost 2182 
Packaging cost 1233 
Transport cost 1997 
Marketing 262 
Total tradable inputs 14347 
Average variable cost (ZAR/ha) 17991 
Notes: Exchange rate was US$1:ZAR10.91 as at December 2013 




Based on the individual cost structure in Table 6.1, gross margins (GM) were calculated by 
subtracting costs from gross returns. The gross margins shown here do not include a share of 
fixed or overhead costs, such as canal maintenance, repair or replacement of tools and 
equipment. Gross margins, both positive and negative, for the 60 farmers in the sample are 
summarised in Table 6.2.  
 


































Upper 12 3 (25%)   9 (75%) -12765 – 22987 13256 7441 
Middle  25 10 (40%) 15 (60%) -28213 – 28486   9754 7964 
Tail-end  23 15 (65%)   8 (35%) -29522 – 16092   6317 9219 
Total 60 28 (47%) 32 (53%) -29522 – 28486 10092 8575 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
The gross margin (GM) represents the amount of total sales revenue that the farm enterprise 
retains after incurring the direct costs associated with production of the commodity. Caution 
in interpreting the GM results is required, considering that GM does not produce the profit (or 
loss) generated by the enterprise, as it does not take into account the fixed costs (overheads) 
that may be attributable to the overall business. 
 
The study showed that GM decreases from the head section of the scheme towards the tail-
end section of the scheme. The majority of farmers, 75% and 60%, in the upper and middle 
section respectively, managed to achieve positive gross margins, compared to 35% in tail-end 
section of the scheme. The gross margin per grower ranged from -ZAR29 522/ha to 
ZAR28 486/ha (Table 6.2).  Among those who had positive returns, the average GM was 
ZAR10 092/ha per farmer. Farmers in the MRIS grow two crop cycles per year, and an 
average farmer has a potential to double the current GMs, if they can manage to do two crop 
cycles. However, such income cannot be met by the majority of the farmers, whose land 
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access is restricted to an average of 0.2ha per farmer, unless extra land is rented from friends 
and relatives whose plots are not fully utilised. Furthermore, variation in water access across 
the scheme also causes a decrease in GM from the head section to the tail-section. This is also 
compounded by the fact that tail-end farmers incur more costs in pumping water to 
supplement canal water, thereby lowering their GM.   
 
6.3.2 Economic estimation of residual water values for irrigated crops in MRIS 
 
The residual imputation method was applied to estimate water values for commonly grown 
crops in the Mooi River Irrigation Scheme. This was done using two different data sets. The 
first estimation was done using secondary data for eight crops grown in the MRIS and 
ssecond estimates were based on primary data for actual water applied to a potato crop 
measured against the actual crop margins recorded for each sampled farmer. 
 
Irrigation water requirements for the various crops were estimated using the SAPWAT 3 
model, which was developed and tested with WRC funding, and is the accepted model for 
use in the calculation of irrigation requirements for registration and licensing purposes by the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (van Heerden et al., 2009). Yield levels used in the 
study are based on 2012/13 “Combud” estimates (DAEA, 2012)  for furrow irrigated crops, 
hence the SAPWAT 3 derived water requirements are also based on furrow irrigation, which 
is the irrigation system used by farmers in the study area.  The production and revenue 
figures from Combud are commonly used by the Provincial Department of Agriculture for 
planning and budgeting purposes. A scrutiny of the enterprise budgets revealed lack of proper 
quantification of water being used in the budgeting process. This is due to either less or more 
quantities of water being reflected in the budgets compared to area specific irrigation water 
requirements as estimated by programs like SAPWAT 3. This can be attributed to lack of 
better water estimates for each crop, grown in specific geographic locations. The SAPWAT 3 
estimated water requirements were, therefore, used to impute residual water values for the 
different crops grown in the MRIS by applying equation [6.5] of the model. The results are 






Table 6.3. Irrigation water values based on 2013 crop prices and SAPWAT 3 water 




























Spinach 6920 62 002 30 908 31 083 4.47 
Potato 4480 74 995 62 994 12 001 2.73 
Cabbage 5240 86 396 59 307 27 090 5.13 
Tomatoes 7030 227 495 144 634 82 872 11.78 
Maize  5170 20 500 13 834 6 666 1.31 
Sweet Potato 5680 89 004 45 931 43 073 7.53 
Dry Beans 4940 17 500 12 088 5 411 1.09 
Notes: Exchange rate was US$1:ZAR10.91 as at December 2013. 
Source: Own calculation, 2014 
 
It is important to note that the estimated average water values are short run values under the 
assumption that fixed costs are sunk and are not considered in annual cropping decisions. The 
estimated water values range from ZAR1.09/m
3
 in dry beans production to ZAR11.78/m
3
 in 
tomato production. The estimated water values for some crops compare well with some 





 for tomatoes and a much higher water 
value of ZAR9.16/m
3







 for this study respectively. Similar studies, for example, Yokwe (2009) 
reported a lower value of ZAR3.60/m
3
 for tomatoes and Hussain et al. (2009) reported lower 
values of US$0.01/m
3
 (equivalence of ZAR0.11/ m
3
 in current terms) for smallholder 
irrigated maize in Pakistan. In this study, maize and dry beans production generated the 




 respectively. The results 
show that high water values are associated with crops that have higher margins. This makes 
                                                 
5
 Estimates for irrigation water requirements (IWR) in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are based on 
SAPWAT 3 model. 
6
 Estimated revenue, cost and gross margins per hectare are based on KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs enterprise budgets (Combud) for 
2012/2013 (IDAEA, 2012) 
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water valuation results an important decision making tool, especially regarding crop choice at 
farm level. In the context of water scarcity, the water values can help ensure efficient 
allocation of water by minimising use on low value crops and redirecting the resource to 
alternative high value crops.  
 
It is evident considering the variations reported by various authors that water values vary 
spatially and temporally. The reasons of variation in water values remain a key aspect. 
According to Hussain et al. (2007), possible causes of variation could be due to different 
irrigation management styles and a wide range of institutional arrangements governing water 
resource management, household demographics as well as different approaches in costing of 
production and marketing activities. Some of the factors affecting water values for a 
communally managed scheme are explained in the next section.  
 
6.3.3 Residual water values for potatoes grown in MRIS 
 
Water applied to potatoes was calculated as a function of number of cycles per week, total 
irrigation hours and the flow rate during the time of irrigation, aggregated from establishment 
to harvesting in cubic metres (m
3
). Total water applied to the crop was also based on the 
location of the plots along the scheme (upper section, middle section and tail-end section), 
and was compared against the irrigation water requirements for potatoes, estimated using the 
SAPWAT 3 model. This was done to show possible variability of water values within a 
scheme, with the assumption that locational differences along the main conveyance canal 
have influence on water access and consequently on water values. Such information would 
help to reflect water allocation challenges among farmers within the same scheme. Table 6.4 
presents actual water applied by farmers in the MRIS compared to estimated (SAPWAT 3) 












Table 6.4. Comparison of irrigation water requirements and actual water applied to 
potato crop, Mooi River Irrigation Scheme, 2013 (n=60) 
Plot location 
along the main 
canal. 

















Upper section 4480 4119 91.9% 32% - 174% 
Middle Section 4480 2780 62.1% 20% - 135% 
Tail-end  section 4480 2001 44.7% 14% - 118% 
Scheme 
Average/ha 
4480 2749 61.4% 14% - 174% 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
The water applied to crops in the study is based on actual water accessed during the entire 
production cycle. Due to relatively dry conditions in the area, farmers did not indicate any 
deliberate cut on irrigation water applied to crops.  The results show that actual water applied 
to the crop gradually decreases from the head/upper section to the tail-end section (Table 
6.4). However, it is important to note that the overall water application is 61.4% of the 
estimated crop water requirement, distributed as 91.9%, 62.1% and 44.7% from upper, 
middle and tail-end sections, respectively. Although the literature has noted water distribution 
disparities among head and tail-end farmers sharing a water course (Mbatha and Antrobus, 
2008), quantification of the magnitude of variation is limited especially among smallholder 
farmers where water use is not measured. Qualitative measures based on farmers‟ perception 
have always been used to describe the uneven water distribution among farmers where water 
is not scientifically measured. Some authors, for example, Hassan and Mungatana (2006), 
relied on farmers‟ estimates, which might not be accurate given their unfamiliarity of water 
measurement techniques and the low literacy levels among smallholder farmers in most 
developing countries. Furthermore, smallholder crop water values from other researchers 
(Speelman et al., 2008; Yokwe, 2009) are aggregated without taking into account variation 
within the individual schemes. A breakdown of water values based on farmer location with 
respect to water source helps to identify embedded multi-user institutional and management 
issues in water allocation at a local level. Quantification of such a disparity is important since 
it may have an influence on how farmers react to water regulation and enforcement agencies, 
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especially local Water User Associations (WUAs). Lack of cooperation by farmers or water 
users with the local water governing bodies is mostly affected by existing water management 
challenges as well as incentives. In this instance, water shortages and unequal distribution in 
the MRIS might have a negative effect on farmer cooperation with such associations.    
 
The irrigation water values for potatoes were estimated by dividing the net gross margins of 
the crop by the actual water applied.  The gross margins were calculated by subtracting 
variable costs from gross revenues, at market prices. Water values were calculated for the 
three sections of the scheme (Table 6.5).  
 
Table 6.5. Return to water for smallholder irrigated potato, Mooi River Irrigation 
Scheme, 2013 (n=60) 
Description Variability for farmers with 
positive gross margins 



















TR (ZAR/ha) 34 803 24 504 22 802 26 980 29 108 20 118 11 565 18 634 
TVC (ZAR/ha) 20 805 14 750 16 485 16 889 20 478 17 445 15 372 17 260 
GM (ZAR/ha) 13 998 9 754 6 317 10 092 8 641 2 673 -3 819 1 375 
Water (m
3





) 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.11 -4.04 -10.91 -17.57 -17.57 
Max (ZAR/m
3





) 3.24 2.99 2.29 2.98 2.10 0.96 -1.91 0.50 
Note: Exchange rate was US$1:ZAR10.91 as at December 2013. 
Source: Survey data, 2013 
 
Yokwe (2009) imputed a residual value of ZAR0.65/m
3
 for a potato crop in Zanyokwe 
irrigation farmers in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, which was lower than the 
average of ZAR2.98/m
3
 imputed in this study for MRIS farmers with positive gross margins 
for irrigated potato (Table 6.5). However, the value over all farmers, including those with 
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negative gross margins was ZAR0.50/m
3
, which was similar to Yokwe‟s estimate. As such, 
water values derived from reliable secondary sources based on optimal conditions may be 
used to infer water values for similar irrigation schemes, especially at national level, where 
individual water use data may not be available. Although the variation in water values within 
the scheme seem to have a narrow spread, the water values declined after including negative 
gross margins in the imputation method (Table 6.5). Since average water value is a good 
indicator of performance (Hussain et al., 2007), it is apparent from the high proportion of 
farmers (47%) with negative gross margins and consequently negative water values,  that 
smallholder farmers in the MRIS are underperforming. Furthermore, water values may show 
intrinsic challenges of water allocation and management at a local level, evidenced by 
negative values by tail-end water users in the scheme (Table 6.5).  
 
The water value estimates from the RVM are accurate to a certain degree, and omission of 
some variables like land might increase the estimates. Although this might be the case in this 
study, such omission exert an equal influence on the final water value figures for all sampled 
farmers and does not affect the variability of water values across the different users. There is 
need for intervention, especially to improve farmers‟ capacity to manage water, schedule 
irrigation and application of best irrigation practices among farmers who have water values 
close to zero or negative. However, since most smallholder farmers do not pay for water in 
South Africa, negative water values might also be an indicator of the extent of 
underperformance of government supported schemes. Of concern are farmers who applied 
above scheme average (≥ 3380m
3
/ha), but still managed negative gross margins. These 
farmers represented 7% of the sample and qualitative reasons for the negative gross margins 
were sought. Some of the reasons include crop damage by livestock at flowering stages while 
potato blight was reported by one farmer as the main reason she lost her crop after applying 
so much water. After the blight attack, the farmer continued to irrigate with the hope of 
harvesting a meaningful yield. However, such a decision could have been different if the 
farmer was paying for irrigation water, whose cost could have deterred her from continual 
application of water to a failing crop. To ensure maximum returns to water, irrigation 
management must always be supported by other scheme management and agronomic 
practices like fencing as well as pest and disease control which minimises crop damage. 




Furthermore, comparing SAPWAT 3 derived irrigation water requirements with actual water 
applied to a potato crop in the MRIS revealed lower irrigation performance and failure to 
meet the desired water application rate at smallholder level. Due to water constraints 
emanating from weak water management systems, farmers at the MRIS are on average 
applying 61.4% of the estimated irrigation water requirements. The amount applied varied 
among farmers, signalling the importance of more localised institutional arrangements 
surrounding irrigation water management at smallholder level.  
 
In the scheme under study, water allocation among farmers was unfairly distributed, as 
shown by variations in volume of water applied from the head section to the tail-end sections. 
There was a need for mechanisms to be developed to improve the water distribution system. 
The relevant question for policy is how smallholder irrigation farmers can improve water 
management in order to raise water values and at the same time optimally allocate scarce 
irrigation water resources among themselves across a wide range of crops. Raising water 
values means an increase in water use efficiency. The current irrigation scheme revitalisation 
programme in South Africa might need to focus on redressing water management challenges 
among farmers in communally owned schemes. Improvement of system design might need to 
take into account the difficulties of excluding farmers who do not comply with the scheme 
irrigation roster from accessing or drawing water outside the agreed schedule. Whilst the 
MRIS revealed a case of under-application of water, over-application can happen in irrigation 
schemes where water supply is not a major constraint. 
 
The residual values vary with time and location of farmers (Hassan and Mungatana, 2006), 
depending on the commodity being produced and market conditions, both for the inputs and 
outputs. The precision of data might also play a role in the imputation of water values, for 
instance, the value of land and management labour could not be correctly estimated in this 
study, which might lead to an over-estimation of water values. There is, however, an 
opportunity to improve the quality of the valuation results by monitoring the actual water 
applied to several crops over many years to establish common trends in water use at 
smallholder level. This also presents the need to analyse some of the factors affecting 





6.3.4 Irrigation water distribution and access 
 
Water is in short supply and one day of irrigation per week has proved to be insufficient for 
farmers in the MRIS. Most farmers grow more than one crop in each season, with an average 
of two crops per farmer. During the single day of irrigation per week, a farmer has to make 
critical decisions on which crop to irrigate depending on the amount of water available and 
the condition of the crop. Some crops end up being water-stressed due to water inadequacy. 
According to key informants and observation of activities, some irrigation challenges in the 
MRIS are associated with leakages along conveyance structures, non-compliance with 
irrigation schedules and lack of enforcement of rules governing water use. Whilst leakages 
are visible along the entire canal from Block 1 to 15, tail end blocks (11, 12, 13, 14 & 15) are 
the worst affected. Farmers engage in unregulated irrigation practices to improve water 
access. These include continuous irrigation outside their scheduled days, irrigating plots 
outside the scheme and night irrigation. All the mentioned practices increase demand for 
water and deprive tail-end block members of irrigation water. Although continuous irrigation 
was cited as a common problem among head section members in blocks 1, 2, 3 and 4, the 
irrigation of plots outside the scheme boundaries is prevalent across the whole scheme. 
 
In light of a possible increase in area under irrigation and a rise in population in the area, a 
detailed evaluation of whether the scheme infrastructure is still adequate to meet current peak 
crop-water demand might be necessary for a possible upgrade. Of concern is the failure by 
scheme management structures to address the water distributional challenges. However, the 
short term and more sustainable strategies must target to improve water management by 
redesigning water allocation systems and ensuring compliance among farmers in the MRIS. It 
is evident that the current reliance on block committees to management water is not achieving 
equitable distribution of the resource among scheme members. By shifting the focus from 
committee members, to ensure that more individuals directly take part in the management of 
water resources through rotational management based on weekly or monthly roster is 
suggested. Rotational management together with irrigation management training for farmers 
ensures that farmers become accountable to their actions and can therefore take part in 




6.3.5 Factors affecting variation in irrigation water values (Effect Size) 
 
Identifying factors influencing variation of water values enhances an understanding of the 
challenges of water management at a local level, and influences allocation policies at a local 
and national level (Hussain et al., 2007). This is particularly important where farmers share 
water from a single source or channel. Local level factors affecting water values are grouped 
into resource-related and production-related (Hussain et al., 2007). Resource-based factors 
include reliability and availability of water. As such, the number of irrigation cycles 
(IRRIG_CYS) was used as a proxy to measure resource-related factors. However, some 
resource-based aspects like water quality could not be captured due to the homogeneous 
nature of the sample, drawing water from the same source. Production-related factors include 
irrigation technology, crops grown (NUM_CRPS) at farm level, land size (HA_PLT), input 
usage as well as water management institutions (Hussain et al., 2007; Speelman et al., 2011). 
Number of crops grown at farm level was therefore used as proxy for diversification and 
hence a mechanism to increase farm returns among smallholders, who are viewed as risk 
averse and participate in agriculture to meet multiple household objectives (Bembridge, 
2000). 
 
Due to challenges of water distribution across the scheme, emanating from institutional and 
management failures, location of the plots along the main canal (FARM_LOC) was used as a 
proxy of the institutional and resource management issues around water allocation in the 
MRIS. Due to unavailability of more detailed biophysical data for individual plots, aspects 
such as soil fertility, slope and drainage could not be incorporated in the model. In order to 
ensure maximum utilisation of water, some socio-economic factors like age and education 
level (EDUC) were used as proxies for farming experience and decision making capabilities, 
respectively.  
 
In the General Linear Model (GLM) regression procedures, there are two ways to assess the 
size effect of an individual predictor (Turner, 2008). The first is based on the estimated 
regression coefficient and gives a measure of how much the dependent variable is a function 
of a change in an independent variable; i.e. the estimated regression coefficient provides the 
change in the dependent variable per unit change in the independent variable (Greene, 2003). 
This approach can also derive meaning from the standardized regression coefficients to assess 
the response. The standardized regression coefficient is the coefficient from a regression in 
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which all variables are standardized (i.e., have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.0); 
hence, all units are expressed as “standard deviation units” (Turner, 2008). 
 
The second way to measure the size effect of an independent variable is in terms of the 
variance explained by that variable (Turner, 2008), and this was adopted for this study. This 
was informed by the objective of the study that sought to explain the underlying factors 
leading to variation in water values among irrigators. This measures the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variable controlling for all 
the other independent variables (Turner, 2008). An F-test was used to determine the fitness of 
the GLM model, and it was accepted at the 5% significance level (p=0.016). Variance 
Inflation factors (VIF) were computed for the variables included in the model and the results 
indicated that multicollinearity was not a serious problem (VIF<10). The GLM results are 
presented in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6. Factors affecting variation in water values, Mooi River Irrigation Scheme, 
2013 (n=60) 
 Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 






551.810 7 2.772** 0.016 0.272 
Intercept 119.423 1 4.201** 0.045 0.075 
AGE 11.553 1 0.406 0.527 0.008 
EDUC 92.694 1 3.261* 0.077 0.059 
HA_PLT 10.333 1 0.363 0.549 0.007 
NUM_CRPS 0.081 1 0.003 0.958 0.000 
IRIG_CYS 90.967 1 3.199* 0.08 0.058 
FARM_LOC 211.484 2 3.718** 0.031 0.125 
Error  1478.730 52    
Total 2074.968 60    
Corrected Total 2030.540 59    
Notes: ** and * mean statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 




Variation in water values across a scheme is mainly influenced by farmers‟ education level, 
frequency of irrigation and farm location with respect to the main water source. The F-Value 
for education (EDUC) is statistically significant at the 10% level and explains 5.9% of the 
variation in water values. This is consistent with a priori expectations that level of education 
would influence water utilisation. Education has an influence on farmer decision making 
processes. Most farmers in the MRIS grow multiple crops at each given time; hence, they 
always make critical decisions pertaining to water allocation across the different crops. The 
more the crops a farmer grows at a time, the more the constraints s/he faces in supplying 
adequate water to the crops. This might be attributed to the restricted access to water in the 
MRIS, where a farmer is allocated water one day per week. Assuming that farmers are 
rational, it can be argued that they allocate the water to what the farmer would regard as 
strategic crops for the household. This can either be based on potential revenue or household 
food security demands. Expectedly, such allocation has an impact on the variability of water 
values per crop and decision making processes have been shown to be positively influenced 
by farmers‟ education level.  
  
Water allocation in the MRIS varies across the different sections of the scheme and among 
the farmers within the blocks. The major challenge affecting farmers is water access. Farmers 
in the upper section of the scheme receive more water than those on the middle and the tail-
end sections (Table 6.4).  Analysis of variance (Table 6.6) shows that 12.5% of the variation 
in water value is explained by farm/plot location (FARM_LOC). Plot location was used as a 
proxy to explain institutional challenges around water allocation and how farmers whose 
plots are located at different positions along the main canal have unequal water access. The 
statistically significant F-value explains how location further from the water source affects 
variation in water values (Table 6.5). This is also revealed by statistically significant F-values 
for irrigation frequency (IRRIG_CYS), which vary from the upper section to tail end section 
of the scheme (Figure 6.1).  Similarly, Speelman et al. (2011) reported that coefficients for 
scheme location and farmers‟ age influenced water variability at the 5%levels of probability, 
while crops grown were significant at 10% level. Consequently, irrigation cycles explain 
5.8% of the variation in water values. This calls for improvement in local water management 








Based on the variation in quantity of water applied, gross margins and in water values across 
farmers within the same scheme, the study can conclude that farmers in MRIS are 
underperforming. The study attributes inequitable water distribution to ineffective water 
management systems and institutional failures in the scheme. Negative water values could 
also imply the existence of negative externalities emanating from upstream users 
withdrawing extra water, reducing the quantity for downstream users. This provides 
important insights into the potential benefits of collective management of irrigation water as a 
common pool resource. Undoubtedly, a policy shift towards a more aggressive cost recovery 
strategy might fail due to the unprofitable levels of smallholder irrigation farming in South 
Africa. However, participative approaches make farmers accountable and more pro-active in 






















CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
7.1 Recapping the purpose of the research 
 
Agricultural crop production in South Africa ranges from being purely subsistence, where 
production is only for household food consumption, to sophisticated irrigation systems, 
which are commercially oriented. However, development of the smallholder irrigation sector 
in most Sub-Saharan African countries has faced many challenges. This is despite the 
considerable potential for smallholder irrigation farming to contribute towards household 
food security and rural livelihoods. A review of the literature on smallholder irrigation 
schemes in South Africa revealed that most of them are facing operational challenges and 
some have ceased operation. Besides the generic challenges of input constraints, poor market 
access, poor access to credit and lack of technical skills, the collapse of irrigation schemes in 
South Africa is mainly attributed to poorly coordinated irrigation support structures. The 
democratic South African government initiated strategies to improve irrigation management 
since 1994, including irrigation management and transfer, introduction of water-user 
associations, scheme revitalisation and rehabilitation programmes, and finance for poor 
resource farmers, but little success has been achieved. Smallholder irrigation schemes in 
South Africa continue to face challenges due to poor governance systems, water-use 
insecurity, poor participation of farmers in the management of schemes, and unequal 
distribution of water that lead to low water productivity and values. 
 
While irrigation farming is one of the major users of stored fresh water, availability of water 
is becoming constrained in South Africa. This is worsened by recurring droughts, which 
presents strong motivation for continuous improvement in water management in the irrigation 
sector. In order to ensure long-term viability of irrigated agriculture, insights into the 
performance of the various water management and irrigation systems are needed, together 
with the adoption of best management practices at scheme and national levels. There is 
limited research on the identification of local irrigation management challenges from an 





The specific objectives of this study, focused on the Mooi River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) in 
KwaZulu-Natal Province in South Africa, have been to: (i) assess the water governance 
systems and their effect on irrigation water management; (ii) assess the implications of 
institutional arrangements on water-use security; (iii) assess the level of farmer participation 
in collective irrigation management and the factors affecting their participation; and (iv) 
explain the factors affecting variability in water values at farm level and implications for 
irrigation water management. The theoretical underpinning of the study was the New 
Institutional Economics, and therefore the different conceptual and empirical models are 
informed by this school of thought. 
 
Firstly, the IAD framework together with Ostrom‟s eight institutional design principles, were 
applied in Chapter 3 to assess the overall performance of governance systems in smallholder 
irrigation farming. The challenges of poor cooperation, ambiguously-defined resource 
boundaries and weak complementary linkages between formal and informal institutions 
negatively affect irrigation management. This exposed farmers to varying degrees of water-
use insecurity associated with poor sharing of irrigation water. Secondly, the extent of water-
use security among irrigators was analysed in Chapter 4. A combination of Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) to generate an index of water-use security and Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) to determine the institutional factors affecting it were applied on 307 
randomly selected farmers. Thirdly, based on the literature, it was imperative to examine 
collective action issues in smallholder irrigation as a major driver towards scheme 
sustainability. As such, the third empirical chapter applied the collective action theory to 
determine the extent of participation in irrigation water management by the 307 sampled 
farmers. After generating an index of participation in irrigation water management, a Tobit 
regression model was used to identify factors affecting participation, and the ordered Probit 
Model was applied to explain factors affecting intensity of participation in irrigation 
activities. The fourth empirical chapter (Chapter 6) explained the variation in water values. 
The residual value method was applied to estimate water values from both secondary and 
primary data. The SAPWAT 3 model was used to derive irrigation water requirements based 
on the long-term weather data of the study site. The SAPWAT 3 estimates were compared 
with estimated provincial gross margin budget estimates, known as Combud (2012/13). 
Primary data were collected from 60 irrigators, whose plots were monitored over the entire 
production cycle of June to December of 2013, and input-output data were captured. The data 
121 
 
were used to estimate average water values and the generalised linear model was used to 
identify factors explaining variability among irrigators within the same scheme. 
 
The remainder of this chapter presents the conclusions (Section 7.2), followed by policy 
recommendations (Section 7.3). Section 7.4 describes the limitations of the study, and, 




This study sought to understand the governance and institutional arrangements around 
smallholder water management at MRIS by applying the IAD framework and Ostrom‟s 
institutional design principles. Given the research design that focused on empirical 
investigation of the institutional linkages between the resource system and the governance 
system, it has emerged that exogenous variables, including the government‟s non-coercive 
cooperation and the surrounding environment, affected resource units and resource users at 
MRIS. Actions of irrigation participants on a set of activities like conflict resolution, 
maintenance activities, negotiations and water allocation were assessed. The qualitative 
analysis helped to determine the interaction of variables, which were relevant to understand 
the outcomes in smallholder irrigation management at MRIS. Some of the findings are that 
despite rule violations being pervasive, rule monitoring and sanctioning of rule violation 
activities are perceived to be uncommon and inadequate. Furthermore, despite the fact that  
irrigators attempt to resolve appropriation and provision problems to avert the „tragedy of the 
commons‟, the state does not deal with various internal problematic issues around water 
sharing, such as sharing of benefits and costs as well as compliance with operational rules. 
 
Institutional and economic categories of laws clarifying ownership, access rights and specific 
incentives for common property resources (CPRs) need to be strengthened, to avoid the 
degeneration of CPRs into open access, with a possibility of further complicating irrigation 
water management. To ensure equity in localised water allocation, it is important to assess 
how the diversity of interests is considered in the decision-making process. This can be 
achieved through stakeholder meetings by the public institutions, which can help to reduce 
tensions among different users and establish fair systems of water distribution. This can be 




The findings on the analysis of water-use security revealed that formal associations including 
water user associations (WUAs), scheme membership and membership of cooperatives were 
not offering adequate incentives to water users at smallholder level. The study noted that rule 
violations by some water users deprived members of formal associations of the anticipated 
improvement in water access at local level. Regarding enforcement mechanisms, conflict 
management and decision-making, the existing water governance structures were weak and 
did not ensure reasonable compliance with both formal and informal rules, which manifested 
in unequal sharing of water and maintenance costs among water users. The overall effect is 
water-use insecurity among smallholder irrigators, which translates into reduced agricultural 
production. The development of local water management systems by synchronising the 
informal and formal institutional arrangements, promoting the participation of farmers in 
decision making, and effective conflict management mechanisms can ensure improvement in 
water-use security at farm level.  
 
Farmer participation in irrigation water management is crucial for the sustainability of 
smallholder irrigation schemes, which are currently associated with high rates of failure. By 
applying the collective action theory and econometric models, the study investigated the 
management and equitable resource sharing of water resources in MRIS. A case study 
approach was adopted to gain insights on user participation in the collective management of 
smallholder irrigation scheme. In cases where water supply is not adequate and is unreliable 
to meet scheme demand, technical interventions in the management of communal schemes, 
such as the infrastructure refurbishments and upgrading of scheme capacity, need to be 
complemented with institutional interventions, which can lead to improved financial 
contributions towards infrastructure maintenance by water users. This can be a positive step 
towards deepening the IMT process, and building the capacity of water users through targeted 
training. 
 
Institutional arrangements in irrigation scheme management must also be tailor-made to take 
into account the low literacy levels among smallholder farmers. The fact that irrigators who 
joined the local WUA revealed higher participation intensity compared to non-members, 
suggests a need to increase farmer participation in formalised institutions that also expose 
them to water management training, through capacity building programmes run by the 
government and other initiatives. However, water-use security was not guaranteed to 
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members of both formal and informal groups, hence a need to strengthen exclusivity rights to 
cooperating members and promote collective irrigation management. 
 
Regarding the factors that affect the variability of water values, the results showed that 
variations in average water values was influenced by crop types grown by farmers, although 
this could not be an indicator of individual importance of each crop to the welfare of farming 
households. Furthermore, the results revealed that crops with higher gross margins (e.g., 
tomatoes and spinach) are also associated with higher water values, while those with lower 
margins (e.g., dry beans and maize) have lower water values. Nevertheless, caution is 
required in interpreting water values across crops because some crops with the lowest returns 
to water are often the most important in terms of household food security, since smallholder 
farmers diversify crop enterprises for a variety of reasons. An example is the lower water 
value in maize, which is a staple crop in South Africa. The impact of maize production on 
household food security might need to be further explored in view of the low financial returns 
and low average water values.  
 
The negative GM attained by 47% of the farmers, raises doubts on the feasibility of 
implementing cost recovery measures among South Africa‟s smallholder farmers, as 
specified by the National Water Act 36 of 1998. On the other hand, if the assumption that 
smallholder farmers have the capacity to conduct farming as a business holds, then cost 
recovery fees might be a suitable stimulant to encourage efficient management of water and 
other resources at farm level. However, this has implications for the current water policy 
where smallholder farmers in South Africa are not paying for water, regardless of the 
inefficiencies in management and utilisation of the resource at farm and scheme level. 
 
Based on the variation in quantity of water applied, gross margins and in water values across 
farmers within the same scheme, the study can conclude that where water measurement does 
not take place, water distribution is not equitable. The study attributes inequitable water 
distribution to ineffective water management systems and institutional failures in the scheme. 
To reinforce the monitoring mechanisms, there is need to invest in both engineering 
approaches of installing water measurement devices and institutional approaches through 
human capacity development. This might ensure that water measurement be done in each 
scheme at a manageable cost that farmers are willing and able to pay, with a potential to 
improve collective management of water.  
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7.3 Recommendations for policy  
 
Based on the findings of the study, a number of policy recommendations could be drawn. 
Firstly, the descriptive statistics revealed low literacy levels among irrigators, hence tailor-
made training and capacity-building approaches are required to improve farmers‟ skills. Such 
an approach may enhance decision-making and consequently farmer productivity in the 
medium to long-term. 
 
Traditional leadership institutions were found to have a strong influence on the behaviour and 
socio-cultural aspects of rural irrigators. There is a need to capitalise on social standing and 
respect afforded to traditional leaders at local level by incorporating them into the formal 
water management structures. This may be important to improve water management in 
smallholder irrigation communities of South Africa. The anticipated benefits of such an 
action are to enhance community participation in collective activities and the possibility of 
enhancing revenue collection mechanisms, which form the basis for cost recovery objectives 
of the IMT and PIM. 
 
Negative average gross margins and water values indicate that many smallholders are 
performing poorly, making cost recovery strategies a challenge. Therefore, it is recommended 
that partial support in the form of employing more water controllers be continued at scheme 
level to ensure accountability and improvement in water allocation. Irrigators considered their 
water access situation to be better when there were more water controllers who are 
operational, than fewer and less empowered to act against offenders due to IMT. The water 
controllers can be incorporated as working staff of the water-user association, whose salary 
obligation is met by the government. This is in view of the poor financial performance, poor 
coordination and failure of most WUAs to fully operate after several years of existence. The 
number of hired staff may increase in correlation with the size of the irrigation system. 
However, despite the increase in hired staff, the process of bureaucratisation (staff organized 
within a hierarchy) can be decreased where the manager or supervisor of the water controller 
is the irrigator and not an officer outside the scheme. Such an approach would ensure 
effective decentralisation of scheme management, at the same time maintaining effective 




7.4 Recommendations for water managers 
 
Technical interventions like provision of lockable water supply infrastructure to ensure easy 
control of unsanctioned withdrawal of water, upgrading of supply capacity and water 
measurement can be pursued at scheme level. These measures have to be complemented with 
an improvement in the institutional arrangements, management capacity of users and the 
governance systems in order to achieve better water allocation and minimize supply 
uncertainties. Without effective local institutional support, user cooperation and investment in 
psychological capital, engineering interventions for smallholder irrigation management may 
continue to be subjected to vandalism and infrastructure decay. 
 
Mechanisms to ensure that additional benefits/incentives accrue to those who cooperate and 
those who comply with membership of WUAs are missing at smallholder level and need to 
be developed during scheme design level and during revitalisation processes. This can be 
explored by thoroughly analysing the interaction of technological improvement, management 
system and governance systems in irrigation water management at scheme level. These three 
systems have to complement each other to ensure improved resource availability and 
utilisation. 
 
The challenges of irrigation water governance highlight the importance of a community‟s 
social capital in management of irrigation water. A key to the construction and success of 
social capital is the extent of relevant linkages in a community, as these are what facilitate 
information exchange and successful water management organizations in a community. One 
concern is whether all members of the community are included in the relevant social capital 
networks of their communities. In particular, the governance systems need to acknowledge 
the importance of women‟s participation in the management of their water systems, not only 
on the basis of equity but also because access to irrigation water affects the welfare of women 
and households. This is based on the realisation that women constitute the majority of rural 







7.5 Directions for future research 
 
Time and funding constraints prevented the additional research. The study relied on cross-
sectional data collected from a single irrigation scheme. As such, more research insights 
could have been gathered if the study had covered a number of irrigation schemes across the 
country. Furthermore, the use of panel data collected over several years may have improved 
an understanding of the dynamics of smallholder irrigation farming. More seasonal data 
could have improved the water valuation process by taking into account seasonal water 
variations. Furthermore, since policy changes influence irrigation farming, an analysis over a 
longer period could have enabled a detailed explanation of the impact of structural changes 
on the performance of irrigation schemes. 
 
These limitations provide possibilities for further research in this field. Research on the 
impact of psychological capital and social capital in the management of communal irrigation 
schemes is recommended. This is informed by the literature, which points to the fact that 
smallholder irrigators view scheme infrastructure as government property, hence they have 
shown little commitment to maintaining the infrastructure. Furthermore, the use of panel data 
might improve the reliability of water valuation results. As such, use of marginal instead of 
average water values require more data precision, hence the recommendation to adopt more 
intensive data collection methods. The study could not control for water use inefficiencies by 
farmers, hence the study recommends the use of frontier estimation techniques to examine 
inefficiency in irrigation water utilisation (under or overvaluing). This allows for an 
identification and adoption of efficient production systems from randomly distributed farm-
level observations.  
 
The possibility of integrating traditional leadership structures into the formal water user 
associations, and defining their possible roles in such an integration process need further 
investigation. This approach might be plausible since most of the traditional leaders are 
already involved in water management through their own parallel structures that concentrate 
on conflict resolution. They are familiar to farmers and likely to receive the least resistance. 
This study concluded that many smallholder irrigation farmers were under-performing and 
generated negative gross margins, hence they are less likely to pay for water management 
services. However, further investigation is required and more cases need to be considered in 
order to inform the irrigation cost recovery policy at national level with more certainty. This 
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may be coupled to investigating the farmers‟ willingness to pay for irrigation water in view of 
the negative water values, and whether this would impact positively on farmers‟ average 
water values. Furthermore, exploring water-use security against the water rights systems 
among smallholder farmers may provide insights into improving water access and 
productivity among irrigators. 
 
The majority of participants in community irrigation schemes are women. This justifies the 
need for future research to investigate the implications of water governance systems, water 
insecurity and collective action issues on the empowerment of women and household 
welfare. It can be hypothesised that good governance systems, improved water security and 
good collective action practices positively contribute towards economic empowerment of 
women. Furthermore, the importance of social networks in water governance systems, water-
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LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Household survey questionnaire on collective action and water-use 
security, MRIS, 2013 
 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
Discipline of Agricultural Economics 
 
Note: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used 
for research purposes by staff and students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Institute of 
Natural Resources and Water Research Commission. Participation in the survey is not 
compulsory but voluntary and no financial or non-financial benefits are paid during or after 
participation.  The respondent should be the (actual) household head or any one well 
informed about the household. Participants can withdraw from the survey anytime they feel 
like doing. However, your cooperation is highly appreciated. 
Signature of interviewee: ................................................................. 
Homestead Number  Interviewee Name  
Contact Details  Interviewer:  
Date  Village Name  
Are you a scheme member?  1= Yes, 0 =No   
Block Number where plot is located  
 
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES:   
Question  Response 
A1.  Gender of household head: 1 = Male;  0= Female   
A2. Indicate the marital status of the household head 
       1: Single 2: Married 3: Divorced 4: Widowed 5: N/A (child < 16yrs) 
 
A3.  Age of the household head (years)  
A4. Household Size (Total number of household members)   
A5. Number of household members who work in the field/rear livestock (actual 
number) 
 
A6. Level of education of the household head (years attended school, including 
tertiary institution)? 
 
A7. Occupation of household head (what the household head does for a living)  











A9. Do you consider the following to be important sources of household income?  
Source of income Ranking (level of 
importance)  
1.Not involved  









How many times do you 
receive this income per 
year? e.g 3 times, 4 
times per year, etc.  
 
Irrigation Crop farming    
Rain-fed crop farming    
Livestock farming    
Family remittances    
Social Grants     
Pension    
Formal employment    
Informal employment    
 
Household asset endowments: Indicate agricultural production assets that you have access to: 
A10. Indicate production 








A11. Do you own the 
assets:  1. Yes 2. No 
A12. Quantity/ Number of items 
owned  






















9. Cattle   
10. Goats   
A13. Do you consider the production assets you have to be adequate for your Agricultural 










Give details of your household land ownership and utilisation?   
A14. 
Land type 
A15. Type of land ownership:  
1: Traditional allocation 
2. Rented-in. 
3. Other (specify)................ 
A16. 





1: Homestead garden    
2: Dry-land fields    
3: Irrigation plots inside the 
scheme 
   
4: Irrigation plots outside the 
scheme 
   
Total    
 
A18: If land is not fully utilised, give reasons: 
………………………………………………………….……………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
A19: What crops have you grown under irrigation between April 2012 and April 2013? 
a. Winter crop (April 2012-September 
2012) 










1.   1.   
2.   2   






















B: FARMERS’ INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPATE AND LEVEL OF 
PARTICIPATION IN IRRIGATION WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
 
B1: Do you benefit (including your livestock) from canal water?1= Yes; 0=. No  
B2:  Do you know of any Water User Association that represents you in your area? 1= Yes     
0 = No  
B3: Are you a member of the Association? 1= Yes; 0 = No 
 
B4. What is your current level of participation in water management structures in the 
scheme? (Circle one appropriate answer). 
0. Not participating and not willing to do so. 
1. Willing to participate but not participating.  
2. Participating as an ordinary member. 
3. Participating as a committee member 
4. Participating as a chairperson of the committee. 
 
B5.  If Not participating, give your reasons? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
B6. Due to current water leakages from the canal, which result in irrigation water shortages in 
some blocks, there might be need to improve the condition of the canal. If you are requested 
to contribute cash towards repairing the canal, how much money would you contribute per 
year before you can consider it unsustainable? (Tip: Tip: Enumerator to use the bidding game 
technique):  R  ………………………….per year. ).  
 
B7: If No OR  R0 for question B11, explain your reasons? ………………………………. 
 
B8: If a contribution would ensure reliable supply of water during the peak demand periods 
of your agricultural activities, how much would you be willing to contribute? (Tip: 
Enumerator to use the bidding game technique): R ………………………….. 
 




B10: If No OR R0 in B13, explain your answer: 
…………………………………………………………. 
B11: What is your level of involvement in the following activities for the year (April 2012 – 




Labour based participation  
B12: Canal cleaning (removing debris, overgrown grass, etc.)  
B13: Repairing broken main canals  
B14: Repairing infield canal  
B15: Repairing pump  
Financial  based participation  
B16: Contributing finance towards irrigation pump maintenance  
B17: Contributing finance towards irrigation maintenance (buying material, paying 
the maintenance people, etc.)  
 
B18: Contributing finances towards the Water Users‟ Association (WUA)  
Participation in decision making processes  
B19: Attending irrigation meetings  
B20: Attending irrigation/water related training  
B21: Giving ideas pertaining to water use and allocation in meetings  
B22: Engaging authorities regarding water issues in the area  
Information dissemination  
B23: Distributing information about water issues (written or verbal)  
B24: Helping other farmers to manage/conserve water  
Other(specify)  
Participation in regulation and control  
B25: Reporting unlawful diversion or use of water from the main canal  
B26: Reporting theft/damage of water management devices (canal gates, flow 
meters or pumps) 
 
B27: Reporting leakages along the canal for repairs  
 






Please answer the questions below. 
Questions Response 
B29: Do you have any training in irrigation water management?  
1= Received training, 0= Otherwise 
 
B30: How do you perceive water distribution among scheme members (within 
same block)? 1= Fair distribution , 0= Unfair 
 
B31: Is water supply adequate to meet your irrigation demands? 0. Poor. (not 
adequate at all)   1. Fair    2. Average 3. Good 4. Excellent (adequate) 
 
B32: Do you perceive existing committees as effective to ensure compliance to 
regulations on water users? 0. Don’t know 1. Not effective; 2. Neutral; 3. 
Effective 4. Very effective  
 
B33: Do you belong to any group/cooperative that deals with irrigation water 
management issues in the scheme?  Member = 1, Not a member =0 
 
B34. Is water supply reliable to meet your irrigation needs in the scheme?  
0. Poor. (Not reliable at all)  1. Fair    2. Average 3. Good 4. Excellent (very 
reliable) 
 
B35: Is water supply reliable to meet your agricultural needs outside the scheme? 
0. Poor. (Not reliable at all)  1. Fair    2. Average 3. Good 4. Excellent (very 
reliable)      
 
B36. Is water supply reliable to meet your non-agricultural needs outside the 
scheme ? 0. Poor. (Not reliable at all)   1. Fair    2. Average 3. Good 4. Excellent 
(very reliable)      
 
B37: How far is your homestead from the main canal?  0= (0 - 0.5km) 1= (0.6 – 
1.5km) 2= (1.6 -2.5km); 3= (2.6 -4.0km) 4= (>4km) 
 
B38: Does your participation in irrigation water management improve access to 
government support? 0. Strongly disagree 1.Disagree 2. Neutral 3. Agree 4. 
Strongly agree 
 
B39: Does your participation in irrigation management increase your feeling of 
responsibility to manage water? 0. Strongly disagree 1.Disagree 2. Neutral 3. 
Agree 4. Strongly agree 
 
B40: Does your participation in water related meetings help to lobby for local 
organisations to solve irrigation? 0. Strongly disagree 1.Disagree 2. Neutral 3. 
Agree 4. Strongly agree 
 
B41a: Do you draw water directly from the Mooi River or other nearby rivers? 
1= Yes ; 0 = No 
B41b: If yes, for what purpose: …………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 










C: INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNANCE, AND WATER ACCESS  
Question  Response 
C1: What is your level of canal water access for irrigation purposes inside the 
scheme? (Tick appropriate)      0. No access 1. Poor    2. Average 3. Good 4. 
Excellent (unlimited access)      
 
C2: What is your level of canal water access for activities outside the scheme?   
0 = No access   1.Poor    2. Average 3. Good 4. Excellent (unlimited access)      
 
 
C3a: How many days were you without irrigation water the past week?……………days 
C3b: What are the reasons for not having irrigation water? ………………………………… 
………………..………………………………………………………………………………… 
C4-13: What is the importance of the following uses of canal water to you? Please rank the 
importance on a scale of 1-5: ( 0=Don’t use the water for that purpose;  1= unimportant;  
2=don’t know; 3 = important;   4=very important )  
Water use Rank (0-4 ) 
Agricultural uses  
C4: Irrigating plots within the scheme  
C5: Irrigating plots outside the scheme (not gardens)  
C6: Irrigating homestead gardens  
C7: Watering Orchard (household fruit trees & ornamental plants)  
C8: Livestock watering   
C9: Other (Specify)  
Non-Agricultural uses  
C10: Laundry   
C11: Domestic use (Cooking, bathing, Drinking)  
C12: House construction  
C13: : Brick making  








Please answer the following questions:   
Aspect Response 
C14: What is the nearest block in which homestead is located?  
C15: Have you ever been involved in water related conflicts, with fellow 
farmers, community members or authorities? 1= Yes, 0=No 
 
C16: Are there water measurement devices at the specific diversion points where 
you get water for your irrigation? 1=Yes, 0=No 
 
C17a: Have you ever been penalised for  using water without authorisation 
1=Yes, 0 =No 
C17b: If so, what was the offence? ………………………………………………. 
C17c: What was the penalty: ………………………………………………….. 
 
C18: How many days do you irrigate per week?  
C19: Do you belong to a group/cooperative that uses canal water for its 
activities? 1. Yes, 0=No 
 
C20: Do you have any personal relations with canal rangers? 1=Yes, 0=No  
C21: Do you have any personal relations with committee members? 1. Yes 0=No  
C22: Do you have any personal relations with Indunas/Inkosi? 1.=Yes 0=No  
C23: Have you received any water management training? 1. Yes 0=No  
C24: Are you consulted when decisions that affect flow or supply of water are 
made? 0 = Never;  1. At times;  2. Regularly 
 
C25. Are you aware of what is deliberated in water related meetings by the 















 C26: Has the involvement of any of the following authorities in water management improved 
water access in your area? Rank as follows: ( 0. Never been involved; 1. No improvement 2.  
don’t know; 3. Good improvement 4. Very good improvement) 
Variable Description Rank (0-4) 
Government management  
C27: Involvement of local Department of Agriculture officials in water 
management (local managers and extension officers. 
 
C28: Involvement of government canal rangers in water allocation  
C29: Involvement of Department of Water Affairs personnel  
Local/Community management   
C30: Involvement of block committees   
C31: Involvement of ordinary non-committee members  
C32: Involvement of traditional authorities (headmen/Izindunas)  
C33: Involvement of the Water Users Association (WUAs)  
 
C34. In your opinion, would the following measures help to improve water availability 
among farmers in the scheme? 0. Strongly disagree 1.Disagree 2. Neutral 3. Agree 4. 
Strongly agree  
Management Authority Rank 
(1-5) 
C35. Water education and awareness campaigns  
C36. Empower the local Water User Association to deal with the problem  
C37. Empowerment of community to deal with water related problem  
C38. Department of Agriculture to deal with water issues in the area  
C39.. Department of Water affairs to deal with water problems in the area  
C40. Empower traditional leadership (indunas, inkosi) to deal with the problem  
C41. Empower political leadership (councillors, MPs) to deal with the problem  








C43.  Can you rank the following as they pertain to irrigation water access and water-use 
security? Use the following scores: [ 1.=  Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree 3. Neutral   
4.Agree   5. Strongly Agree] 
Variable Scale 
(1-5) 
Water distribution/sharing at farm level is fair  
Water is supplied in adequate quantities  
Water supply to my plot is reliable  
Conflict resolution mechanisms are effective  
The penalty system for non-compliance is effective  
I have the capacity to pay for infrastructure maintenance  
I often participate in infrastructure maintenance   
Management committees are effective  
I participate fully in decision making relating to water allocation in the scheme  
 
C44: If there are any additional points/issues that we didn‟t raise but you would like to raise 




THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION! 
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Appendix 2: Checklist for focus group discussions on irrigation scheme governance, 
MRIS, 2012 
 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
Discipline of Agricultural Economics 
 
The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for 
research purposes by staff and students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (School of 
Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences - Discipline of Agricultural Economics), 
Institute of Natural Resources and Water Research Commission. Participation in the survey is 
not compulsory but voluntary and no financial or non-financial benefits are paid during or 
after participation. Answers are solicited for all daily activities that the farmer performs on a 
specific crop from land preparation, planting, maintenance and marketing. 
 
Q1a: What is the irrigation water used for? (Identify other multiple uses of water which is 
meant for irrigation) 
 
Q1b.Is it clearly documented as to who should/not use canal water? Explain   
 
Q2: Do scheme members have a source for domestic water? 
 
Q3: What support (from government/private) is the scheme currently getting to improve 
water availability and usage, for agriculture Please specify the nature and source of support 
e.g. finance, training etc.       
 
Q4: Do scheme members /Irrigators pay for irrigation water? 
 
Q5: At your block, describe how water delivered to the plots? (Include source of power and 
frequency)  
 
Q6: If relevant, specify pumping costs per season/annum (or week/month): R……… 
 




Q7b: How are rules enforced? Explain using examples. 
 
Q7: Is there a Water User Association (WUA) in this area? 1: Yes 2: No 
Explain: …………………………………………………………………………………..  
 
Q8: Are members satisfied with the work being done by the WUA in your area? 1: Yes 2: No 
Explain:…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Q9. Where do members get technical maintenance support for the irrigation infrastructure? 
Explain:……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Q11. Is total amount of water used for farming measured? If so explain how? If not, how do 
irrigators ensure equitable distribution of water? 
 
Q12: Describe system of water release and allocation (who controls and enforces policies)? 
 
Q13: Is the water available for irrigation adequate for irrigation activities at the scheme?    
1: Yes 2: No 
Explain: ……………………………………………………………………………………  
    
Q14: Rank the factors that affect access to irrigation water in the scheme? 
 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree 3. Neutral  4. Agree  5. Strongly Agree  
      
Factor Ranking (1-5) 
Amount supplied not adequate  
Illegal access by non-scheme members  
Illegal access by scheme members  
Weak regulatory framework  
Absents of regulatory policies  
Leakages along the conveyance structures  
Increase in users (due to population increase and non-agric uses)  
Increase in area under irrigation (due to expansion)  
 





Appendix 3: Data collection form for water valuation, MRIS, 2013 
 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
Discipline of Agricultural Economics 
 
The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for 
research purposes by staff and students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (School of 
Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences - Discipline of Agricultural Economics), 
Institute of Natural Resources and Water Research Commission. Participation in the survey is 
not compulsory but voluntary and no financial or non-financial benefits are paid during or 
after participation. Answers are solicited for all daily activities that the farmer performs on a 
specific crop from land preparation, planting, maintenance and marketing. 
 
Household Details: 
Date  Household Number  
Farmer Name  Gender  
Age  Village  Name  
Block No  Total size of plots (ha)  
Crop  Variety  
Area planted (ha)  Date planted  
Date of first harvest  Date of final harvest  
 
 
1. How the plot was ploughed (eg. hoe, donkeys, tractor)? ……..…   Cost:  R ………… 
 
2. Seeds: were seeds kept from last year or purchased? ……… … 
 
3. If purchased, amount in grams: ….…. Where purchased? ……….. Cost: R …….. 
 


























Clearing the plot      
Planting      
Ploughing      
Weeding      
Watering      
Chemical spraying  (pests 
and diseases) 
     
Physical/Mechanical 
control of pest and disease 
control (e.g covering 
crops, hand picking of 
pests etc) 
     
Harvesting       
Canal maintenance      
Infield fallow/feeder 
maintenance 
     
Packaging      
Marketing      
Pumping labour      
Pump maintenance      
Fertiliser application      
Other (specify)      
 
6. What are your average working time for family labour in the field per day (this week)?     
Start time: ………….   Finish time: ………Total hours worked …………………..hours 
 
7. What are the average working time for hired labour in the field per day (this week)?    
 Start time: ………….   Finish time: ………….  Total hours worked ………………..hours 
 
8: What are the average irrigation hours per day (this week)?    









8. Chemicals used to control pests and diseases (within the last one week): 
Pest or disease     Name of chemical Amount (Units)    Cost 
    
    
    
    
Total  
 
9. Chemical fertilizers applied before planting:   
Name/type      Amount in kg     Cost 
   
   
Total  
 
10. Organic fertilizers applied before/after planting (eg kraal manure, compost): 
  
Type      Amount     Source Cost 
    
    
Total  
 
11. Chemical fertilizers used as top dressing: 
Name/type      Amount in kg     Cost 
   




12. Yields (The unit of measurement will vary with crop eg crates, buckets, kg, bags, heads, 
etc.) 
 Quantity Units(eg bags, buckets, etc) 
Used in farmer‟s home   
Given to others as gifts   
Used to pay workers   











12. If sales took place, to who was the crop sold? (Complete the details in table below). 
Crop……………………………………………………………. 
 
 Number of buyers Quantity(units) Price per unit 
Directly to consumers    
To hawkers    
To traders with vans / bakkies    
To shops    
Others    
Total    
    
 
13. Marketing costs  
 Costs Quantity Costs 
Travel (taxi fares/hiring)   
Materials (eg bags)   
Market research   























Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics for proxies to measure perception of water security 
 Mean Std. Dev min max 
W_DISTR 3.350 1.744 1 5 
W_ADEQ 3.150 1.739 1 5 
RELWAT 2.320 1.090 1 5 
EF_PENLT 1.725 1.722 1 5 
INV_CONF 1.890 1.210 1 5 
RELCOM 1.780 1.364 1 5 
WAT-CONS 1.101 1.293 1 5 
CAPAY 1.603 1.732 1 5 

























Appendix 5: Descriptive statistics for proxies to measure collective participation 
 Mean Std. Dev min max 
Providing labour for main canal cleaning (CANCLEN) 3.221 1.011 0 4 
Canal repairs (RPCANAL) 2.091 1.604 0 4 
Repair of infield distribution canals (INFILDCA) 2.590 1.484 0 4 
Pump repairs (REP_PUMP) 0.726 1.243 0 4 
Contribute funds for pump repairs ( FUNDPUM) 0.902 1.413 0 4 
Contribute towards Water User Association 
(FUNDWUA) 
0.782 1.085 0 4 
Attend water-related meetings (ATTMEET) 2.648 1.283 0 4 
Attend irrigation training (ATRAING) 1.596 1.448 0 4 
Participating in meetings (IDEAS_IN) 1.906 1.426 0 4 
Engage water authorities (ENGAGE) 1.638 1.325 0 4 
Disseminate water-related information (INFODISTR) 2.668 1.129 0 4 
Informally train others on water management 
(TRAINWAT) 
1.873 1.435 0 4 
Report unlawful use of water (RPT_UNLAW) 1.775 1.400 0 4 
Report equipment theft (RPT_EQUP) 1.739 1.388 0 4 
Report damages and leakages (RPT_LKGS) 2.296 1.377 0 4 
Source: Survey data (2013) 
 
